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Abstract
The duty of prudence enunciated by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 1830
in Amory v. Harvard College has come to stand as a talisman for the duties of investment man-
agers. However, the variety of arrangements that are now used to manage other people’s money
could not have been foreseen in 1830. Investment management is now subject to a collection of
largely self-contained statutory and common-law systems. Although related in principle, they dif-
fer extensively in the investment management activities they affect and in the specific obligations
they impose. Now seldom does a single statutory or common- law system cover all of an invest-
ment manager’s responsibilities, whether with respect to obtaining new business, setting proper
investment objectives, choosing particular investments or obtaining execution of its investment
decisions.
To understand modern investment management, it is necessary to deal with many and complex
rules that, at least in spirit, cross jurisdictional bounds. This Article identifies some of the several
statutory and common-law schemes directed at the regulation of investment managers and briefly
explain how each applies to matters of concern to those managers. Some of these schemes attach
to almost all managers, others only to certain types of managers and some others only to managers
serving certain types of clients.
Notwithstanding the apparently ever-expanding variety of regulatory schemes, three principles
that govern investment management law— the duty of care, the duty of loyalty and the public
duty—remain the common conduct postulates underlying investment management law. In the
fullness of time, however, the means for promoting and particulars of enforcement of fiduciary
conduct and remedying breaches were once mainly the product of common-law developments and
scholarly commentary, statutory controls and regulatory oversight in separately defined spheres
of activity now dominate. Compliance seems both to govern the boundaries of investment re-
sponsibility for investment fiduciaries and to protect against after-the-fact challenges. To be sure,
professionally indefensible investment management and classic self-dealing will likely transgress
both statutory and regulatory requirements, on the one hand, and common-law precedent, on the
other. Yet, satisfaction of legislative and administrative requirements, coupled with defined con-
tractual undertakings are so much the focus of attention that often it is lost how dependent statutory
∗This Article is based in part on the authors’ treatise HARVEY E. BINES & STEVE THEL,
INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT LAW AND REGULATION (3d ed. 2015), and the subject of
this Article is analyzed more extensively therein. Material from that treatise is reproduced herein
with the permission of the publisher. We appreciate the helpful comments of Norman Stein and
the help of the editors of the Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law.
and regulatory requirements are on the common-law history. Appreciation of this history should
promote broader recognition that planning and structuring legal responsibilities and risks associ-
ated with new or evolving investment management practices depends on engineering that crosses
jurisdictional lines.
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The duty of prudence enunciated by the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts in 1830 in Amory v. Harvard College has come to 
stand as a talisman for the duties of investment managers. However, 
the variety of arrangements that are now used to manage other 
people’s money could not have been foreseen in 1830. Investment 
management is now subject to a collection of largely self-contained 
statutory and common-law systems. Although related in principle, 
they differ extensively in the investment management activities they 
affect and in the specific obligations they impose. Now seldom does 
a single statutory or common- law system cover all of an investment 
manager’s responsibilities, whether with respect to obtaining new 
business, setting proper investment objectives, choosing particular 
investments or obtaining execution of its investment decisions. 
To understand modern investment management, it is necessary to 
deal with many and complex rules that, at least in spirit, cross 
jurisdictional bounds. This Article identifies some of the several 
statutory and common-law schemes directed at the regulation of 
investment managers and briefly explain how each applies to matters 
of concern to those managers. Some of these schemes attach to 
almost all managers, others only to certain types of managers and 
some others only to managers serving certain types of clients. 
Notwithstanding the apparently ever-expanding variety of regulatory 
schemes, three principles that govern investment management law—
the duty of care, the duty of loyalty and the public duty—remain the 
common conduct postulates underlying investment management law. 
In the fullness of time, however, the means for promoting and 
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measuring fiduciary conduct have changed remarkably. Whereas the 
particulars of enforcement of fiduciary conduct and remedying 
breaches were once mainly the product of common-law 
developments and scholarly commentary, statutory controls and 
regulatory oversight in separately defined spheres of activity now 
dominate. Compliance seems both to govern the boundaries of 
investment responsibility for investment fiduciaries and to protect 
against after-the-fact challenges. To be sure, professionally 
indefensible investment management and classic self-dealing will 
likely transgress both statutory and regulatory requirements, on the 
one hand, and common-law precedent, on the other. Yet, satisfaction 
of legislative and administrative requirements, coupled with defined 
contractual undertakings are so much the focus of attention that often 
it is lost how dependent statutory and regulatory requirements are on 
the common-law history. Appreciation of this history should 
promote broader recognition that planning and structuring legal 
responsibilities and risks associated with new or evolving investment 
management practices depends on engineering that crosses 
jurisdictional lines. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1830, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts addressed 
the question of whether a trustee may invest in the common stock of 
manufacturing companies in Harvard College v. Amory.1 The holding 
may have been less important than the way the court explained it: 
Do what you will, the capital is at hazard. . . . All that can be 
required of a trustee to invest, is, that he shall conduct himself 
faithfully and exercise a sound discretion. He is to observe how men 
of prudence, discretion and intelligence manage their own affairs, 
not in regard to speculation, but in regard to the permanent 
disposition of their funds, considering the probable income, as well 
as the probable safety of the capital to be invested.2 
Harvard College has come to stand as a talisman for the duties of 
investment managers. However, the variety of arrangements that are 
now used to manage other people’s money could not have been foreseen 
in 1830. Indeed, since then, the institutionalization of professionalized 
investment management has changed the very nature of American 
capitalism.3 
Over time, investment management has become subject to a 
collection of largely self-contained statutory and common-law systems. 
Although related in principle, they differ extensively in the investment 
management activities they affect and in the specific obligations they 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Harvard College v. Amory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446, 454 (1830). 
 2. Id. at 461. 
 3. See, e.g., Robert Charles Clark, The Four Stages of Capitalism: Reflections on 
Investment Management Treatises, 94 HARV. L. REV. 561 (1981). 
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impose. Now seldom does a single statutory or common-law system 
cover all of an investment manager’s responsibilities, whether with 
respect to obtaining new business, setting proper investment objectives, 
choosing particular investments or obtaining execution of its investment 
decisions. 
In view of the diversity and cross-jurisdictional reach of these 
statutory and common-law schemes, investment managers need to 
understand how each connects with the investment management 
activities it regulates. Knowing the various systems by which investment 
management is regulated simplifies identification of the controls that 
might be imposed in any case. It may be that: 
[T]he legal rules governing financial intermediaries are so many and 
so complex that no one can hope to know them all in the detail and 
timeliness that a seasoned practitioner advising only one kind of 
intermediary would desire. Even to gain a thorough grasp of the 
legal structure of one kind of intermediary seems to preclude, or at 
least to make very difficult, a sophisticated grasp of the ideas and 
information supplied by other disciplines, such as modern finance 
theory.4 
To understand modern investment management, it is nonetheless 
necessary to deal with many and complex rules that, at least in spirit, 
cross-jurisdictional bounds. In this Article, we identify some of the 
several statutory and common-law schemes directed at the regulation of 
investment managers and briefly explain how each applies to matters of 
concern to those managers. We also discuss recent controversies about 
investment management law, including some that have yet to be 
resolved. These often highlight contemporary disagreement about long-
standing practices and principles, even when these have ended with 
regulatory initiatives being quashed. 
I. COMMON-LAW REGULATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
MANAGER AND CLIENT 
Almost all investment management relationships are the product of 
an express contract or an instrument creating a trust. A contract to 
provide management services triggers agency law; a trust instrument 
                                                                                                                 
 4. Id. at 582. 
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triggers trust law. Even where an investment management arrangement 
is not documented, however, either agency or trust doctrine governs the 
acts of the manager. Together, agency and trust law cover every 
investment management service for which an investment manager 
expressly or impliedly has any discretion to act on behalf of and bind a 
client or beneficiary. 
A. TRUST RELATIONSHIPS 
A trust is a relationship in which legal title to property resides in 
one party who is subject to equitable duties to deal with the property for 
the benefit of another.5 Individuals, partnerships, associations, and 
corporations may all assume the office of trustee.6 Compensation for 
assuming the duties of trustee is not required, although a trustee is 
assumed to be entitled to reasonable compensation unless a provision to 
the contrary appears in the trust instrument or the trustee otherwise 
agrees to forgo compensation.7 Once engaged in administering the trust, 
                                                                                                                 
 5. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (AM. LAW. INST. 2003) (“Definition of 
Trust”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 348 (AM. LAW. INST. 1959) 
(“Definition of Charitable Trust”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §28 (“Charitable 
Purposes”). 
 6. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 32-33. The general principle is that 
natural persons can hold property in trust and administer it to the extent they could if 
they owned the property beneficially. A corporation, association, partnership or other 
entity can administer a trust only to the extent permitted by state or federal law. 
Although a corporate trustee has the same responsibilities as an individual trustee with 
respect to performing or delegating the administration of the trust, a corporation may 
properly administer the trust through its directors, officers and appropriate employees. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 80 cmt. d (AM. LAW. INST. 2007). Use of common 
trust funds is supported under state laws either by special systems of statutory and 
administrative regulation or by enabling legislation (usually the Uniform Common 
Trust Fund Act) that relies essentially on Regulation 9 of the U.S. Comptroller of the 
Currency, 12 C.F.R. Part 9, to govern the operation of these bank funds. Some statutes 
also authorize the creation of mutual investment companies, in the shares of which 
participating banks and trust companies may invest the funds of individual trusts under 
their administration. These various practices are intended to facilitate economical fund 
management and diversification of investments for small trusts and, in some states, for 
small corporate trustees. On the use of common trust funds, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. m, and the reporter’s notes thereto. 
 7. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 38; UNIF. TRUST CODE § 708 (UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 2000). In some jurisdictions, trustee compensation is determined by statute. 
The English rule is that a trustee is not entitled to compensation unless the terms of the 
 
76 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXI 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
the trustee assumes the duties determined by the terms of the trust 
instrument, plus all general duties normally incident to trusteeship 
except those expressly excluded by the trust instrument.8 Those duties 
normally incident to the trust include loyalty,9 administration,10 fair 
dealing among beneficiaries and between beneficiaries and 
remaindermen,11 and, with respect to the selection of investments, the 
duty to invest prudently.12 
                                                                                                                 
trust provide otherwise. See 5 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT, WILLIAM FRANKLIN 
FRATCHER & MARK L. ASCHER, SCOTT & ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 21.1 (5th ed. 2006); 
HARVEY E. BINES & STEVE THEL, INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT LAW AND REGULATION § 
5.03 (3d ed. 2015) (compensation of investment managers). Note that restrictive 
compensation rules may pressure investment managers to increase their revenues 
through additional services to their managed accounts. The provision of these extra 
services can create conflicts of interest that are more subversive of an account’s net 
return than higher management fees would be. Before active cash management became 
customary, for example, the efficiency with which a trust officer in a bank managed the 
uninvested cash of its trust accounts sometimes depended on whether the fees for trust 
management provided enough independent compensation to enable the trust department 
to retain the personnel necessary to use uninvested cash effectively by removing it from 
commercial department time and demand deposits and investing it in more productive 
short-term debt instruments. See, e.g., EDWARD S. HERMAN, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST, 
COMMERCIAL BANK TRUST DEPARTMENTS: REPORT TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND 
STEERING COMMITTEE ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN THE SECURITIES MARKETS 
(Twentieth Century Fund 1975). As another example, the power to hire an associated 
adviser raises the question of whether the adviser should be paid by the trustee or the 
trust. See UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 709 (“Reimbursement of Expenses”), 807 (“Delegation 
by Trustee”), 816(15) (expenses of administration); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TRUSTS § 90, cmt. m & reporter’s notes. Compare Stillman v. Watkins, 325 N.E.2d 
294, 295 (Mass. App. Ct. 1975) (trustee not empowered to compensate retained 
investment adviser from estate), with Chase v. Pevear, 419 N.E.2d 1358, 1364-65 
(Mass. 1981) (trustee, who took no fee, properly retained his firm as investment adviser 
for its customary fee). 
 8. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 70, 85. 
 9. Id. § 78. 
 10. Id. §§ 80, 90, 91. A trustee may not properly commit the entire administration 
of the trust to an agent, cotrustee, or other person, unless permitted to do so by the 
terms of the trust. Id. § 80; see also id. §§ 39, 81. If there are several trustees, each is 
under a duty to the beneficiaries to participate in the administration of the trust and to 
use reasonable care to prevent a co-trustee from committing a breach of trust, and if 
necessary to compel a cotrustee to redress a breach of trust. Id. § 81. 
 11. Id. §§ 79, 90, 109-111. 
 12. Id. § 90 (the “Prudent Investor Rule”). The Prudent Investor Rule applies the 
prudence norm to investing and managing the trust assets. See BINES & THEL, supra 
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Institutional trusts, such as the endowments of educational and 
charitable organizations, often receive special treatment. Unlike 
individual trusts, they rarely involve remaindermen who can realistically 
expect to receive trust assets.13 Moreover, they are usually larger than 
individual trusts and hence more likely to rely upon professional 
assistance in managing their investments. These characteristics of 
institutional trusts often raise problems concerning the delegation of 
investment responsibility and the application of capital gains and 
income to preservation of the trust corpus or to current expenses.14 As a 
result, state law in most jurisdictions treats institutional trusts differently 
from individual trusts. Many states, for example, have adopted the 
Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act15 or its replacement, 
the Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act, both of 
which are discussed below. In general, they permit both delegation of 
investment management and the expenditure of capital appreciation,16 
                                                                                                                 
note 7, at § 8.03. The prudent investing standards of Section 90 are codified in the 
UNIF. PRUDENT INV’R ACT § 7, 7B U.L.A. 16 (Supp. 1995), the UNIF. MGMT. PUB. EMP. 
RET. SYS. ACT § 7 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1997), and in comparable nonuniform 
legislation. For a discussion, see John H. Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act 
and the Future of Trust Investing, 81 IOWA L. REV. 641 (1996). 
 13. See Saint Joseph’s Hosp. v. Bennett, 22 N.E.2d 305, 306 (N.Y. 1939) (defining 
an endowment as money permanently bestowed, “the income of which is to be used in 
the administration of a proposed work”); cf. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 103 cmt. (“The great 
majority of the Code’s provisions apply to both charitable and noncharitable trusts 
without distinction. The distinctions between the two types of trusts are found in the 
requirements relating to trust creation and modification.”). 
 14. See WILLIAM L. CARY & CRAIG B. BRIGHT, THE LAW AND THE LORE OF 
ENDOWMENT FUNDS (1969) [hereinafter, CARY & BRIGHT, ENDOWMENT FUNDS]; 
WILLIAM L. CARY & CRAIG B. BRIGHT, THE DEVELOPING LAW OF ENDOWMENT FUNDS: 
“THE LAW AND THE LORE” REVISITED (1974) [hereinafter, CARY & BRIGHT, 
ENDOWMENT FUNDS REVISITED]; see also William L. Cary & Craig B. Bright, The 
Delegation of Investment Responsibility for Endowment Funds, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 207 
(1974). As a general matter, the trustee cannot properly commit the entire 
administration of the trust to an agent, co-trustee, or other person, unless permitted to 
do so by the terms of the trust. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 80. If there are 
several trustees, each is under a duty to the beneficiaries to participate in the 
administration of the trust and to use reasonable care to prevent a co-trustee from 
committing a breach of trust, and if necessary to compel a co-trustee to redress a breach 
of trust. Id. 
 15. The Act was approved in 1972 largely in response to the arguments of Cary & 
Bright. See CARY & BRIGHT, ENDOWMENT FUNDS, supra note 14. 
 16. UNIF. MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT §§ 2, 5 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF 
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1972) (repealed 2006); UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. 
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and are supportive of trustees seeking more discretion in applying 
endowment-fund assets to current expenditures and retaining 
professional investment management services than traditional trust law 
may permit. Nonetheless, they still require the exercise of ordinary skill 
and care,17 and the allowance of discretion carries with it the risk of 
liability.18 
                                                                                                                 
OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT §§ 4, 5 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON 
UNIF. STATE LAWS 2006). 
 17. UNIF. MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 6 (requiring “ordinary business 
care and prudence”); UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 3. The 
Commissioners’ comment to Section 6 of the Uniform Management of Institutional 
Funds Act stated: 
Officers of a corporation owe a duty of care and loyalty to the 
corporation, and the more intimate the knowledge of the affairs of 
the corporation the higher the standard of care. . . . This is a proper 
standard for the managers of a nonprofit institution, whether or not it 
is incorporated. 
UNIF. MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 6 cmt. In Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat’l 
Training Sch. for Deaconesses and Missionaries, 381 F. Supp. 1003 (D.D.C. 1974), the 
court held that trustees of a charitable corporation owe a higher duty of care with 
respect to management of investments than do corporate investors in matters of 
judgment, the standard applicable to trustees being mere negligence. Stern raised 
questions both of mismanagement and self-dealing. For a useful analysis of the 
practical application of Stern, see Myles L. Mace & Charles T. Stewart, From the 
Boardroom: Standards of Care for Trustees, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1976, at 14-
16, 21, 24, 28, 148. 
 18. The Prudent Investor Rule creates greater (not less) potential for liability, to the 
extent it imposes higher investment standards for fiduciaries than did the prior system 
of laws. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90. There is clearly no longer a safe 
harbor or a statutory list of safe investments in which a fiduciary can invest. Instead, the 
Prudent Investor Rule emphasizes diversification and thoughtful analysis—and 
reanalysis—of the performance of a portfolio in relation to the objectives of the 
account. The damage provisions of Section 100 of the Third Restatement exacerbate 
this exposure, since they measure damages for a breach of trust by constructing a 
hypothetical portfolio and then calculating how that portfolio would have grown over 
the period in question. Id. § 100. Although this theory also allows for the possibility 
that the hypothetical portfolio would drop in value, this affords small comfort in light of 
the historical upward trend in asset prices, especially since breaching trustees are 
subject to the argument that prudent investing would have produced less of a loss. 
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B. AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS 
An agency relationship is created when one party, the principal, 
manifests assent to another party, the agent, that the agent shall act on 
the principal’s behalf and subject to its control, and the agent assents or 
otherwise consents so to act.19 Any person or entity legally empowered 
to contract may be an agent.20 An investment management arrangement 
that is not a trust thus subjects the manager to the constraints of the 
common law of agency. Unless otherwise agreed, principals are 
obligated to compensate their agents for the services they provide, but 
compensation is not required to create an agency relationship.21 
Consequently, agency law would apply, for example, to voluntary 
investment management services provided by an eleemosynary 
institution.22 
Agents owe duties of loyalty, care, competence and diligence to 
their principals.23 The Restatement (Second) of Agency (which has been 
replaced by the Restatement (Third)), separately addressed the duties of 
investment managers, and specified three general duties they owe 
investors in selecting investments: 
 
(1) To invest promptly; 
(2) To invest prudently; and 
(3) To shift investments according to changes in the safety of 
existing investments or the needs of the investor.24 
 
In addition to these specific duties, agency law imposes on 
investment managers the other duties normally incident to an agency 
relationship. Thus, an investment manager owes its client duties of 
                                                                                                                 
 19. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. LAW. INST. 2006). 
 20. Id. § 3.05. A person acting as agent can bind the principal to a third party even 
though, due to an incapacity, the agent cannot be held to fiduciary duties. Id. 
 21. Id. § 8.13 cmt. d. Consideration is not a necessary element of an agency 
relationship either, nor is it necessary that there be an actual contract. Id. at §§ 1.01 cmt. 
d, 7.07 cmt. f. 
 22. Many nonprofit institutions are operated as charitable trusts. Although the 
general trust rule is that despite a trustee’s authority to appoint agents, trustees may not 
delegate investment management authority, it is now recognized (and legislatively 
affirmed) that trustees of nonprofit institutions may delegate such authority to 
professional investment managers. See supra notes 8, 9, 17 and accompanying text. 
 23. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 8.01-8.12. 
 24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 425 (AM. LAW. INST. 1958). 
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service and obedience,25 loyalty,26 and any additional duties imposed by 
the investment contract.27 Agency law is ancient doctrine, and, as a 
result, has a well-developed scheme of liabilities and remedies.28 Absent 
contrary contractual arrangements that a court will enforce, they all 
apply to investment management relationships that are not purely trusts 
in nature. 
II. REGULATION BY TYPE OF TRANSACTION: THE GENERALLY 
APPLICABLE ANTIFRAUD PROVISIONS OF THE FEDERAL SECURITIES 
LAWS 
The antifraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 (the 
“Securities Act”) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 
“Exchange Act”) apply broadly to a variety of activities in which 
investment managers engage. These provisions are triggered by the 
activity of the manager rather than anything deriving peculiarly from the 
fact of investment management. That is, the activities to be regulated 
taken together may represent an investment management relationship, 
but the antifraud provisions themselves apply to each of these activities 
severally, and without regard to whether the actor is acting for his own 
or a managed account. If the existence of investment management is 
relevant at all, it is only to strengthen the resolve of a reviewing 
authority to insist on a high degree of fairness toward a client.29 
The general antifraud provisions from which the federal courts and 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) derive open-
ended authority to regulate securities practices are Section 17(a)30 of the 
Securities Act, and Sections 10(b)31 and 15(c)32 of the Exchange Act. 
                                                                                                                 
 25. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 8.01-8.06. 
 26. Id. §§ 8.02-8.06. 
 27. Id. § 8.07. 
 28. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY. Depending on the injury, a 
principal may sue in law or in equity. The principal’s choice of remedies is broadest for 
breaches of duty of loyalty. See id. §§ 8.01 cmt. d, 8.02-8.06. 
 29. See, e.g., Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167, 1170-73 (2d Cir. 
1970) (broker-dealer, complying with rules in disclosing principal status, held liable to 
customer relying on its recommendations and advice for failing to disclose status as 
market-maker). 
 30. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2012). 
 31. Id. § 78j(b). 
 32. Id. § 78o(c). 
2016]    THE VARIETIES OF INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT LAW 81 
Although they are similar in the non-distinct character of their reach, 
they are different in certain respects that can affect their application in a 
given case: 
 
(1) Both Sections 17(a) and 10(b) apply to “any person.” Section 
15(c) applies only to brokers, dealers, and municipal securities dealers. 
(2) Section 10(b), and its primary implementing regulation, Rule 
10b-5, proscribe manipulative and fraudulent practices “in connection 
with the purchase or sale of any security.” Section 17(a) applies to such 
practices “in the offer or sale of any securities.” This means a trade must 
take place to trigger Section 10(b),33 whereas an offer to sell is enough 
under Section 17(a). On the other hand, Section 17(a) does not reach 
fraud in a purchase, whereas Sections 10(b) and 15(c) do.34 
(3) Section 17(a) of the Securities Act and Section 15(c) of the 
Exchange Act are self-executing, whereas Section 10(b) must be 
implemented by rule. Section 15(c)(1) also authorizes the SEC to 
promulgate rules defining manipulative and deceptive contrivances, and 
section 15(c)(2) authorizes it to adopt rules reasonably designed to 
prevent fraud, both of which powers are more extensive than those 
under Section 10(b). Rules 10b-5 and 15c1-235 substantially incorporate 
the language of Section 17(a). 
(4) The Supreme Court has held that scienter is an element of 
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5.36 Scienter is required 
only under the first clause of section 17(a) of the Securities Act, but not 
under the other two clauses.37 All courts of appeal that have considered 
the matter have held that recklessness is sufficient to satisfy the scienter 
requirement.38 
                                                                                                                 
 33. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731-34 (1975). 
 34. On the relation between Section 17 and Rule 10b-5, see Steve Thel, Taking 
Section 10(b) Seriously: Criminal Enforcement of SEC Rules, 2014 COLUM. BUS. L. 
REV. 1 (2014). 
 35. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c1-2 (2015). 
 36. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 689-95 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 
U.S. 185 (1976). 
 37. Aaron, 446 U.S. at 695-97. 
 38. See, e.g., Meadows v. SEC, 119 F.3d 1219, 1226-27 (5th Cir. 1997); 
McDonald v. Alan Bush Brokerage Co., 863 F.2d 809, 814-15 (11th Cir. 1989); 
Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114, 1117-18 (10th Cir. 1982); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman 
Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 44-47 (2d Cir. 1978). The leading description of 
recklessness is “extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care . . . .” 
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Although the antifraud provisions are transaction-oriented, they can 
apply to a course of dealing. With respect to investment management 
relationships in particular, a management arrangement may be deemed a 
statutory investment contract, and hence a statutory security.39 In that 
event, the activities leading to the creation of an investment 
management relationship and the circumstances under which it is carried 
out would be both “an offer of” a security and “in connection with” the 
purchase or sale of a security, and thus, the antifraud provisions would 
be available as a regulatory tool. Even if an investment management 
arrangement is not deemed a statutory investment contract, Section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 may nonetheless apply to a manager’s activities. 
Since one of the functions of investment management is expert 
assistance in selecting suitable securities, the very existence of a 
management arrangement suggests a connection with the purchase or 
sale of securities. Thus, Rule 10b-5 applies to the marketing of 
management services,40 suitability determinations,41 investment 
recommendations,42 and execution practices.43 While Rule 10b-5 has 
been the primary federal law vehicle for imposing obligations on broker-
dealers in dealing with their customers, as discussed below, the SEC is 
now considering imposing fiduciary-like duties on broker-dealers who 
provide personalized investment advice.44 
The antifraud provisions may create special problems for 
investment managers in two respects. The first concerns the enforcement 
of a client’s rights against persons other than the manager. The law of 
trusts and the law of agency require trustees and agents to protect the 
legal rights of beneficiaries and principals, at least by informing them 
that legal steps may be available.45 An investment manager, having 
                                                                                                                 
McDonald, 863 F.2d at 814. See generally NORMAN S. POSER, BROKER DEALER LAW & 
REGULATION § 3.01[D][4] (2d ed. 2001). 
 39. See BINES & THEL, supra note 7, at § 3.03. 
 40. See id. at § 3.02. 
 41. See id. at § 4.01[B]. 
 42. See id. at § 8.02[B][2][b]. 
 43. See id. at §§ 11.02[C], 11.02[D], 11.03. 
 44. See infra Part IV.B.2; cf. Labaty v. UWT, Inc., No. SA-13-CV-389-XR, 2015 
WL 4716087 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 7, 2015) (RICO). 
 45. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.11 (AM. LAW INST. 2006); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 76, 78, 82 (AM. LAW INST. 2007); see also 
Auchincloss & Lawrence Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 
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expertise in the operation of the securities markets and the application of 
securities laws, may be under an obligation to use reasonable diligence 
to identify and preserve the legal rights of its managed accounts, 
particularly where the client is unsophisticated with respect to these 
matters. The second concerns the antifraud provisions that may create 
obligations that override a manager’s common-law fiduciary obligations 
to its clients. A manager may not use inside information unlawfully 
simply because of its duty to its clients.46 Also, a manager may have 
conflicting fiduciary obligations if it manages a number of accounts or 
acts as agent for both parties to a transaction. In that event, the manager 
is under a duty of fair dealing to both clients, and cannot cite fiduciary 
obligation to one as an excuse for ignoring fiduciary obligation to the 
other.47 
The antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act are supplemented by 
two provisions that, although transaction-oriented, deal with the 
substance of investment management issues far more narrowly than do 
the antifraud provisions. Section 11(a) of the Act requires consent and 
                                                                                                                 
¶¶ 79,762, 79,686 (1974) (exculpatory language must be removed from advisory 
contract which might be construed to relieve adviser from fiduciary duty); Mennen v. 
Wilmington Trust Co., No. 8432-ML, 2015 WL 1914599 (Del. Ch. Master’s Report, 
Apr. 24, 2015) (however broad, exculpatory clause cannot excuse bad faith or flagrant 
self-dealing), adopted by No. 8432-VCL, 2015 WL 4935373 (Del. Ch. Aug. 18, 2015). 
 46. Broker-dealers and investment advisers must establish, maintain and enforce 
written policies and procedures reasonably designed to prevent the misuse of material 
nonpublic information by persons associated with them. Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 § 15(g), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(g) (2012); Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 204A, 15 
U.S.C. § 80b-4a; see also Securities Exchange Act § 21A, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1 (control 
person liability); 12 C.F.R. § 9.5(b) (2015) (“A national bank exercising fiduciary 
powers shall adopt and follow written policies and procedures adequate to maintain its 
fiduciary activities in compliance with applicable law. Among other relevant matters, 
the policies and procedures should address, where appropriate, the bank’s . . . [m]ethods 
for ensuring that fiduciary officers and employees do not use material inside 
information in connection with any decision or recommendation to purchase or sell any 
security . . . .”); In re Investors Mgmt. Co., Exchange Act Release No. 9267 (July 29, 
1971), [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 78,163; In re 
Oppenheimer & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 12319 (April 2, 1976), [1975-1976 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 80,551. But cf. MELANIE L. FEIN, 
SECURITIES ACTIVITIES OF BANKS § 5.04[B] (3d ed. 2000); Frigitemp Corp. v. Fin. 
Dynamics Fund, Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 94,907 
(S.D.N.Y. 1974). 
 47. See BINES & THEL, supra note 7, at § 10.06[D]; see also RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. c (“Prudent Investor Rule”). 
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reporting for combined institutional brokerage and management for 
certain transactions on national securities exchanges. Section 28(e) 
enables investment managers to pay excess commissions for 
supplementary services. Ostensibly added to federal law to ameliorate 
perceived conflicts of interest, Sections 11(a) and 28(e) have a complex 
genesis that was heavily connected to the transition from fixed to 
negotiated commission rates.48 
III. REGULATION BY TYPE OF CLIENT 
Several statutes, discussed below, regulate investment management 
activities only for specific types of clients deemed worthy of extra 
concern as a matter of public policy. The principal effect of these 
statutes is to create rules of compliance and prohibitions or restrictions 
on conduct that apply only to statutory clients (though, of course, such 
rules, prohibitions, and limitations have been used as models for 
standards to be imposed under other statutory and common-law 
schemes). This is not to say that these statutes are entirely technical in 
character. On the contrary, they impose obligations that are as open-
ended and indefinite as the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act and 
the Exchange Act. The distinction is that these statutes apply only to 
statutory clients and their managers. Investment managers may fail to 
consider the possibility that their clients are the beneficiaries of special 
statutory protections, and indeed management activities may themselves 
create such clients. Thus, even though the status of a client may be clear 
in most cases, errors on the issue resulting in regulatory action occur 
often enough to underline the hazard of providing investment 
management for a client that is an inadvertent statutory client. 
                                                                                                                 
 48. See BINES & THEL, supra note 7, at §§ 9.01-11.03. Investment management 
activities are also subject to the antifraud provisions of state Blue Sky legislation and 
other legislation, which, as a refinement of common-law deceit and unfair competition, 
can apply to securities transactions. As a general rule, the federal antifraud provisions 
are broader than state provisions, but state law has become increasingly responsive to 
securities matters, especially with respect to investment management activities. See 
Antifraud Initiatives, 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 57,217; JOSEPH C. LONG, BLUE SKY 
LAW § 6:6 (CCH 2002). 
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A. PUBLICLY OWNED CORPORATE INVESTORS: THE INVESTMENT 
COMPANY ACT OF 1940 
The Investment Company Act of 1940 (the “Investment Company 
Act”)49 is a comprehensive statute that regulates publicly owned 
corporate investors and face-amount certificate companies. Because they 
occupy the dominant position in the pooled-agency account market, 
however, open-end investment companies (mutual funds) and closed-
end investment companies have been the principal objects of regulation 
under this statute. Usually organized as specialized corporations or 
business trusts, these companies buy and sell securities and commodities 
in accordance with investment programs previously constructed by their 
promoters. Typically, external advisers handle their selection of 
investments and their trading activities, though in some cases investment 
management is an internal operation conducted by officers and 
employees of the company. In any event, either because of their 
occasional notoriety or because so many of their activities are a matter 
of public record, given their role as repositories mostly of the savings 
and retirement of individual investors, investment companies have been 
responsible for much legislative and regulatory activity not only in 
connection with administration of the Investment Company Act, but also 
with respect to the administration of other securities laws. 
The Investment Company Act defines an investment adviser to a 
registered investment company in Section 2(a)(20).50 The definition 
includes anyone regularly furnishing the company advice concerning 
investments in securities and other property, anyone empowered to 
determine the securities to be bought or sold by the company, and 
anyone under contract with a statutory investment adviser to perform 
substantially all duties of the adviser. The most serious danger facing 
one not deliberately evading regulation under the Investment Company 
Act is that it will provide sufficient advisory assistance to a statutory 
investment adviser that it is brought within Section 2(a)(20).51 
Another difficult area concerns changes in the composition of the 
investment adviser. Assignment of the investment advisory contract 
                                                                                                                 
 49. Investment Company Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 789 (codified 
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64). 
 50. Investment Company Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(20). 
 51. See, e.g., Lutz v. Boas, 171 A.2d 381, 388-90 (Del. Ch. 1961) (holding that a 
broker-dealer to whom the advisers of an investment company delegated responsibility 
for selecting securities for the company’s portfolio was a statutory investment adviser). 
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terminates the contract.52 Thus, one assuming investment management 
duties for an investment company must be properly approved or qualify 
for one of the exclusions in Section 2(a)(20).53 
                                                                                                                 
 52. See Investment Company Act § 15(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a)(4). When an 
investment advisory agreement is assigned, the item of value being transferred is the 
discounted value of the advisory fee over the life of the fund. Complaining mutual fund 
shareholders sometimes asserted that this value belonged to them, and that the fund’s 
directors should use it as a means to buy less expensive advice. See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. 
Black, 445 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir. 1971), superseded by statute, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-15(f), as 
recognized in Meyer v. Oppenheimer Mgmt. Corp., 895 F.2d 861, 865 (2d Cir. 1990). 
But see SEC v. Ins. Sec., Inc., 254 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1958); Kukman v. Baum, 346 F. 
Supp. 55 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (profits above book value realized on sale of the advisory 
office do not involve a breach of fiduciary duty under the Investment Company Act); 
see also Sec. Mgmt. & Research, Inc., [1969-1973 Transfer Binder] (CCH) Mut. Funds 
Guide ¶ 9400 (1971); Lexington Research Fund, Inc., [1969-1973 Transfer Binder] 
(CCH) Mut. Funds Guide ¶ 9258 (1971). In response to Rosenfeld, Section 28(1) of the 
Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. 94-29 (June 4, 1975), amended Section 
15(f) of the Investment Company Act to permit transfer of an interest in the advisory 
office if certain statutory conditions are met. See Wexler v. Equitable Capital Mgmt. 
Corp., [1993-1994 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 98,118 at 98,924 
(S.D.N.Y. 1994); 7 LOUIS LOSS, JOEL SELIGMAN & TROY PAREDES, SECURITIES 
REGULATION § 8[C][4] (4th ed. 2006). In connection with Citigroup’s plan to transfer 
management of certain closed-end investment companies to Legg Mason, Inc., in return 
for certain Legg Mason assets, the New York Exchange ruled that shareholder approval 
of a new investment adviser agreement is not a routine matter, so that brokers may not 
vote shares on account of holders who do not give instructions. See Angela Pruitt, 
Citigroup Dealt Blow on Asset Swap, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 2005, at C15. 
  Investment Company Act Rule 2a-6, 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-6 (2015), provides 
that a transaction that would not result in the change of actual control of management of 
an investment adviser or principal underwriter of an investment company is not an 
“assignment” terminating an investment advisory or underwriting contract. Rule 15a-4, 
17 C.F.R. § 270.15a-4, allows a person to act as an investment adviser to an investment 
company, under certain circumstances, for an interim period without prior shareholder 
approval. See generally Timothy P. Harris & Marc C. Cozzolino, Change of Control 
and Contract Assignment: Ramifications for Investment Advisers and Investment 
Companies, 5 INV. LAW. 1 (Apr. 1998). 
 53. Excluded are persons distributing their publications to subscribers, persons 
providing statistical information without regularly furnishing advice or making 
recommendations concerning specific securities, persons compensated under the 
supervision of a court, and persons excluded by rule or regulation. See Investment 
Company Act § 2(a)(20), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2(a)(20). None of these exclusions would 
ordinarily apply to an assignment, defined in Section 2(a)(4), to include “any direct or 
indirect transfer or hypothecation of a contract . . . or of a controlling block of the 
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As serious as mistaking one’s status as a statutory investment 
adviser is the possibility of unwittingly providing investment 
management services to a client that should register as a statutory 
investment company. Section 3(a) of the Investment Company Act,54 the 
statutory definition of investment company, is broad enough to include 
every organization engaged in investing at least forty percent of its 
assets in the securities of other issuers.55 In fact, Sections 3(a)(1) and 
3(b)(1) also capture so-called “inadvertent” and “transient” investment 
companies and parent/subsidiary arrangements. For companies not 
holding securities primarily for passive investment, regulatory relief is 
essential.56 Section 3(b)57 excludes certain holding companies, and 
                                                                                                                 
assignor’s outstanding voting securities . . . .” Investment Company Act § 2(a)(4), 15 
U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(4). 
  Ironically, the Investment Company Act’s strictness with respect to assignment 
and approval of the advisory contract made it extremely difficult for a statutory 
company to rid itself of an unsatisfactory adviser and hire a new one. Section 15(a) 
makes it unlawful to serve as a statutory investment adviser except “pursuant to a 
written contract, which . . . has been approved by the vote of a majority of the 
outstanding voting securities of such . . . company . . . .” Investment Company Act § 
15(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a). Thus, except when the SEC obtained the appointment of a 
receiver (see 15 U.S.C. § 80a-41(e)), an investment company had to obtain an 
exemption under Section 6(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-6(c), to permit an interim adviser to 
serve. Rule 15a-4, 17 C.F.R. § 270.15a-4, allows engagement of an investment adviser 
for up to 150 days under an interim contract that maximizes compensation of the 
interim adviser at the level received by the previous adviser, receiving board approval, 
including a majority of disinterested directors and, in the case of termination by 
assignment (see BINES & THEL, supra note 7, at § 8.02[B][2][b]), incorporates 
additional restrictions. 
 54. Investment Company Act § 3(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a). 
 55. See SEC v. Nat’l Presto Indus., 486 F.3d 305 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding that an 
operating company was not an inadvertent investment company). 
 56. For example, companies organized with multiple subsidiaries may not qualify 
for the exemption provided in Section 3(b)(1) and, case-by-case must apply for an 
exemptive order under Section 3(b)(2). Also, in a sale of substantially all of a 
company’s assets, where the consideration is paid in securities of the buyer, the 
transaction could convert an operating company into an investment company. Three 
rules under the Investment Company Act, reflecting previous orders of exemption and 
no-action assurances, deem certain issuers not to be investment companies. Rule 3a-1, 
17 C.F.R. § 270.3a-1, is a “safe harbor” rule which deems certain “prima facie 
investment companies” having more than forty percent of their assets invested in 
investment securities not to be investment companies. This relief is conditioned upon 
such a company’s having no more than forty-five percent of the value of its total assets 
(exclusive of government securities and cash items) consisting of and receiving no 
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Section 3(c)58 contains special exclusions for various defined 
organizations. 
                                                                                                                 
more than forty-five percent of its net income after taxes from securities other than: (1) 
government securities; (2) securities issued by employees’ securities companies; (3) 
securities issued by certain majority-owned subsidiaries of the issuer that are not 
investment companies; and (4) securities issued by certain controlled companies 
through which an issuer engages in a noninvestment company business. Rule 3a-2, 17 
C.F.R. § 270.3a-2, relates to “transient investment companies,” deeming an issuer not 
to be engaged in securities activities for purposes of Section 3(a)(1) or Section 3(a)(3) 
of the Investment Company Act during a period of time not to exceed one year, 
provided the issuer has a bona fide intent to be engaged primarily, as soon as is 
reasonably possible, in a business other than that of investing, reinvesting, owning, 
holding, or trading in securities. This intent must be evidenced by the company’s 
business activities and an appropriate resolution of the issuer’s board of directors or 
persons performing similar functions. Rule 3a-2 may not be relied on by an issuer more 
frequently than once during any three-year period. Rule 3a-3, 17 C.F.R. § 270.3a-3, is 
another safe harbor deeming certain issuers having corporate parents as not being 
investment companies for purposes of the Act, provided that the parent and its 
subsidiary have no more than forty-five percent of their consolidated assets invested in, 
and received no more than forty-five percent of their consolidated net income after 
taxes from, investment securities. These rules of general application still proved 
inadequate to accommodate developments in corporate finance techniques that 
technically run afoul of Section 3(a)(1) or Section 3(b)(1) of the Investment Company 
Act, or at least are not clearly excluded. Active investment activities in support of the 
business objectives of operating companies can press on the statutory definition. Also, 
technology companies frequently rely on strategic alliances, and the interests created 
might well be considered investment securities. Accordingly, the SEC has adopted rules 
to exempt parent financing of subsidiary activities, Rule 3a-5, 17 C.F.R. § 270.3a-5, 
issuance of asset-backed securities, Rule 3a-7, 17 C.F.R. § 270.3a-4, and research and 
development companies, Rule 3a-8, 17 C.F.R. § 270.3a-8. Particularized exemption 
applications pursuant to § 3(b)(2) continue to be frequent, however. 
 57. Investment Company Act § 3(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(b) excludes companies 
holding securities in wholly-owned subsidiaries not in the business of investing in 
securities, and companies the SEC finds to be not in the business of investing in 
securities either through majority-owned subsidiaries or controlled companies 
conducting similar types of business. “Control” means the power to exercise a 
controlling interest and is presumed for ownership of more than twenty-five percent of 
an issuer’s voting securities. Investment Company Act § 2(a)(9), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
2(a)(9). 
 58. Investment Company Act § 3(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c). Among the more 
significant organizations excluded under this provision are “so-called private 
investment companies,” §§ 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7), investment banking operations, § 
3(c)(2), banks and insurance companies, including common trust funds, § 3(c)(3), 
certain finance and real estate companies, §§ 3(c)(5)-(6), oil and gas companies, § 
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Two exclusions of particular importance are for so-called private 
investment companies. An issuer is not an investment company for most 
purposes of the Investment Company Act if it does not publicly offer its 
securities and its securities are beneficially owned by 100 persons or 
less.59 Venture capital, leveraged buyout and hedge funds often used this 
so-called private investment company exemption, but its 100-investor 
ceiling began to chafe. In a major study of the Investment Company 
Act’s first fifty years, the SEC’s Division of Investment Management 
recommended that a new exception should be added for companies 
owned exclusively by high net-worth investors.60 The statute was duly 
amended, and since 1996, an issuer has been excluded from the statutory 
definition of investment company if it does not publicly offer its 
securities and those securities are owned exclusively by “qualified 
purchasers.”61 Broadly speaking, qualified purchasers include natural 
persons with $5 million or more in investments and other persons that 
own and invest not less than $25 million on a discretionary basis.62 The 
amendment also set out a procedure that older private companies could 
use to convert to qualified-purchaser companies. Moreover, in 
recognition that some older private companies would want to set up 
parallel qualified-purchaser companies, the Investment Company Act 
                                                                                                                 
3(c)(9), charitable organizations, § 3(c)(10), and qualified pension and profit-sharing 
plans, § 3(c)(11). 
 59. Investment Company Act § 3(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1). 
 60. SEC, DIV. OF INV. MGMT., PROTECTING INVESTORS: A HALF CENTURY OF 
INVESTMENT COMPANY REGULATION (1992). 
 61. Investment Company Act § 3(c)(7), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7). Funds that had 
relied on the § 3(c)(1) exclusion could convert to funds excluded under § 3(c)(7). See 
A.B.A. No-Action Letter, [1999 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 77,548 
(Apr. 22, 1999); Paul S. Stevens & Craig S. Tyler, Mutual Funds Investment Advisers 
and the National Securities Markets Improvement Act, 52 BUS. LAW. 419, 469-74 
(1997). 
 62. Investment Company Act § 2(a)(51), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(51); see also 17 
C.F.R. §§ 270.2a51-1 to 2a51-3 (2015). Rule 2a51-1(h), 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a51-1(h), 
provides that a “qualified purchaser” for purposes of § 3(c)(7) includes any person who 
the exempt company or a person acting on its behalf reasonably believes meets the 
definition. For a discussion of problems presented by the definition when securities are 
issued in book-entry form, see Barry Barbash et al., Book-Entry Deposit Procedures for 
Certain Offerings by Non-US Issuers under Section 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company 
Act, INV. LAW., Jul. 2008, at 3; Barry Barbash et al., New Developments in Procedures 
for Book-Entry Deposit of Rule 144A Securities by 3(c)(7) Issuers, INV. LAW., Mar. 
2003, at 3. 
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contains an unusual no-integration provision that keeps such issuers 
separate for purposes of determining the availability of the exemptions.63 
In December 2006, the SEC proposed to amend its regulations 
under the Securities Act to make it more difficult for hedge funds to 
market their securities to less-affluent investors without registration.64 
However, changes to the general-solicitation prohibition of Regulation 
D that the SEC was directed to make by the Jumpstart Our Business 
Startups Act, enacted in 2012, have made it easier for hedge funds to 
market their securities.65 
Whatever precision the definition of statutory investment company 
now has, it has been accomplished over a long time and with great 
confusion. For many years, the SEC sought with some success to restrict 
the exclusions. For example, the ectoplasmic theory, which concentrated 
on the structure of an investment vehicle instead of the structure of its 
sponsor, enabled the SEC to reach variable annuities and variable life 
insurance despite the specific exclusion provided insurance companies 
in Section 3(c)(3) of the Investment Company Act, and an exemption for 
insurance policies in the Securities Act.66 Similarly, collectively 
                                                                                                                 
 63. Investment Company Act § 3(c)(7)(E), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7)(E). 
 64. See Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles; 
Accredited Investors in Certain Private Investment Vehicles, Sec. Act Release No. 8766 
(Dec. 27, 2006); see also BINES & THEL, supra note 7, at § 2.05[B][3]. 
 65. See infra notes 351-54 and accompanying text. Registration as an investment 
adviser, however, has become a statutory requirement with the passage of Dodd-Frank. 
See infra notes 351-54 and accompanying text. 
 66. Benefits under variable life insurance (“VLI”) are not fixed, but are determined 
according to the asset value of a portfolio of securities. Although the insurance industry 
claimed that VLI was an insurance contract and hence should not be subject to 
regulation under the federal securities laws, the SEC insisted that VLI was a security 
and that the policyholders were investors in an investment company. Based on the 
SEC’s successes in obtaining jurisdiction under the Securities and Investment Company 
Acts over the sale of variable annuities, see SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of 
Am., 359 U.S. 65 (1959), the industry capitulated and sought and received exemptive 
relief from various provisions in the federal securities laws, and especially from the 
Investment Company Act. See, e.g., Rules 6c-3, 6e-2, 17 C.F.R. §§ 270.6c-3, 6e-2. 
Other exemptions have been granted to accommodate new products and marketing 
conditions. See Rules 6c-6, 6c-7, 6c-8, 6e-3(T), 17 C.F.R. §§ 270.6c-6, 6c-7, 6c-8, 6e-
3(T). Other rules, listed at Rule 0-1(e), 17 C.F.R. § 270.0-1(e), also apply. The 
Commission’s efforts to regulate so-called fixed indexed annuities under the Securities 
Act have been less successful. See BINES & THEL, supra note 7, at § 3.02[B][4]. 
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managed individual accounts may constitute a statutory investment 
company.67 
The Investment Company Act provides for broad and pervasive 
regulation of the activities and governance of registered investment 
companies. This oversight was enhanced in the National Securities 
Markets Improvement Act of 1996,68 the same statute that created the 
exemption for funds made up of qualified purchasers.69 Thus, for 
example, the SEC has broad authority to require registered investment 
companies to file information, documents and reports,70 and to 
determine the contents of reports to shareholders.71 The best indication 
of the breadth of existing regulatory authority over registered investment 
companies may be the way they were treated in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002.72 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted after a string of remarkably 
bold corporate scandals, and represented an attempt by Congress to 
restore corporate accountability and provide tools for improved 
corporate governance. While investment companies were not 
responsible for those scandals, one might have expected them to be 
subject to Congress’ reforms. Even after the adoption of the 1996 Act, 
the SEC continued to discuss the importance of independent directors in 
investment company governance and the need for investment companies 
                                                                                                                 
 67. See BINES & THEL, supra note 7, at § 3.04. Perhaps the best-known instance of 
the SEC’s taking action under this theory is the First National City Bank case. SEC 
Litigation Release No. 4534, 1970 WL 104562 (Feb. 6, 1970). 
 68. National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 
110 Stat. 3416 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). See generally 
Stevens & Tyler, supra note 61. 
 69. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text. 
 70. Investment Company Act § 30(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-29(b). 
 71. Investment Company Act § 30(d), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-29(d); see also Investment 
Company Act § 31(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-30(a) (“Accounts and records”). 
 72. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). The Act quickly 
engendered a substantial commentary. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And It Just Might Work), 35 
CONN. L. REV. 915 (2003); Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to 
Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 IOWA J. CORP. L. 1 
(2002); Brian Kim, Recent Development, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 40 HARV. J. LEGIS. 235 
(2003). 
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to improve their disclosures of information necessary to investors,73 and 
it has proposed rules requiring investment companies to give investors 
more extensive information about fees and expenses, and to disclose 
their portfolio investments more frequently.74 Nevertheless, even though 
these issues of disclosure and governance have been on the table for 
some time and attracted legislative attention, many of the most 
important provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requiring improved 
financial disclosures and mandating changes in governance do not apply 
to investment companies registered under the Investment Company 
Act.75 Congress apparently concluded that investment companies were 
already sufficiently regulated.76 
                                                                                                                 
 73. See DIV. OF INV. MGMT., REPORT ON MUTUAL FUND FEES AND EXPENSES, SEC 
(2000), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/feestudy.htm#item [http://perma.cc/G4RU-
KEDB]; Role of Independent Directors of Investment Companies, 66 Fed. Reg. 3734 
(Jan. 16, 2001). 
 74. See, e.g., Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and Investment 
Advisers, 68 Fed. Reg. 7038 (Feb. 11, 2003) (proposed rules requiring investment 
companies and advisers to implement compliance programs); Investment Company Act 
Release, 68 Fed. Reg. 160 (Jan. 2, 2003) (proposed rules on portfolio disclosure); Staff 
Report: Joint SEC/NASD/NYSE Report of Examinations of Broker-Dealers Regarding 
Discounts on Front-End Sales Charges on Mutual Funds (Mar. 2003), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/breakpointrep.htm [http://perma.cc/FZQ3-WLWS]. 
 75. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 405, 15 U.S.C. § 7263. Registered Investment 
Companies are subject to the officer certification provisions of the Sarbanes Oxley Act. 
See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 906, 15 U.S.C. § 1350. The SEC has adopted a rule 
implementing this requirement. See Rule 30a-2, 17 C.F.R. § 270.30a-2 (2015); see also 
Investment Company Act Release 25722, 67 Fed. Reg. 57,276 (Aug. 28, 2002); 
Investment Company Act Release 25967, 68 Fed. Reg. 15600 (Mar. 21, 2003); 
Kimberly L. Sachse, Welcome to Form N-CSR!, INV. LAW., June 2003, at 1. 
 76. See REPORT OF THE SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN 
AFFAIRS, PUBLIC COMPANY ACCOUNTING REFORM AND INVESTOR PROTECTION ACT OF 
2002, S. REP. NO. 205-107 (2002) (“The bill exempts investment companies from 
certain disclosure requirements. The Committee feels that the objectives of those 
disclosure sections are adequately addressed by existing Federal securities laws and the 
rules thereunder affecting investment companies.”); REPORT OF THE HOUSE COMM., 
CORPORATE AND AUDITING ACCOUNTABILITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND TRANSPARENCY 
ACT OF 2002, H.R. REP. NO. 414-107 (2002) (“[C]ertain provisions of the bill are not 
meant to apply to investment companies registered with the Commission under the 
Investment Company Act of 1940. Because those companies are already subject to a 
thorough regulatory regime, the application of these provisions would be 
inappropriate.”). Based on legislative and regulatory activity in reaction to the market 
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As Sarbanes-Oxley was being adopted, late trading, market timing, 
preferential access to fund securities holdings and sources, and amounts 
of adviser compensation were almost daily headlines in the financial 
news. State and federal regulators who had been occupied with 
spectacular corporate frauds turned their attention to mutual funds. As 
the SEC summed it up at the end of 2003: 
In recent months, the Commission and State securities authorities 
have discovered unlawful conduct involving a number of fund 
advisers, broker-dealers, and other service providers that confirms 
the need for [new] rules. Fund advisory or distributor personnel have 
engaged in, or actively assisted others in engaging in, inappropriate 
market timing, late trading of fund shares, and the misuse of 
material, nonpublic information about fund portfolios. These 
personnel, including in some cases senior executives of fund 
advisers, have placed their personal interests or the business interests 
of the fund adviser ahead of the interests of fund shareholders, thus 
breaching their fiduciary obligations to the funds involved and their 
shareholders. These individuals have harmed the funds, their 
management organizations, and the confidence of fund investors.77 
The controversy surrounding market timing and late trading of 
privileged investors in mutual funds led regulators to re-examine the 
regulatory regime for mutual funds and investment advisers. The SEC, 
working to refine traditional approaches to duty-of-loyalty problems, 
began an extensive examination of its rules under the Investment 
Company Act and the Investment Advisers Act, and subsequently 
amended a number of its rules.78 Some of the changes were challenged 
in court and Congress. 
                                                                                                                 
timing activities of privileged investors in mutual funds breaking as this edition is 
published, these earlier observations may have been premature. 
 77. Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and Investment Advisers, 
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2204, 68 Fed. Reg. 74,714 at 74714-15 (Dec. 24, 
2003). For surveys of the investigation of and reaction to mutual fund late trading, 
market timing and compensation that began in 2003, see Paul G. Mahoney, Manager-
Investor Conflicts in Mutual Funds, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 161 (2004), Stephen J. 
Crimmins et al., The Mutual Fund Crisis—Beginning to See a Resolution, 36 SEC. REG. 
& L. REP. 349 (Feb. 23, 2004), and Stephen J. Crimmins, David U. Gourevitch & 
Joseph V. Del Raso, The Mutual Fund Probes—What We Can Tell So Far, 35 SEC. 
REG. & L. REP. 1834 (2003). 
 78. See Disclosure Regarding Portfolio Managers of Registered Management 
Investment Companies, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,533, 69 Fed. Reg. 
52,788 (Aug. 27, 2004) (adopting rule changes requiring greater disclosure of identity 
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of managers, compensation, and security ownership); Disclosure Regarding Approval 
of Investment Advisory Contracts by Directors of Investment Companies, Investment 
Company Act. Release No. 26,486, 69 Fed. Reg. 39,798 (June 23, 2004); Mandatory 
Redemption Fees for Redeemable Fund Securities, Investment Company Act Release 
No. 26,375A, 69 Fed. Reg. 11,762 (Mar. 5, 2004); Disclosure Regarding Approval of 
Investment Advisory Contracts by Directors of Investment Companies, Investment 
Company Act Release No. 26,350, 69 Fed. Reg. 7852 (Feb. 11, 2004) (proposing 
release); Investment Adviser Codes of Ethics, Investment Company Act Release No. 
26,492, 69 Fed. Reg. 41,696 (July 2, 2004); Investment Adviser Codes of Ethics, 
Investment Company Act Release No. 26,337, 69 Fed. Reg. 4040 (Jan. 20, 2004) 
(proposing release); Disclosure of Breakpoint Discounts by Mutual Funds, Investment 
Company Act Release No. 26,464 69 Fed. Reg. 33,262 (June 7, 2004); Disclosure of 
Breakpoint Discounts by Mutual Funds, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,298, 
68 Fed. Reg. 74,732 (Dec. 17, 2003) (proposing release); Disclosure Regarding Market 
Timing and Selective Disclosure of Portfolio Holdings, Investment Company Act 
Release No. 26,418, 69 Fed. Reg. 22,300 (Apr. 19, 2004); Disclosure Regarding Market 
Timing and Selective Disclosure of Portfolio Holdings, Investment Company Act 
Release No. 26,287, 68 Fed. Reg. 70,402 (Dec. 11, 2003) (proposing release); 
Amendments to Rules Governing Pricing of Mutual Fund Shares, Investment Company 
Act Release No. 26,288, 68 Fed. Reg. 70,388 (Dec. 11, 2003). 
  The SEC also proposed rules to create a hard close for mutual fund trades at 4 
p.m. Eastern Time; see Amendments to Rules Governing Pricing of Mutual Fund 
Shares, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,288, 68 Fed. Reg. 70,388 (Dec. 17, 
2003); to impose a 2% fee on short-term mutual fund trades, see Mandatory 
Redemption Fees for Redeemable Fund Securities, Investment Company Act Release 
No. 26,375A, 69 Fed. Reg. 11,762 (Mar. 5, 2004), and to require greater disclosure of 
mutual fund fees and conflicts at the point of sale and in confirmations, see 
Confirmation Requirements and Point of Sale Disclosure Requirements for 
Transactions in Certain Mutual Funds and Other Securities, and Other Confirmation 
Requirement Amendments, and Amendments to the Registration Form for Mutual 
Funds, Sec. Act Release No. 8358, Sec. Exchange Act Release No. 49,148, Investment 
Company Act Release No. 26,341, 69 Fed. Reg. 6438 (Feb. 10, 2004). In the end, the 
Commission chose not to require redemption fees. Mutual Fund Redemption Fees, 
Investment Company Act Release No. 26,782, 70 Fed. Reg. 13,328 (Mar. 18, 2005). 
Instead, the Commission adopted Investment Company Act Rule 22c-2, which makes it 
unlawful to redeem shares of most investment companies within seven days of their 
purchase unless the directors of the investment company, including a majority of 
disinterested directors, have either approved a redemption fee or determined that one is 
either not necessary or not appropriate. Such redemptions are also prohibited unless the 
investment company has entered into a written agreement with all financial 
intermediaries in which the intermediaries agree to provide the investment company, 
upon its request, with certain information about trades in the investment company’s 
shares and to restrict trading of an investment company shareholder upon the 
company’s request. Rule 22c-2(c), 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-2, broadly defines “financial 
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In the light of the controversy over market timing, the SEC focused 
on the role of independent investment company directors as investor 
guardians, responsible for ensuring that fund assets are used for the sole 
benefit of investors and not for managers.79 In one of its first rule 
changes, the SEC adopted Investment Company Act Rule 38a-180 and its 
companion Rule 206(4)-7 under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940,81 
which require investment companies and investment advisers to adopt 
compliance controls to be administered by chief compliance officers.82 
                                                                                                                 
intermediary” to include “[a]ny broker, dealer, bank, or other entity that holds securities 
of record issued by the fund, in nominee name . . .” and, in “the case of a participant-
directed employee benefit plan that owns the securities issued by the fund, a retirement 
plan’s administrator under Section 3(16)(A) of the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. [§] 1002(16)(A)) or any entity that maintains the plan’s 
participant records.” 
  While Rule 22c-2 became effective on May 23, 2005, the Commission delayed 
the compliance date to October 16, 2006, to allow investment companies and financial 
intermediaries to make contracts and enhance their systems. Subsequently, in response 
to numerous complaints that compliance would be costly, the Commission proposed to 
amend the rule to “(i) limit the types of intermediaries with which funds must negotiate 
information-sharing agreements, (ii) address the rule’s application when there are 
chains of intermediaries, and (iii) clarify the effect of a fund’s failure to obtain an 
agreement with any of its intermediaries.” Mutual Fund Redemption Fees, Investment 
Company Act Release No. 27255, 2006 WL 2794768 (Feb. 28, 2006). For example, the 
proposed amendments would clarify that if an investment company does not have an 
agreement with a particular intermediary, only that intermediary would be prohibited 
from trading. Moreover, the Commission asked for comments on whether it would be 
better to allow such an intermediary to effect purchases but simply prohibit it from 
redeeming shares within seven days of their purchase. 
 79. See Phyllis Diamond & Rachel McTague, SEC Looking Closely at Role Played 
by Independent Directors in Fund Scandal, 36 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 49 (2004). SEC 
Chair Donaldson also indicated that the SEC was reexamining the use of fund assets to 
facilitate distributions, the use of soft-dollars, and other matters. Id. The use of fund 
assets to facilitate distribution has since been significantly curtailed. See BINES & THEL, 
supra note 7, at §10.07[B][3]. 
 80. 17 C.F.R. § 270.38a-1. Rule 38a-1 complements Rule 17j-1(c)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 
270.17j-1(c)(1), which requires funds to adopt a code of ethics with provisions 
reasonably necessary to prevent certain persons from engaging in certain fraudulent, 
manipulative, and deceptive actions. For a discussion of Rule 17j-1, see BINES & THEL, 
supra note 7, at §11.03[A]. 
 81. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-7. 
 82. See Antoinette Gartrell, SEC Suits Against Compliance Officers Sending 
Wrong Message, Gallagher Says, 47 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1217 (2015); John Sakhleh, 
David S. Petron & Kevin Garvey, As Chief Compliance Officer, Could You Be the 
Target of an Enforcement Action?, 46 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 977 (2014). 
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Investment Company Act Rule 38a-1 requires every registered 
investment company (and business development company) to adopt 
written policies and procedures that are reasonably designed to prevent 
the investment company and its service providers—including 
investment advisers, principal underwriters, administrators, and transfer 
agents—from violating the federal securities laws. Moreover, the 
directors of a registered investment company, including a majority of 
disinterested directors, must approve—on the basis of a finding that the 
policies are reasonably designed to prevent violations—the investment 
company’s policies and procedures and those of each investment 
adviser, principal underwriter, administrator, and transfer agent.83 The 
investment company must review the adequacy and implementation of 
its own policies and those of its service providers at least annually. 
Rule 38a-1 also requires every investment company to designate a 
chief compliance officer to be responsible for the administration of the 
policies and procedures adopted under the rule.84 The designation and 
compensation of the chief compliance officer must be approved by the 
investment company’s board, including, again, a majority of 
disinterested directors, and the chief compliance officer may be removed 
only with the approval of the board. The chief compliance officer must 
meet with the independent directors at least annually, and report to the 
board at least annually in writing on the operation of the required 
policies and procedures of the company and its service providers. The 
annual report must also address every “Material Compliance Matter” 
that has occurred since the last report.85 
In addition to enumerating various matters that should be addressed 
in Rule 38a-1 policies, the SEC emphasized that its purpose was to force 
investment company directors to pay attention to their duties: 
The consequences of failing to meet the Investment Company Act’s 
governance requirements are severe. Therefore, a fund’s policies and 
procedures should be designed to guard against, among other things, 
an improperly constituted board, the failure of the board to properly 
consider matters entrusted to it, and the failure of the board to 
                                                                                                                 
 83. 17 C.F.R. § 270.38a-1. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See id. § 270.38a-1(e)(2). 
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request and consider information required by the Investment 
Company Act from the fund adviser and other service providers.86 
The SEC directly intervened in the governance of investment 
companies later in 2004 by conditioning exemptions on compliance with 
SEC wishes. A variety of SEC rules provide investment companies with 
exemptions from certain proscriptions if actions are approved by 
independent directors.87 At the beginning of 2004, the SEC proposed to 
amend these exemptions to condition their availability on the investment 
company’s having adopted a number of measures intended to secure 
independence from the adviser.88 The proposals aroused substantial 
interest and controversy, both within and outside the SEC, but in 
September 2004 the SEC adopted the amendments, over a vigorous 
dissent, which argued that the Commission had inadequately considered 
the costs that the rule changes would impose. As adopted, the rules 
provided that exemptions would be available only for investment 
companies that satisfied the fund governance standards set forth in Rule 
0-1(a)(7): at least seventy-five percent of the directors of the investment 
company must be independent (or two independent directors on a three-
member board); the board must be chaired by an independent director; 
the board must perform a self-assessment at least annually; independent 
directors must meet separately at least quarterly; and independent 
directors must be able to hire their own staff.89 
                                                                                                                 
 86. Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and Investment Advisers, 
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2204, 81 SEC Docket 2775 (Dec. 17, 2003). 
 87. These rules include Rules 10f-3, 12b-1, 15a-4(b)(2), 17a-7, 17a-8, 17d-1(d)(7), 
17e-1, 17g-1, 18f-3 and 23c-3. Cf. Task Force on Fund Director’s Guidebook, Fund 
Director’s Guidebook, 59 BUS. LAW. 201, 210 (2003) (“The SEC has promulgated a 
special set of governance standards which apply to funds that have adopted Rule 12b-1 
plans, issue multiple classes of shares, or rely upon widely used SEC exemptive rules to 
engage in certain types of transactions with affiliates . . . . As a practical matter, the 
SEC governance standards apply to most funds because few funds can operate without 
having the ability to rely upon one or more of the exemptive rules. The rules adopted by 
the SEC in 2001 require that a majority of the directors be independent. Most fund 
complexes have adopted this practice even in the absence of any requirement.”). 
 88. Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 
26,323, 69 Fed. Reg. 3472 (Jan. 15, 2004). 
 89. Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 
26,520, 69 Fed. Reg. 46,378 (Aug. 2, 2004). The SEC had urged independent directors 
to retain their own counsel earlier in the year. See Roye to Fund Directors: Make Use of 
Independent Counsel, CCO, Auditor, 36 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 56 (Jan. 12, 2004). 
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The SEC’s governance changes engendered substantial opposition 
on several fronts. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce sued, challenging the 
SEC’s authority to adopt the rules.90 In Congress, legislators 
sympathetic to the industry secured legislation requiring the SEC to 
submit a study to Congress justifying the independent chair rule and 
discussing whether funds chaired by disinterested directors perform 
better, have lower expenses, or have better compliance records than 
mutual funds chaired by interested directors, and to act on the studies’ 
recommendations before the rule change is scheduled to be effective.91 
In April 2005, the SEC published its response to Congress’ demand 
that it justify the independent chair rules.92 The Commission’s report 
discussed the late-trading and stale pricing problems that led the 
Commission to act, and justified the rule changes in terms of enhanced 
investor confidence: 
The Commission adopted the independent chair condition as a 
means of enhancing independent oversight of the conflicts of interest 
inherent in the transactions permitted by the Exemptive Rules. As 
the recent scandals demonstrated, active independent oversight of 
fund advisers and other affiliates was sorely missing in many of the 
leading fund complexes. 
                                                                                                                 
 90. See Deborah Solomon & David Rogers, Fund Industry Nears Lobbying Win, 
WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 2004, at C21; Rachel McTague, D.C. Circuit Denies U.S. 
Chamber’s Request to Delay SEC Independent Fund Director Rule, 36 SEC. REG. & L. 
REP. 1890 (2004). 
 91. See H.R. REP. NO. 108-792, at 104 (2004) (“Not later than May 1, 2005, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission shall submit a report to the Committee on 
Appropriations of the Senate that provides a justification for final rules issued by the 
Commission on June 30, 2004 (amending title 17, Code of Federal Regulations, Parts 
239, 240, and 274), requiring that the chair of the board of directors of a mutual fund be 
an independent director: Provided, That such report shall analyze whether mutual funds 
chaired by disinterested directors perform better, have lower expenses, or have better 
compliance records than mutual funds chaired by interested directors: Provided further, 
That the Securities and Exchange Commission shall act upon the recommendations of 
such report not later than January 1, 2006.”); see also Rachel McTague, Oxley, Baker 
Object to Language on SEC Fund Rule in Appropriations Bill, 36 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 
2063 (2004); Solomon & Rogers, supra note 90 at C21 (supporting SEC’s positions by 
some prominent legislators); House, Senate Lawmakers Endorse Proposal on 
Independent Fund Chairman, 36 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 515 (2004). 
 92. EXEMPTIVE RULE AMENDMENTS OF 2004: THE INDEPENDENT CHAIR 
CONDITION, SEC (2005), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/indchair.pdf [http://perma.cc 
/88J8-YCQF]. 
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The Commission did not adopt the independent chair provision as a 
means of enhancing fund financial performance or reducing fund 
expenses. The staff, including the staff of the Division of Investment 
Management and the Office of Economic Analysis, examined this 
issue, however, and found that the empirical data regarding the 
relationship between an independent chairman and fund performance 
and fees are inconclusive.93 
The Commission’s acknowledgment that its primary purpose had 
not been to enhance fund performance or reduce fund expenses 
highlighted an aspect of its judgment that would soon come back to 
haunt it. In a remarkable June 2005 decision, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit granted the Chamber’s petition for review 
in part and remanded the case to the SEC to further consider its 
governance rules.94 The court rejected the Chamber’s argument that the 
Commission lacked authority to address the “corporate governance” of 
investment companies, but did conclude that the Commission had 
violated the Administrative Procedure Act and the Investment Company 
Act by failing to consider the costs imposed by the amendments and the 
alternatives thereto.95 
When the court announced its decision, the sponsor of the rule 
changes, Commission Chairman William Donaldson, was set to resign 
from the Commission in about a week. Inasmuch as the rules had 
initially been adopted on a 3-2 vote, prospects for the rules might have 
seemed uncertain. However, the Commission promptly readopted the 
rules, and apparently satisfied itself that it was able quite quickly to 
evaluate the costs of the changes it made and find those changes 
superior to any alternatives.96 The Chamber of Commerce challenged 
that decision on a number of grounds, including the Commission’s 
failure to seek further public comment.97 A few months later, the Court 
                                                                                                                 
 93. Id. at 2-3. 
 94. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 95. Id. at 136. 
 96. Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 
26985, 2005 WL 2756705 (June 30, 2005); see also Michael Schroeder, SEC Adopts 
Mutual Fund Rule, Risks New Court Challenge, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2005, at C1. 
 97. Judith Burns, SEC’s Fund-Rule Fight Continues, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 2005, at 
C13; Kara Scannell, SEC Defends Review, Readoption of Mutual-Fund Rule in Appeal, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 2006, at B13; John Spence & Robert Schroeder, Independent 
Boards at Issue Again, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 2006, at C13; see also Barry P. Barbash & 
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of Appeals vacated the readopted rule changes but stayed its mandate so 
that the Commission could reopen its record, and ordered the 
Commission to report on its progress.98 The court explained that while 
its prior decision did not prescribe how the Commission should estimate 
the costs of the rule changes, the Commission had violated the 
Administrative Procedure Act99 by readopting the rules on the basis of 
material not in the record of the rulemaking and without affording an 
opportunity for public comment. The Commission was apparently not 
ready to concede defeat, however, and in June 2006 it gave the court a 
status report and sought additional public comment on the costs of the 
rule changes.100 Nonetheless, the Commission has not adopted the rules. 
Investment advisers to statutory investment companies are subject 
to a number of legal restrictions, principally in regard to transactions 
between themselves and their companies and joint transactions with 
their companies.101 In addition, such investment advisers are under a 
general statutory fiduciary duty102 and a specific fiduciary duty with 
                                                                                                                 
Jennifer Raymer Suellentrop, The SEC’s Mutual Fund Governance Rule: The 
Continuing Saga, INV. LAW., Oct. 2005, at 1. 
 98. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 99. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946). 
 100. Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 
27395, 2006 WL 2794769 (June 13, 2006); see also SEC Seeks Comment on Fund 
Rules, Files Status Report with D.C. Circuit, 38 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1053 (June 19, 
2006). The Commission reopened the comment period in December 2006 to seek 
additional comments, particularly with respect to two papers prepared by Commission 
staff economists. Investment Company Act Release No. 27600, 2006 WL 3718282 
(Dec. 15, 2006). 
 101. Investment Company Act §§ 17(a)-17(e), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-17(a) to 80a-17(e). 
See Application of Section 17 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 to Portfolio 
Affiliates, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 983 (1972); see also Investment Company Act § 10(f), 15 
U.S.C. § 80a-10(f) (concerning an investment company’s participation as a purchaser in 
affiliated underwritings). 
 102. Investment Company Act § 36(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(a), provides: 
The Commission is authorized to bring an action in the proper 
district court of the United States, or in the United States court of 
any territory or other place subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States, alleging that a person serving or acting in one or more of the 
following capacities has engaged within five years of the 
commencement of the action or is about to engage in any act or 
practice constituting a breach of fiduciary duty involving personal 
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respect to compensation for services.103 Also extensively regulated are 
other details of the relationship between the adviser and the company, 
such as dual employment,104 terms of advisory contracts,105 and other 
matters of administration.106 
                                                                                                                 
misconduct in respect of any registered investment company for 
which such person so serves or acts— 
(1) as officer, director, member of any advisory board, investment 
adviser, or depositor; or 
(2) as principal underwriter, if such registered company is an open-
end company, unit investment trust, or face-amount certificate 
company. 
If such allegations are established, the court may enjoin such persons 
from acting in any or all such capacities either permanently or 
temporarily and award such injunctive or other relief against such 
person as may be reasonable and appropriate in the circumstances, 
having due regard to the protection of investors and to the 
effectuation of the policies declared in Section 1(b) [15 U.S.C. § 
80a-1(b)] of this title. 
 103. Investment Company Act § 36(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (added by Pub. L. No. 
91-547, § 20, 84 Stat. 1413, 1429 (1970)). 
 104. Investment Company Act § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10, limits the extent to which 
statutory companies can choose persons as directors who are otherwise affiliated with 
the company (§ 10(a)), and restricts the discretion of a company not having a majority 
of independent directors on its board to use the services of brokers, of underwriters of 
the company, and of other investment bankers (§ 10(b)). Special rules also apply to 
persons connected with banks (§ 10(c)) and to certain open end, no-load (i.e., no 
underwriting commission) companies (§ 10(d)). 
 105. Investment Company Act § 15(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a)-(b), makes it unlawful 
for any person to serve as an investment adviser to a company except pursuant to a 
written contract that has been approved by vote of a majority of the outstanding voting 
securities of the company (or except on an interim basis, see supra note 45). This 
includes a contract by another investment adviser to offer investment advice to the 
fund’s regular investment adviser. The written contract must precisely describe all 
compensation to be paid. The advisory contract may not continue in effect for longer 
than two years, unless continuance is specifically approved at least annually 
(“annually” is defined in Rule 15a-2, 17 C.F.R. § 270.15a-2, by the board of directors 
or by a vote of the majority of the shareholders. It must provide for termination at any 
time without payment of penalty on sixty day’s written notice to the investment adviser 
and for automatic termination in the event of assignment by the adviser. 
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  Investment Company Act § 15(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c), requires that approval 
of the investment advisory contract or underwriting contract must be made by a vote of 
the majority of directors who are not parties to the contract or interested persons of any 
party to the contract. These disinterested directors have the duty to request and evaluate 
such information as may be reasonably necessary to evaluate the terms of the advisory 
contracts and the investment adviser has the duty to provide any such information. This 
duty on the part of the disinterested directors to inquire and the correlative duty of the 
adviser to inform, though implicit in the original version of the Act (see Moses v. 
Burgin, 445 F.2d 369, 376-77 (1st Cir. 1971); Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207 
(S.D.N.Y. 1961)), was made express in Section 15(c) by statutory amendment in 
Section 8(c) of the Investment Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
547, 84 Stat. 1419 (1970). 
  In 2004, the SEC amended its rules and forms to require registered 
management investment companies to provide greater disclosure about how their 
directors evaluate, approve and recommend shareholder approval of investment 
advisory contracts. Investment company proxy statements were previously required to 
discuss the material factors on which the directors based their recommendation that 
shareholders approve the investment advisory contract. See Item 22(c)(11) of Schedule 
14A, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101; Investment Company Act Release No. 20,614, 59 Fed. 
Reg. 52,689 (Oct. 13, 1994); see also Investment Company Act Release No. 24,816, 66 
Fed. Reg. 3734 (Jan. 2, 2001) (amending requirements for disclosure in Statement of 
Additional Information). The 2004 amendments to Schedule 14A and to forms N-1A, 
17 C.F.R. §§239.15A & 274.11A, N-2, 17 C.F.R. §§239.14 & 274.11a-1, and N-3, 17 
C.F.R. §§239.17a & 274.11b, which are used for registration under the Securities Act 
and the Investment Company Act, require funds to include in the shareholder reports 
the information that is required by the fund’s registration statement form, and require 
shareholder reports of management investment companies and insurance company 
managed accounts offering variable annuities to discuss, in reasonable detail, the 
material factors and the conclusions on which the directors based their decision. 
(Investment Company Act Rule 30e-1, 17 C.F.R. § 270.30e-1, correlates the 
information in shareholder reports with that included in registration statements. The 
SEC deleted as redundant the requirement that similar information be included in the 
Statement of Additional Information.) The reports must disclose the directors’ basis for 
approving investment advisory contracts and recommending them to shareholders, 
including factors relating to the selection of the adviser and the approval of the fee. 
They must also indicate whether the directors relied upon comparisons of the adviser’s 
fees and services with those under other investment advisory contracts. Moreover, the 
investment company’s principal executive and financial officers must certify, based on 
their knowledge, the description of the board’s evaluation process. The SEC justified 
the changes with the argument that expansive disclosure would encourage directors to 
carefully review contracts and fees and assist investors in choosing among investment 
companies in which to invest. See Disclosure Regarding Approval of Investment 
Advisory Contracts by Directors of Investment Companies, Investment Company Act. 
Release No. 26,486, 69 Fed. Reg. 39,798 (June 23, 2004). 
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B. EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS 
1. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
In order to protect retirement and other employment benefits 
normally paid for by employee contributions from, or in lieu of, 
additional salary, Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”).107 ERISA governs private employee 
and benefit plans for millions of workers and is itself the subject of 
extensive commentary.108 It imposes requirements, duties, and liabilities 
that are often different from, and sometimes in conflict with, law that 
                                                                                                                 
 106. See, e.g., Investment Company Act §§ 12, 16, 20, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-12, 80a-16, 
80a-20. Section 12 covers a number of matters, including acquisitions and mergers, 
ownership of securities in insurance companies, and broker-dealers. Section 16 deals 
principally with the process for selection of directors, and Section 20 with proxy and 
voting trust matters and circular ownership. The SEC has broad exemptive power with 
respect to Investment Company Act regulation. Section 6(c) permits the Commission to 
exempt “any person, security, or transaction” from all or part of the Act if public-
interest and protection-of-investors standards are satisfied. The Section 6(c) exemptive 
power is not ordinarily applied to the entire Act, however, and where the SEC has done 
so or been requested to do so, the issues involved usually relate to competition battles 
among the investment company industry, the insurance industry and the banking 
industry. See supra note 55. This general exemptive power in Section 6(c) is 
supplemented by a specific exemptive power in Section 17(b) respecting joint 
transactions prohibited by Section 17(a). An exemption is authorized if it is shown that 
the terms of the transaction are fair and the transaction is consistent with the policy of 
any investment company affected by the proposed transaction and with the general 
purposes of the Act. 
 107. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-406, 88 Stat. 
829 (codified as amended at § 1001-1461 (2012) and scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
Discussions contemporaneous with enactment of the background of ERISA and the 
administration of the fiduciary responsibility provisions of the Act appear in 
Proceedings, ABA Nat’l Inst., Fiduciary Responsibilities Under the Pension Reform 
Act, 31 BUS LAW. 1 (1975); see also William J. Chadwick & David S. Foster, Federal 
Regulation of Retirement Plans: The Quest for Parity, 4 VAND. L. REV. 641 (1975). A 
bibliography of articles is appended to ERISA Fiduciary Responsibility and Prohibited 
Transactions, 365-2nd T.M. (BNA). 
 108. For more extensive discussion of ERISA, see RONALD J. COOKE, ERISA 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (2d ed. 1996); JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, 
PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 62-96 (2d ed. 1995); JAYNE E. ZANGLEIN, 
LAWRENCE A. FROLIK & SUSAN J. STABILE, ERISA LITIGATION (4th ed. 2011). 
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otherwise governs investment management.109 ERISA is a complex 
statute. It is, in fact, an amalgam of two separate bills—a labor bill and a 
tax bill—and both portions have consequences for investment managers. 
ERISA itself explained that the purpose of the statute was to protect plan 
participants and beneficiaries “by establishing standards of conduct, 
responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit 
plans.”110 The labor portion of ERISA, which labor lawyers typically 
cited to instead of the United States Code, reaches investment 
management through a set of provisions pertaining to fiduciary 
responsibility.111 With respect to investment managers, the tax 
provisions, which are typically cited to the Internal Revenue Code, are 
less broad in scope, reaching primarily prohibited transactions (a defined 
term).112 
                                                                                                                 
 109. See ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2012) (providing for preemption of 
state law). 
 110. ERISA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b). 
 111. ERISA §§ 401-414, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114. The Department of Labor has 
issued a series of interpretive bulletins concerning the fiduciary responsibility 
provisions that are incorporated as regulations. 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-2 (2015) 
(prohibited transactions); id. § 2509.75-3 (investment in shares of investment 
companies); id. § 2509.75-4 (indemnification of fiduciaries); id. § 2509.75-5 (definition 
of fiduciary; lines of responsibility; funding; investment manager of qualifications; 
bonding); id. § 2509.75-6 (advances on expenses to party in interest); id. § 2509.75-8 
(definition of fiduciary; fiduciary’s right to rely on information provided by others; 
number of fiduciaries required; allocation and delegation of fiduciary responsibilities; 
performance monitoring obligations); id. § 2509.75-9 (independence of accountant for 
purpose of auditing or rendering opinion on financial information in annual report of 
plan); id. § 2509.75-10 (special reliance procedure adopted to accommodate interim 
qualification pending adoption of permanent ERISA regulations); id. § 2509.94-1(the 
fiduciary standard in considering economically targeted investments); id. § 2509.95-1 
(fiduciary standard when selecting an annuity provider); id. § 2510.3-21 (definition of 
fiduciary); see also id. § 2550.404a-1(b) (2015), discussed extensively in BINES & 
THEL, supra note 7, at § 8.02[B][1]. 
 112. See I.R.C. § 4975; see also BINES & THEL, supra note 7, at § 11.02[B][1]. As 
was the case even before the enactment of ERISA, a plan that engages in imprudent 
investment practices can lose its tax-qualified status under Section 401(a) of the Code. 
See Rev. Rul. 69-494, 1969-2 C.B. 88; Rev. Rul. 69-421, Pt. 2(k)(1), 1969-2 C.B. 59, 
declared obsolete by Rev. Rul. 72-488, 1972-2 C.B. 649. Disqualification is not 
automatic even if a plan’s investments are imprudent, however. See Shedco Inc. v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Mem. 1998-295, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 267, 1998 Tax Ct. Memo 
LEXIS 296, at *46-49 (1998). Moreover, it appears clear that satisfaction of ERISA’s 
prudence requirements will be deemed to satisfy the prudence aspect of Section 401(a). 
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ERISA Section 3(21)113 defines “fiduciary” broadly enough to 
include nearly everyone having a measurable influence in fashioning or 
carrying out an investment program for covered employee benefit 
plans.114 Investment managers are also defined as a subclass of fiduciary 
in Section 3(38).115 The principal requirement of this definition as 
originally adopted was that a statutory investment manager had to be a 
registered investment adviser under the Investment Advisers Act, a 
bank, or a qualified insurance company. As discussed below,116 the 
Investment Advisers Act was amended in 1996 to provide that smaller 
investment advisers are generally regulated at the state level and may 
not register with the SEC. ERISA Section 3(38) was subsequently 
amended to include within the definition of “investment manager” a 
fiduciary exempt from registration as an investment adviser because of 
its small size if it is registered under state law and filed a copy of its 
                                                                                                                 
Id. at *38. In any event, because removal of tax-exempt status is so devastating a 
weapon, and because its exercise has an impact on blameless employees, it is not likely 
to be used except in egregious cases in which relatively few employees are involved. 
But see BNA Daily Tax Report No. 127, June 30, 1976, at G-3 (Teamsters Union 
pension fund reportedly in danger of losing tax-exempt status). The prudence 
requirement derives from the statutory requirement that a qualified plan must be for the 
exclusive benefit of employees and their beneficiaries, see Rev. Rul. 69-494, 1969-2 
C.B. 88, and thus imprudent investments that might lead to disqualification typically 
involve duty-of-loyalty breaches that transgress the ERISA prohibited transaction 
provisions anyway. Predictably, disqualifications for imprudence seem always to 
involve investments in employer securities or other plan-employer transactions 
involving serious breaches of the duty of loyalty that would constitute prohibited 
transactions. See, e.g., Winger’s Dept. Store, Inc. v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 869 (1984) 
(loan of assets to employer); Ada Orthopedic, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1997-
606 (unsecured loans to participants, relatives, and friends of the trustees); Rev. Rul. 
73-282, 1973-2 C.B. 123 (loans to affiliate of plan sponsor); Rev. Rul. 71-311, 1971-2 
C.B.184 (investment in employer securities); Tech. Adv. Mem. 97-13-002 (loans to 
sponsor’s sole stockholder). 
 113. ERISA § 3(21), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21). 
 114. There has been a fair amount of controversy over whether particular parties 
were statutory fiduciaries, but courts have construed the term broadly. See, e.g., Kayes 
v. Pacific Lumber Co., 51 F.3d 1449 (9th Cir. 1995); Olson v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 957 
F.2d 622 (8th Cir. 1992); Lowen v. Tower Asset Mgmt. Inc., 829 F.2d 1290 (2d Cir. 
1987); Donovan v. Mercer, 747 F.2d 304 (5th Cir. 1984). For a discussion of the 
judicial treatment of whether particular persons are statutory fiduciaries, see ZANGLEIN, 
FROLIK & STABILE, supra note 108, at 104-12. 
 115. ERISA § 3(38)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(38). 
 116. See BINES & THEL, supra note 7, at § 2.05[B]. 
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most recent state registration form with the Secretary of Labor when it 
filed that form with the state.117 
The reason for specially defining investment manager in ERISA 
was not, however, to change the responsibilities of investment managers 
as fiduciaries.118 Rather, the purpose was to permit plan fiduciaries and 
trustees to rely on investment management services without breaching 
common-law duties against delegation119 and without incurring vicarious 
                                                                                                                 
 117. Section 3(38) now provides in pertinent part that an investment manager is a 
fiduciary who, among other things: 
(B) . . . (i) is registered as an investment adviser under the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 [15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 et seq.]; (ii) is 
not registered as an investment adviser under such Act by reason of 
paragraph (1) of section 203A(a) of such Act [15 U.S.C. § 80b-
3a(a)], is registered as an investment adviser under the laws of the 
State (referred to in such paragraph (1)) in which it maintains its 
principal office and place of business, and, at the time the fiduciary 
last filed the registration form most recently filed by the fiduciary 
with such State in order to maintain the fiduciary’s registration under 
the laws of such State, also filed a copy of such form with the 
Secretary; (iii) is a bank, as defined in that Act [15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 et 
seq.]; or (iv) is an insurance company qualified to perform services 
described in subparagraph (A) under the laws of more than one State 
. . . . 
ERISA § 3(38), 29 U.S.C. §1002(38). 
 118. But cf. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-21(c)(2) (2015); IRS Reg. 54.4975-9(c)(2) 
(investment manager that renders advice for compensation is not fiduciary with respect 
to assets as to which it does not have requisite influence or responsibility). 
 119. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 80 (AM. LAW. INST. 2007); see also 
Brock v. Self, 632 F. Supp. 1509 (W.D. La. 1986) (holding that limitation of liability is 
contingent on governing document’s providing for designation of others to perform 
fiduciary functions); 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8 (stating that a named fiduciary may not 
delegate management of assets except to a statutory investment manager); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 70, 78, 85. Section 403(a)(2) of ERISA, 29 
U.S.C. § 1103(a), places in the trustees “exclusive authority and discretion to manage 
and control the assets of the plan, except to the extent that . . . (2) authority to manage, 
acquire, or dispose of assets of the plan is delegated to one or more investment 
managers pursuant to section 402(c)(3).” Section 402(c)(3) vests authority in the named 
fiduciary to appoint investment managers. Assuming reasonable care in the 
appointment of the investment manager, the delegation privilege is quite valuable to the 
named fiduciary. For example, in Marshall v. Unicorn Group, [1979-1981 Transfer 
Binder] CCH Pension Plan Guide ¶ 23,068 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), a properly appointed 
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liability for statutory violations by the investment manager.120 The 
Department of Labor and the Treasury Department regulations adopted 
soon after the enactment of ERISA somewhat narrow the statutory 
definition of fiduciary,121 so that a person will be treated as a fiduciary 
under ERISA because he provides investment advice to a plan “in only 
two circumstances: first, when a person had discretionary authority or 
control to purchase or sell securities or other property for a plan; and 
second, when a person renders investment advice to a plan on a regular 
                                                                                                                 
investment manager prematurely redeemed a certificate of deposit, thus sacrificing the 
pension plan’s right to accrued interest. The trustees of the plan were held not liable. In 
Dardaganis v. Grace Capital, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff’d in part and 
vacated in part on other grounds, 889 F.2d 1237 (2d Cir. 1989), a pension plan’s 
investment adviser was found to have breached its fiduciary duty to the plan by 
exceeding the equity limit established by the plan’s trustees. In rejecting the adviser’s 
claim that the trustees should bear responsibility for their failure adequately to enforce 
the investment objectives set forth in the management agreement, the court noted that 
the management agreement specifically required the adviser to invest “in strict 
conformity” with the trustees’ guidelines. Id. at 110. But see Schetter v. Prudential-
Bache Sec., Inc., 695 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D. Cal. 1988) (holding that a brokerage firm not 
duly appointed investment manager because trustees never obtained written 
acknowledgment from the firm that it was a fiduciary with respect to the plan). ERISA 
conditions the definition of “investment manager” on the manager’s having 
acknowledged in writing that it is fiduciary with respect to the plan. ERISA § 3(38)(C), 
29 U.S.C. § 1002(38). 
 120. Section 405(d)(1) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1105(d)(1), relieves a trustee from 
liability for the acts or omissions of properly appointed statutory investment managers. 
See Lowen v. Tower Asset Mgmt. Inc., 829 F.2d 1209 (2d Cir. 1987). The insulation 
from liability is far less than total, however. Section 405(d)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1105(d)(2), 
restricts the scope of Section 405(d)(1) so as not to affect a fiduciary’s independent 
liability under Section 405. Thus, complicity with a statutory investment manager, for 
example, would deprive a fiduciary of the protection of Section 405(d)(1). Cf. Trs. of 
HEREIU Welfare Pension Fund v. Amivest Corp., 733 F. Supp. 1180 (N.D. Ill. 1990). 
 121. 29 C.F.R. §§ 2510.3-21(c), 2510.3-21(d); I.R.S. Reg. § 54.975-9(c)(1). These 
provisions are discussed extensively in BINES & THEL, supra note 7, at § 11.02[B]. 
Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978, effective December 31, 1978, transferred the 
authority of the Secretary of the Treasury to issue interpretations regarding Code 
section 4975 to the Secretary of Labor. Although IRA’s are generally not governed by 
E.R.I.S.A. Title II, they are subject to the prohibited transaction rules and tax. 
Prohibited transaction exemptions in turn require investment advisers to IRAs to 
consent to being subject to E.R.S.A.-based duties. See EMP. BENEFITS COMM. SECTION 
OF LABOR AND EMP’T LAW, AM. BAR ASS’N, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW Ch. 10.VIII.B.2 
(3d ed. 2012 and online resource). For criticism of the Department of Labor rules, see 
Norman P. Stein, I, Fiduciary: Some Reflections on the Definition of Fiduciary Under 
ERISA, 6 DREXEL L. REV. 555 (2014). 
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basis, pursuant to an agreement or understanding that the advice will be 
a primary basis for the plan’s investment decisions, and that the advice 
is individualized to the particular needs of the plan.”122 
The second test has proven extraordinarily important and 
controversial. By conditioning the fiduciary standing of an adviser 
without discretionary authority on advice being provided regularly, and, 
more importantly, pursuant to an agreement that the advice will be a 
primary basis for the plan’s decisions, it may make it possible for 
broker-dealers and others to avoid fiduciary standing by the simple 
expedient of clearly stating that their advice is not intended to be the 
primary basis of the plan’s investments. With the growth of defined 
contribution plans, brokers advising persons on their IRA accounts, 
especially when those persons roll substantial defined contribution plans 
from their former employers into personal IRA accounts, this possibility 
has become controversial. 
In 2010, the Department of Labor proposed rulemaking to define as 
fiduciaries persons who render investment advice to plans for a fee.123 
Large parts of the investment advisory business lobbied intensely 
against the proposal, and found the support of numerous legislators,124 
and in 2012, the Department of Labor withdrew the proposal.125 
However the issue did not disappear, and in February 2015, President 
Obama endorsed stricter standards in the form of a new, as of then 
unpublished, Department of Labor rule.126 The Department of Labor’s 
consideration of the matter has been complicated by the SEC’s 
                                                                                                                 
 122. See Stein, supra note 121, at 565. 
 123. Florence Olsen, DOL Says It Will Repropose Fiduciary Rule, Citing Need to 
Do Further Economic Analysis, 43 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1951 (2011); US Labor 
Department’s EBSA to Re-Propose Rule on Definition of a Fiduciary, DOL (Sept. 19, 
2011), [hereinafter Fiduciary Definition] http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/newsroom/2011/11-
1382-NAT.html [http://perma.cc/622W-RBJ7]. 
 124. See Definition of the Term “Fiduciary” Proposed Rule, DOL, 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/regs/cmt-1210-AB32.html [http://perma.cc/3CB6-8796] (coll- 
ecting commentary); Stein, supra note 121, at 569. 
 125. See GAO, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS, 401(K) PLANS: LABOR 
AND IRS COULD IMPROVE THE ROLLOVER PROCESS FOR PARTICIPANTS 11-13 (2013), 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/652881.pdf [http://perma.cc/6W92-ZGK9]. 
 126. See Andrew Ackerman & Karen Damato, Obama Backs New Rules for Brokers 
on Retirement Accounts, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 2015, at C2. 
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consideration of whether to impose fiduciary duties on all brokers and 
dealers.127 
In April 2015, the Department of Labor proposed a rule to extend 
the definition of “fiduciary” to extend to more persons who give 
investment advice to plans, participants, or beneficiaries, including 
individual retirement account plans.128 This proposal engendered a 
remarkable amount of opposition and controversy,129 including 
aggressive television advertising by industry groups (acting as 
“Americans to Protect Family Security”) urging viewers to contact their 
senators and representatives in opposition.130 
ERISA requires that all benefit plan assets other than insurance be 
held in trust.131 This requirement itself works indirectly to create 
fiduciary responsibilities, and the trust requirement results in the 
application of “rules and remedies similar to those under traditional trust 
law to govern the conduct of fiduciaries.”132 In addition to the trust 
requirement and aside from the prohibited-transactions provisions, the 
fiduciary-responsibility provisions in the labor portion impose three 
principal obligations that affect investment managers: 
 
                                                                                                                 
 127. See infra text accompanying notes 293-305; see also Joyce, supra note 127; 
Maria Lokshin, supra note 127. 
 128. See Sean Forbes, Senators Demand Revisions to DOL Fiduciary Proposal, 
SEC. L. DAILY (Aug. 7, 2015); Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest 
Rule—Retirement Investment Advice, 80 Fed. Reg. 21928 (Apr. 20, 2015) (to be 
codified at 29 C.F.R. 2509, 2510). 
 129. See, e.g., SIFMA Pitches Best-Interest Standard as Counter to DOL Proposed 
Fiduciary Rule, 47 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1129 (June 3, 2015). 
 130. See TV Attack Ads Stoke Debate Over DOL Proposal, FINANCIAL ADVISOR IQ 
(Aug. 17, 2015), http://financialadvisoriq.com/c/1178843/128453 [http://perma.cc/GE9 
Q-9VSR]. 
 131. ERISA § 403, 29 U.S.C. § 1103. 
 132. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1280 (1974); see also Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 
489 U.S. 101, 100-11 (1989) (“ERISA’s legislative history confirms that the Act’s 
fiduciary responsibility provisions, ‘codif[y] and mak[e] applicable to [ERISA] 
fiduciaries certain principles developed in the evolution of the law of trusts.’ Given this 
language and history, we have held that courts are to develop a ‘federal common law of 
rights and obligations under ERISA-regulated plans.’ In determining the appropriate 
standard of review for actions under [ERISA], we are guided by principles of trust 
law.”) (citations omitted). 
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(1) Delegation. The controlling instrument, which must be in 
writing,133 can delegate investment management responsibility only 
through a fiduciary named in the instrument.134 
(2)  Fiduciary duties. An investment manager must invest “solely in 
the interest” of plan participants and beneficiaries,135 and it must do so in 
accordance with a statutory standard of prudence,136 including prudence 
in diversification of investments.137 
                                                                                                                 
 133. ERISA § 402(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1). 
 134. ERISA § 402(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(c)(3); see also ERISA § 403(a)(2), 29 
U.S.C. § 1103(a)(2). 
 135. ERISA § 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1). 
 136. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (“with the care, skill, 
prudence and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man 
acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an 
enterprise of a like character and with like aims”). Section 404(a)(1)(B) is discussed 
extensively at § 8.02[B][1]. As discussed infra note 91, the prudence standard is relaxed 
to a certain extent in employee stock ownership plans, at least to the extent prudence 
would otherwise require diversification. 
 137. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C) (“by diversifying . . . so as to 
minimize the risk of large losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent 
not to do so”). In interposing the word “clearly,” Congress intended to place the burden 
of proof on justification of nondiversification on the investment manager or such other 
parties as were responsible for diversification. H.R. Rep. No. 1280, at 304 (1974). 
Congress declined, however, to give more than general guidance with respect to 
diversification requirements, preferring to have the meaning of “diversification” turn on 
the facts of each case. For cases discussing ERISA’s diversification requirement. See, 
e.g., Lanka v. O’Higgins, 810 F. Supp. 379 (N.D.N.Y. 1992); Marshall v. Glass/Metal 
Ass’n, 507 F. Supp. 378 (D. Haw. 1980); Dimond v. Ret. Plan for Emps. of Michael 
Baker, 582 F. Supp. 892 (W.D. Pa. 1983); Freund v. Marshall & Ilsley State Bank, 485 
F. Supp. 629 (W.D. Wis. 1979). For a discussion of the meaning of diversification 
measured by contemporary investment theory, see BINES & THEL, supra note 7, at §§ 
7.03[C][4], 8.04[B], and for further discussion of ERISA’s diversification provision, 
see § 8.02[B][1]. 
  One obvious departure from meeting ordinary diversification (and, to some 
extent, prudence) standards is the employee stock ownership plan (“ESOP”). ERISA 
defines an ESOP in Sections 407(d)(6) (29 U.S.C. § 1107(d)(6), and 2003(a) (I.R.C. § 
4975(e)(7)), as a qualified defined benefit plan “designed to invest primarily in 
employer securities.” Section 407 pertains, among other things, to holding employer 
securities. Section 404(a)(2) of ERISA (29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(2)) exempts an ESOP 
from statutory diversification requirements, but not from statutory prudence 
requirements except as diversification is deemed an element of prudence. To the extent 
an ESOP is for the purpose of providing incentives to employees through participatory 
ownership, the meaning to be given statutory prudence as applied to investment in 
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(3) Co-fiduciary duties. As an ERISA fiduciary, an investment 
manager incurs liability for the acts of a co-fiduciary if the manager 
knowingly participates in, conceals, fails to take reasonable steps to 
remedy, or, by its own wrong, enables the commission of a breach of 
duty by the co-fiduciary.138 
                                                                                                                 
employer securities may receive guidance from Section 402(b)(1) (29 U.S.C. § 
1102(b)(1)), which requires a plan to provide for “a funding policy and method 
consistent with the objectives of the plan.” Many circuit courts adopted the so-called 
Moench presumption, holding that “an ESOP fiduciary who invests the assets in 
employer stock is entitled to a [rebuttable] presumption that it acted consistently with 
ERISA by virtue of that decision.”). See Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553, 569 (3d 
Cir. 1995), abrogated in part by Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 134 S.Ct. 2459 
(2014); see also Kuper v. Iovenko, 66 F.3d 1447 (6th Cir. 1995) (following Moench); 
Henry L. Blackiston III, ESOPs: What They Are and How They Work, 45 BUS. LAW. 85 
(1989); Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA’s Fundamental Contradiction: The 
Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1105, 1154 (1988); Henry Hansmann, When 
Does Worker Ownership Work? ESOPs, Law Firms, Codetermination, and Economic 
Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1749 (1990); John M. Wilson, Note, Are All ERISA 
Fiduciaries Created Alike?: Moench v. Robertson, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 255 (1996); cf. 
Matthew T. Bodie, Aligning Incentives with Equity: Employee Stock Options and Rule 
10b-5, 88 IOWA L. REV. 539, 556 (2003) (“[C]ourts have split over whether ESOPs 
constitute securities, mainly due to conflicts over the application of Daniel’s 
‘compulsory, noncontributory’ analysis.”). However, in Fifth Third Bankcorp v. 
Dudenhoeffer, the Supreme Court unanimously rejected the presumption of prudence.  
See Fifth Third Bankcorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 134 S.Ct. 2459 (2014). 
  Another aspect of prudence might be the proper valuation of employer 
securities. See ERISA § 407(e), 29 U.S.C. § 1107(e); see also 1975-50 I.R.B. 16, Rev. 
Rul. 69-65, 1969-1 C.B. 114; cf. Canale v. Yegen, 782 F. Supp. 963 (D.N.J. 1992). 
Particularly difficult issues of prudence are presented in connection with ESOP’s voting 
employer common stock and responding to tender offers. See, e.g., Herman v. 
NationsBank Trust Co., 126 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 816 
(1998); see also Steven J. Arsenault, Fiduciary Duties of ESOP Trustees Under ERISA 
in Tender Offers: The Impact of Herman v. NationsBank Trust Company and a 
Proposal for Reform, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 87 (2000); Brett McDonnell, ESOPs’ 
Failures: Fiduciary Duties When Managers of Employee-Owned Companies Vote to 
Entrench Themselves, 2000 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 199 (2000). 
 138. ERISA § 405(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a). There is no cause of action for damages 
against nonfiduciaries who participate in fiduciary violations. See Mertens v. Hewitt 
Assoc., 508 U.S. 248 (1993). But see Harris Tr. & Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney 
Inc., 530 U.S. 238 (2000) (nonfiduciary party in interest liable for prohibited 
transaction). 29 C.F.R. §§ 2510.3-21(c)-(d)(2015) and 26 C.F.R. §§ 54.4975-9(c)-
(d)(2015), interpreting the statutory term “investment advice” as it appears in Sections 
3(2) and 2003(a) of ERISA, take the position that an investment manager who is a 
statutory fiduciary with respect to assets it manages shall not be deemed a fiduciary 
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The prohibited-transactions provisions bear special note. The 
remedies and liabilities applicable to prohibited transactions are far 
more extensive than those applicable to other breaches of duty under the 
statute.139 In addition to the general criminal, legal, and equitable 
remedies specified in Sections 501 through 502,140 and the personal 
liability in damages that Section 409(a) provides against fiduciaries for 
their breaches of duty,141 an investment manager participating in a 
prohibited transaction is answerable for civil fine under the labor 
provisions,142 and mandatory excise taxes under the tax provisions.143 
The general principle is that, unless expressly exempted, any 
transaction (1) with an employee benefit plan by a fiduciary for its own 
account, or (2) between a plan and a party in interest (under the labor 
provisions) or a disqualified person (under the tax provisions) caused by 
a fiduciary is prohibited. Although there are linguistic differences, the 
definition of fiduciary with respect to investment management seems 
operatively the same in both parts of the statute,144 and the definitions of 
                                                                                                                 
with respect to other assets, the management of which is not its responsibility. But 
while those regulations (discussed more fully at BINES & THEL, supra note 7, at § 
11.02[B][4]) save an investment manager from fiduciary status with respect to such 
other assets, they do not on their face limit the scope of Section 405(a). Thus, for 
example, an investment manager, aware of imprudent investing by another investment 
manager, may have an obligation to take reasonable steps to remedy that situation. 
 139. See Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985) (discussing 
ERISA policy against self-dealing); Arthur H. Kroll & Yale D. Tauber, Fiduciary 
Responsibility and Prohibited Transactions Under ERISA, 14 REAL PROP. PROB. & 
TRUST J. 657 (1979). Compare Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 260-62 (1993) 
(holding a non-fiduciary not liable for breach of duty by fiduciary), with Harris Trust & 
Sav. Bank, 530 U.S. at 241 (2000) (non-fiduciary party in interest liable for prohibited 
transaction). 
 140. ERISA § 501-502, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1132; see also LaRue v. DeWolff, 
Boberg & Assocs., 552 U.S. 248 (2008). 
 141. ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a). For a discussion of the judicial treatment 
of liability for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA, see ZANGLEIN, FROLIK & 
STABILE, supra note 108, at 151-56. 
 142. ERISA § 502(i), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(i). 
 143. ERISA § 2003(a), I.R.C. §§ 4975(a), 4975(b). 
 144. The labor (29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-21) and tax (26 C.F.R. § 54.4975-9) regulations 
interpreting the term “fiduciary” with respect to investment management are identical. 
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party in interest (in the labor portion) and disqualified person (in the tax 
portion) are operatively equivalent.145 
In 2010, the Department of Labor proposed rulemaking to define as 
fiduciaries persons who render investment advice to plans for a fee, but 
in 2011 withdrew the proposal and announced it would re-propose the 
rule.146 The Department’s subsequent consideration of the matter has 
been complicated by the SEC’s consideration of whether to impose 
fiduciary duties on all brokers and dealers.147 
In view of the serious consequences facing investment managers 
subject to ERISA, it is important that there be no mistake about the 
status of one’s client. The labor and tax provisions affecting investment 
management activities apply to all employee benefit plans except those 
expressly excluded or exempted,148 whether or not the covered plans 
meet the funding, vesting, insurance, and other requirements of ERISA. 
The definitions of employee welfare benefit plan in Section 3(1)149 and 
employee pension benefit plan in Section 3(2)150 include most plans 
offering employee fringe and retirement benefits established or 
                                                                                                                 
 145. ERISA § 3(14), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14), defines “party in interest” to include 
“any fiduciary (including, but not limited to, any administrator, officer, trustee, or 
custodian), counsel, or employee of such employee benefit plan [or] a person providing 
services to such a plan.” ERISA § 2003(a), I.R.C. § 4975(e)(2), defines “disqualified 
person” to include “a fiduciary [or] a person providing services to the plan.” The labor 
and tax statutory provisions differ in an important respect. Section 406(a)(1) is violated 
if a fiduciary “knows or should know that the transaction constitutes a direct or indirect 
[prohibited transaction].” Section 4975(a)(1), which imposes an excise tax on “any 
disqualified person who participates in [a prohibited transaction],” has no comparable 
state-of-mind qualifying condition. Also, the event resulting in the prohibited 
transaction imposes the tax, subject to waiver (see I.R.C. C.F.R. § 54.4975-1(d)(2)); 
imposition of an administrative penalty is discretionary with the Secretary of Labor “if 
the transaction is not corrected” as prescribed by the Secretary. See ERISA § 502(i), 29 
U.S.C. § 1132(i). 
 146. Fiduciary Definition, supra note 123. 
 147. See infra text accompanying notes 293-305; see also Joyce, supra note 127; 
Lokshin, supra note 127. 
 148. See ERISA § 4, 29 U.S.C. § 1003. Application of the fiduciary responsibility 
provisions does not depend on the qualification of a plan. Unfunded deferred 
compensation plans for select employees and plans for retired partners, however, are 
specifically exempted from the fiduciary responsibility provisions. ERISA § 401(a), 29 
U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2012). 
 149. ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1). 
 150. ERISA § 3(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2). 
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maintained by an employee organization or employer, as those terms are 
defined in Sections 3(4)151 and 3(5).152 
2. The Uniform Management of Public Employee Retirement Systems 
Act 
In 1997, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws approved the Uniform Management of Public Employee 
Retirement Systems Act (“UMPERSA”).153 A principal purpose of 
UMPERSA is to establish the fiduciary obligations of those with 
“discretionary authority” over public retirement systems.154 UMPERSA 
is intended to replace state laws with broad statements of manager duty 
that the Commissioners found to preclude appropriate investments,155 
and is explicitly modeled on the Restatement (Third) of Trusts’ Prudent 
Investor Rule.156 
UMPERSA also draws from ERISA. Like ERISA, it requires 
system assets to be held in trust,157 and UMPERSA enacts exclusive-
benefit and fiduciary duty standards very similar to those found in 
ERISA.158 
C. CHARITABLE ENDOWMENT FUNDS 
1. Private Foundations: The Internal Revenue Code 
Before the Tax Reform Act of 1969,159 the only federal remedy for 
breaches of duty by investment managers serving private foundations 
was to disqualify such foundations from tax-preferred status. Now, 
                                                                                                                 
 151. ERISA § 3(4), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(4). 
 152. ERISA § 3(5), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(5). 
 153. 7A U.L.A. 510 (1999). 
 154. Id. at 511. 
 155. Id.; see also BINES & THEL, supra note 7, at § 8.03[B][2]. 
 156. See BINES & THEL, supra note 7, at § 8.03[B][2]. 
 157. UNIF. MGMT. OF PUB. EMP. RET. SYS. ACT § 4 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1997). 
 158. See id. § 7. 
 159. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (1969). See generally 
W. Smith & C. Chiechi, Private Foundations Before and After the Tax Reform Act of 
1969 (American Enterprise Institute for Public Research, 1974). 
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Section 4944(a)(2)160 of the Internal Revenue Code and Regulation 
Section 53.4944-1(a)(2)161 (implementing the section) provide that 
foundation managers are subject to tax sanctions for making investments 
without exercising ordinary business care and prudence so that the 
purposes of the foundation are jeopardized. Investment managers who 
are officers, directors, or trustees of a foundation also are subject to the 
requirements of Section 4944(a)(2).162 In addition, they are defined in 
Section 4946(a)(1)(B)163 of the Code as disqualified persons subject to 
tax in the event they engage in certain self-dealing transactions with the 
foundation. Aside from the possibility of incurring direct personal tax 
liability, an investment manager may also face civil sanctions as a result 
of its relationship with a private foundation. The Code imposes taxes for 
violations on foundations as well as on foundation managers, with this 
important distinction: Whereas foundation managers can avoid personal 
liability if their involvement is not willful or due to lack of reasonable 
care, a foundation has no such defense. It may well be, therefore, that an 
investment manager whose investment policies are held to violate the 
requirements of the Code, such that the foundation suffers tax sanctions, 
will also incur state-law liability, prosecuted most likely by the state 
attorney general, for making imprudent investments that result in 
imposition of an excise tax. 
There are a number of organizations excepted from the Code’s 
private foundation classification, principally schools, churches, 
hospitals, and organizations receiving substantial support from 
governmental bodies.164 Management of these organizations’ 
investments presents less of a hazard to investment managers since there 
is one less regulatory authority to worry about. But the very distinction 
                                                                                                                 
 160. I.R.C. § 4944(a)(2) (2012). There is also a tax imposed directly on the 
foundation. I.R.C. § 4944(a)(1). The legislative history shows clearly that the tax on 
investments and on foundation managers is to be related to investment of foundation 
assets “in a way which jeopardizes their use for the organization’s exempt purpose.” S. 
REP. NO. 91-552, at 45 (1969). According to the Committee, investments are to be 
judged “in accordance with a ‘prudent trustee’ approach . . . .” Id. at 46; see also 
Summary of H.R. 13270, The Tax Reform Act of 1969, Staff Report of the Joint 
Comm. on Internal Revenue Taxation and the Comm. on Finance, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 
16-17 (Aug. 18, 1969). 
 161. 26 C.F.R. § 53.4944-1(a)(2) (2015). 
 162. I.R.C. § 4946(b). 
 163. Id. § 4946(a)(1)(B). 
 164. Id. § 509(a)(1). 
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in treatment afforded excepted organizations emphasizes the importance 
of properly identifying their status, especially since the statutory scheme 
provides that a foundation is classified as a private foundation unless 
exempt.165 Moreover, tax liabilities aside, on the question of investment 
policy, the standards of prudence developed for regulated foundations 
are equally well suited to setting standards of prudence for charitable 
endowment funds investing generally. The principal reason for tax 
regulation of private foundations is to prevent the use of foundations as 
tax havens. By regulating investment purpose, therefore, Congress 
insists that foundation endowments be managed consistently with the 
donative intent assumed to be the motive of contributors. Although there 
is little sign that Section 4944-1(a)(2) will be applied to do so, if federal 
tax law with respect to “prudent” investing for foundations develops 
further, such development could well serve as a broader model for other 
managers.166 
2. Charitable Organizations: The Uniform Prudent Management of 
Institutional Funds Act 
Although the enforcement problems for charitable institutions are 
different from those for private trusts,167 the trust duties of prudence and 
                                                                                                                 
 165. Id. § 509(a). 
 166. See BINES & THEL, supra note 7, at § 8.02[B][2][d]; cf. Rev. Rul. 78-90, 1978-
1 CB 380 (Jan. 1978) (low-interest loans consistent with charitable purpose). 
 167. Generally, the enforcement responsibility for breaches of duty to a charitable 
trust or corporation resides with the state attorney general. See, e.g., Cal. Gov. Code § 
12598(a) (“The primary responsibility for supervising charitable trusts in California, for 
insuring compliance with trusts and articles of incorporation, and for protection of 
assets held by charitable trusts and public benefit corporations, resides in the Attorney 
General.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 94(2) (AM. LAW. INST. 2012); UNIF. 
TRUST CODE § 110(d) (UNIF. TRUST COMM’N 2000) (“The [attorney general of this 
State] has the rights of a qualified beneficiary with respect to a charitable trust having 
its principal place of administration in this State.”); Bennet B. Harvey, Jr., The Public-
Spirited Defendant and Others: Liability of Directors and Officers of Not-For-Profit 
Corporations, 17 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 665, 696-99 (1984); Jennifer L. White, Note, 
When It’s OK to Sell the Monet: A Trustee-Fiduciary-Duty Framework for Analyzing 
the Deaccessioning of Art to Meet Museum Operating Expenses, 94 MICH. L. REV. 
1041 (1996). Nonetheless, persons with a special interest and settlors who have 
properly reserved enforcement authority may do so also. See Johnson v. Johnson, 515 
A.2d 255 (N.J. Super. 1986) (former trustee sued unsuccessfully for investment 
mismanagement, and for removal; attorney general joined for removal only); UNIF. 
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loyalty are essentially the same.168 Even so, in the investment 
environment after World War II, it became apparent that many of the 
                                                                                                                 
TRUST CODE § 405(c) (“The settlor of a charitable trust, among others, may maintain a 
proceeding to enforce the trust.”); id. cmt. (“Contrary to Restatement (Second) of Trusts 
§ 391 (1959), subsection (c) grants a settlor standing to maintain an action to enforce a 
charitable trust. The grant of standing to the settlor does not negate the right of the state 
attorney general or persons with special interests to enforce either the trust or their 
interests.”); SCOTT, FRATCHER & ASCHER, supra note 7, at § 37.3.10; cf. James v. 
Gerber Prods. Co., 483 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1974) (beneficiary of testamentary trust has 
standing under Rule 10b-5 to sue purchaser of securities sold from trust). Third parties 
dealing with a charitable organization retain their right to sue for breach of duty to 
them, even where the breach occurs in carrying out the charitable organization’s 
charitable purpose. See, e.g., Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat’l Training Sch. for 
Deaconesses and Missionaries, 381 F. Supp. 1003 (D.D.C. 1974). 
 168. According to the comments of Restatement (Third) of Trusts, P.I.R., § 389 cmt. 
(AM. LAW. INST. 1992), “[i]n making decisions and taking actions with respect to the 
investment of trust funds, the trustee of a charitable trust is under a duty similar to that 
of the trustee of a private trust. However, “social considerations may be taken into 
account in investing the funds of charitable trusts to the extent the charitable purposes 
would justify an expenditure of trust funds for the social issue or cause in question or to 
the extent the investment decision can be justified on grounds of advancing, financially 
or operationally, a charitable activity conducted by the trust.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TRUSTS § 90, cmt. c (AM. LAW. INST. 2007). RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS, P.I.R., 
§ 379 cmt. stated: 
The trustee of a charitable trust, like the trustee of a private trust, 
must comply with valid terms of the trust, except as the doctrine of 
cy pres is applied or deviation is authorized, and is subject to normal 
fiduciary duties: to administer the trust; to administer it solely in the 
interest of effectuating the charitable purposes; to act with 
impartiality with respect to different charitable purposes and 
different interests in the trust; to delegate as a prudent investor 
would delegate; to keep and render clear and accurate accounts with 
respect to the administration of the trust; to furnish complete and 
accurate information as to the nature and amount of the trust 
property; to exercise such care and skill in administering the trust as 
a manager of ordinary prudence would exercise; to take reasonable 
steps to assume and maintain control of the trust property; to use 
reasonable care and skill to preserve the trust property; to take 
reasonable steps to realize on claims that are a part of the trust 
property; to defend actions that may result in a loss to the trust 
estate, unless it is reasonable not to make such defense; to keep trust 
property separate from the trustee’s individual property; to act 
properly in making deposits of trust funds in a bank; to use 
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restrictions on the administration of private trusts were harming 
charitable trusts. In particular, trustees of charitable trusts desired clear 
authority to delegate investment responsibility to professional 
investment managers and to participate in a wider range of investment 
opportunities, as well as more power to disregard the distinction 
between principal and income in order to meet current expenses.169 With 
the publication of two influential reports on these matters concerning 
college endowment funds as a catalyst,170 the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws undertook to fashion a statute 
that would be responsive to the investment needs of charitable 
institutions. In 1972, the Conference approved the Uniform 
Management of Institutional Funds Act (“UMIFA”),171 which authorized 
the prudent expenditure of capital appreciation “for the uses and 
purposes for which an endowment fund is established,”172 the making of 
certain kinds of investments “without restriction to investments a 
fiduciary may make,”173 and the delegation of investment authority and 
                                                                                                                 
reasonable care and skill to make the trust property productive; and 
to incur expenses only on a reasonable basis. (citations omitted.) 
 169. If the terms of a charitable trust call for both the expenditure of income and 
preservation of corpus, they require the trustee to respond to both present and future 
objectives. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. i. 
 170. See CARY & BRIGHT, ENDOWMENT FUNDS, supra note 14; ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON ENDOWMENT MANAGEMENT, MANAGING EDUCATIONAL ENDOWMENTS: 
REPORT TO THE FORD FOUNDATION (1969); see also J. PETER WILLIAMSON, 
PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT AND INVESTMENT OBJECTIVES FOR EDUCATIONAL 
ENDOWMENT FUNDS (1972); William L. Cary & Craig B. Bright, The “Income” of 
Endowment Funds, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 396 (1969). 
 171. 7A U.L.A. 475 (1999). For a discussion on the influence of the federal rules on 
private foundations, see BINES & THEL, supra note 7, at § 2.04[C][1]. On the language 
of UMIFA, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 reporter’s notes. The UMIFA 
standard of care is discussed in BINES & THEL, supra note 7, at § 8.02[C]. 
 172. UNIF. MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 2. On the wisdom of using 
principal for current expenses, see The Harvard-Yale Game, 8 INSTITUTIONAL 
INVESTOR 46 (Sept. 1972); Let’s Not Strangle the Golden Goose: An Open Letter to 
Harvard’s President from Paul Cabot, id. at 50; see also Shakin, Down to Its Last $2 
Billion: Ford Foundation Is Tightening the Purse-Strings, BARRON’S, June 2, 1975, at 
11. 
 173. UNIF. MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 4. 
2016]    THE VARIETIES OF INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT LAW 119 
payment of compensation to “independent investment advisors, 
investment counsel or managers, banks, or trust companies . . . .”174 
Broadly speaking, trustees of charitable trusts are subject to the 
same duties of prudence and loyalty as are other trustees.175 UMIFA, 
however, restated the standard of care for members of a “governing 
board.”176 Under UMIFA, governing board members are subject to a 
standard of “ordinary business care and prudence under the facts and 
circumstances prevailing at the time of the action or decision.”177 The 
Commissioners described this standard as “generally comparable to that 
of a director of a business corporation rather than that of a private 
trustee,” and they explained their purpose as follows: 
Fear of liability of a private trustee may have a debilitating effect 
upon members of a governing board, who are often uncompensated 
public-spirited citizens. They are managers of nonprofit corporations 
guiding a unique and perhaps very large institution. The proper 
standard of responsibility is more analogous to that of a director of a 
business corporation than that of a professional private trustee. The 
Act establishes a standard of business care and prudence in the 
context of the operation of a nonprofit institution.178 
The extent to which UMIFA departs from the prudent-investor rule 
depends on the manner in which UMIFA is construed in states that 
adopted it.179 It is clear that a material distinction was intended. Indeed, 
even after the UMIFA was promulgated, some states, including 
Massachusetts, continued to favor a standard closely aligned, in 
language at least, with Harvard College. For example, long after that 
promulgation, Massachusetts law continued to provide that: 
                                                                                                                 
 174. Id. § 5. 
 175. See BINES & THEL, supra note 7, at § 2.04[C][2]. 
 176. UNIF. MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 1(4) (defining the governing 
board as “the body responsible for management” of a charitable institution or its funds). 
 177. Id. § 6. 
 178. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM 
STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE MEETING IN ITS EIGHTY-
FIRST YEAR 190 (1972). 
 179. See 5 SCOTT, FRATCHER & ASCHER, supra note 7, at § 37.3.8 n. 15 (adopting 
states). At the time UMIFA was approved, many states had a far more restrictive view 
of a trustee’s investment discretion than contemplated by Harvard College v. Amory, 26 
Mass. (9 Pick.) 446, 461 (1830), much less the rule as adopted in RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90. See 5 SCOTT, FRATCHER & ASCHER, supra note 7, at § 37.3.8. 
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No member of the governing board shall be liable for any action 
taken or omitted with respect to such appropriation or accumulation 
or with respect to the investment of institutional funds, including 
endowment funds, under the authority granted in this chapter, if such 
member shall have discharged the duties of his position in good faith 
and with that degree of diligence, care and skill which prudent men 
would ordinarily exercise under similar circumstances in a like 
position.180 
In 2006, the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
modified UMIFA, and renamed it the Uniform Prudent Management of 
Institutional Funds Act (“UPMIFA”).181 UPMIFA’s prudence standard 
no longer uses the “ordinary business care” language, but instead rings 
closer rings to Harvard College. Section 3(b) of UPMIFA provides in 
relevant part that, “each person responsible for managing and investing 
an institutional fund shall manage and invest the fund in good faith and 
with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would 
exercise under similar circumstances.”182 The comments noted the 
departure from the “ordinary business care and prudence” language of 
the UMIFA, but also stated that the new standard “is consistent with the 
business judgment standard under corporate law, as applied to 
charitable institutions.”183 
This was apparently enough for Massachusetts, which in 2009 
amended its Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act: 
“In addition to complying with the duty of loyalty imposed by law other 
than this chapter, each person responsible for managing and investing an 
                                                                                                                 
 180. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 180A § 8 (amended 2009); see also CAL. PROB. 
CODE § 18506(a) (repealed 2008) (“When investing, reinvesting, purchasing, acquiring, 
exchanging, selling, and managing property, appropriating appreciation, and delegating 
investment management for the benefit of an institution, the members of the governing 
board shall act with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances 
then prevailing that a prudent person acting in a like capacity and familiar with these 
matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of like character and with like aims to 
accomplish the purposes of the institution. In the course of administering the fund 
pursuant to this standard, individual investments shall be considered as part of an 
overall investment strategy.”). 
 181. UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT (2006). 
 182. Id. § 3(b). 
 183. Id. § 3 cmt. (emphasis in original); see also Susan N. Gary, Charities, 
Endowments, and Donor Intent: The Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional 
Funds Act, 41 GA. L. REV. 1277 (2007). 
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institutional fund shall manage and invest the fund in good faith and 
with the care that an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would 
exercise under similar circumstances.”184 
D. HOLDERS OF DEBT SECURITIES: THE TRUST INDENTURE ACT OF 1939 
The purpose of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939185 is to provide, 
through independent trustees, protection for holders of debt securities, 
which, because of the size of the issue and the number of security 
holders, must be issued under indentures and administered through a 
central supervising authority.186 In normal circumstances, the work of an 
indenture trustee involves administrative duties far more than 
investment management. Nonetheless, issuers occasionally seek to alter 
the security underlying their obligations, and the process of deciding 
whether to approve or disapprove can require investment analysis of 
high quality from an indenture trustee.187 Furthermore, should it be 
necessary for an indenture trustee to avail itself of its creditor’s 
remedies, issues involving more active investment management may 
arise. In all events, Section 315(c) of the Trust Indenture Act188 imposes 
on the trustee a statutory duty of prudence in carrying out all its 
responsibilities after default. Additionally, the theoretical independence 
of the indenture trustee frequently is unsupported by the facts, since 
indenture trustees usually have commercial relations with the debtor 
and, indeed, may obtain office by virtue of those relations. With 
middling effectiveness, the Trust Indenture Act also tries to deal with 
the conflicts of interest that occur when the indenture trustee is not truly 
independent. 
                                                                                                                 
 184. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 180A § 2 (West 2015) (following UPMIFA, but 
adding the word “that”); see also CAL. PROB. CODE § 18503(b) (West 2015). 
 185. See Trust Indenture Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 76-253, 53 Stat. 1149 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa—77bbbb (2012)). 
 186. See 4 LOSS, SELIGMAN & PAREDES, supra note 52, at ch. 4. 
 187. See, e.g., Royce De R. Barondes, An Economic Analysis of the Potential for 
Coercion in Consent Solicitations for Bonds, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 749 (1994); William 
W. Bratton, Jr., Corporate Debt Relationships: Legal Theory in a Time of 
Restructuring, 1989 DUKE L.J. 92, 172 (1989); Marcel Kahan, Rethinking Corporate 
Bonds: The Trade-off Between Individual and Collective Rights, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1040 (2002). 
 188. Trust Indenture Act § 315(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo(c). 
122 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXI 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
E. CROWDFUNDING 
The Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (the “JOBS Act”),189 
enacted in 2012, was designed to reduce the regulatory burden of the 
securities laws on businesses raising investment funds. Among other 
changes, it was intended to facilitate “crowdfunding,” by which ventures 
may use the internet to seek relatively small investments from large 
numbers of investors. The JOBS Act added Section 4(a)(6) to the 
Securities Act,190 which provides an exemption from registration under 
the Securities Act for small crowdfunding transactions provided, among 
other things, that the aggregate amount sold to any single issuer is 
limited to: 
 
(i) the greater of $2,000 or 5 percent of the annual income or net 
worth of such investor, as applicable, if either the annual income or the 
net worth of the investor is less than $100,000; and 
(ii) 10 percent of the annual income or net worth of such investor, 
as applicable, not to exceed a maximum aggregate amount sold of 
$100,000, if either the annual income or net worth of the investor is 
equal to or more than $100,000.191 
 
The exempted transactions must be conducted through a broker or a 
“funding portal” that complies with the requirements of new Section 4A 
of the Securities Act.192 The SEC’s proposed implementation of the 
crowdfunding provisions of the JOBS Act was criticized, and it is not 
clear how the crowdfunding market will evolve, if it does.193 However, 
the statute contemplates that brokers and funding portals will play a 
central role in crowdfunding. Among other things, they will screen 
                                                                                                                 
 189. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 
306 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 190. JOBS Act § 4(a)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6). 
 191. JOBS Act § 4(a)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6). 
 192. 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1. 
 193. See, e.g., Brian Korn, The Trouble with Crowdfunding, FORBES (April 14, 
2013, 2:59 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/deborahljacobs/2013/04/17/the-trouble-
with-crowdfunding [http://perma.cc/9NU6-X2AM]; see also Ruth Simon & Angus 
Loten, Frustration Rises over Crowdfunding Rules, WALL ST. J. (April 30, 2014), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304163604579532251627028512 
[http://perma.cc/KS6L-NJU2]. 
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investors to assure that they do not over-invest. In October 2015, the 
SEC adopted a regulatory framework for crowdfunding under the JOBS 
Act, and much of the very long adopting release focused on the 
qualifications and obligations of fund portals and broker 
intermediaries.194 
F. MUNICIPAL ADVISERS 
In 2010, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (the “Dodd-Frank Act”)195 amended Section 15B of the 
Exchange Act to require “municipal advisers” to register with the 
SEC.196 Municipal advisers are persons who are not municipal entities, 
or employees who give advice to or on behalf of municipal entities with 
respect to municipal financial products, or the issuance of municipal 
securities, or solicit municipal entities.197 This broad definition 
encompasses “financial advisors, guaranteed investment contract 
brokers, third-party marketers, placement agents, solicitors, finders, and 
swap advisors” that advise municipalities.198 The focus of the regulatory 
scheme relates largely to the issuance of securities by municipalities, but 
the definition of “municipal financial product”199 includes “investment 
strategies,” which in turn includes plans or programs for the investment 
of proceeds of municipal securities.200 
In November 2013, the SEC adopted Rules 15Ba1-1 through 15Ba-
8,201 which establish a registration regime for municipal advisers and 
require them to keep records.202 The rules were to become effective in 
January 2014, but the Commission temporarily stayed the rules and 
                                                                                                                 
 194. Securities Act Release No. 9974 (Oct. 30, 2015); see also Securities Act 
Release No. 9470, (CCH) FED. SEC. L. REP. ¶ 80,470 (Oct. 23, 2013) (proposing 
release). 
 195. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank) Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 15 U.S.C.). 
 196. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(a)(1). 
 197. Securities Exchange Act § 15B(e)(4)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(e)(4)(A). 
 198. Exchange Act Release. Release No. 70462 at 35 (Sept. 20, 2013). 
 199. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(e)(5). 
 200. Securities Exchange Act § 15B(e)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(e)(2). 
 201. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.15Ba1-1—240.15Ba-8 (2015). 
 202. Registration of Municipal Advisors, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-
70462 (September 20, 2013), 78 Fed. Reg. 67467 (Nov. 12, 2013). 
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related forms until July 1, 2014, to allow market participants adapting 
their policies and procedures to comply with the rules.203 
IV. REGULATION BY TYPE OF MANAGER 
The primary sources of professional investment management 
services are the trust departments of banks, insurance companies (which 
manage variable annuity and variable life insurance products through 
separate accounts registered as investment companies), investment 
advisers and counselors, and brokerage firms. Although some cross-
regulation occurs, separate regulatory systems control most of these 
organizations. Moreover, they are subject not only to different sets of 
rules, but also to regulation by different administrative authorities. 
A. BANK TRUST DEPARTMENTS: REGULATION BY THE FEDERAL RESERVE 
AND THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY 
Because bank trust departments receive their authority to act from, 
and are regulated by, both state and federal authorities,204 their 
investment management duties and obligations may differ depending on 
the jurisdiction exercising regulatory authority. Since federal law 
governing national banks is broader than state law in coverage and is 
representative of relevant state law in design, federal law is the model 
used in this Article. The trust law obligations of state banks are 
generally a matter of state trust law.205 
The Federal Reserve Act conferred authority on the Federal 
Reserve Board to grant trust powers to national banks, a power now held 
                                                                                                                 
 203. Registration of Municipal Advisors; Temporary Stay of Final Rule, Securities 
and Exchange Act Release No. 34-71288, (Jan. 13, 2014). 
 204. See 5 SCOTT, FRATCHER & ASCHER, supra note 7, at § 11.1.6.2; see also Lewis 
v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27 (2000) (holding unconstitutional state statute 
that prohibited out-of-state banks from owning or controlling in-state provider of 
investment advisory services). 
 205. See FEIN, supra note 46, at § 12.03; see also 5 SCOTT, FRATCHER & ASCHER, 
supra note 7, § at 11.1.6.2. For nonmember state banks required to become insured by 
the FDIC, the FDIC inspects trust activities, formerly in conformity with national bank 
inspection requirements under Regulation 9 (12 C.F.R. pt. 9 (2015)), but now subject to 
the standards set by the FDIC, except for 12 C.F.R. § 9.18 (“Collective Investment 
Funds”). See FDIC Trust Examination Manual § 1.B (2001). 
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by the Comptroller of the Currency.206 Initial rudimentary controls over 
the trust activities of national banks appeared as early as 1933 in the 
Glass-Steagall Act207 (substantial portions of the Glass-Steagall Act 
were repealed in 1999).208 At present, the most significant federal 
regulations are those of the Comptroller of the Currency, who was 
authorized in 1962 to grant fiduciary powers to national banks by 
special permit, so long as those trust activities do not violate local 
law.209 A number of traditional restrictions, such as a prohibition of 
commingling trust accounts and general funds, were also enacted at that 
time. 
The enabling statute itself contemplates that the trust powers of 
national banks will mirror those of local state banks.210 Generally, a 
                                                                                                                 
 206. 12 U.S.C. § 92a(a) (2012). The Federal Reserve Act has been amended so 
frequently that no useful catalogue of its codification is possible save a statement that, 
as amended, it is generally dispersed throughout Title 12 of the United States Code. 
 207. Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall Act), ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 , repealed in 
part by Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 101(a), 113 Stat. 1338, 1341 
(1999). The Glass-Steagall Act was designed primarily to “reduce the risk that 
inventory losses in speculative securities might jeopardize the stability of banks and the 
banking system,” Gerald T. Dunne, Glass-Steagall Act—A History of Its Legislative 
Origins and Regulatory Construction, 92 BANKING L. J. 38, 41-42 (1975), and was 
directed mainly at banks dealing in securities for their own accounts. Banks 
traditionally acted as trustees and managing agents for individual accounts, and this 
activity did not violate the Glass-Steagall Act’s separation of investment and 
commercial banking. See Invest. Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971). Thus, 
ordinary bank trust activities did not implicate the Glass-Steagall Act. See FEIN, supra 
note 46, at § 12.04[E]. Nevertheless, the legislative history of the Act did contain some 
indication of concern with the activities of trust departments, see, for example, 77 
CONG. REC. 3491-3493 (1933) (remarks of Rep. McFadden), and many provisions of 
the statute could have application in that area. See, e.g., Invest Co. Inst., 401 U.S. at 617 
(prohibiting collective agency accounts). The Glass-Steagall Act, its post-enactment 
history and its partial repeal by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act are extensively discussed 
in FEIN, supra note 46, ch. 1, 4. 
 208. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 101(a), 113 Stat. 1338, 1341 
(1999). 
 209. 12 U.S.C § 92a(a). 
 210. See id. (The “Comptroller of the Currency shall be authorized and empowered 
to grant by special permit to national banks applying therefor, when not in 
contravention of State or local law, the right to act as trustee, executor, administrator, 
registrar of stocks and bonds, guardian of estates, assignee, receiver, committee of 
estates of lunatics, or in any other fiduciary capacity in which State banks, trust 
companies, or other corporations which come into competition with national banks are 
permitted to act under the laws of the State in which the national bank is located.”); see 
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national bank may not exercise fiduciary powers without first obtaining 
approval from the Office of the Comptroller.211 Part 9 of the 
Comptroller’s regulations governs the fiduciary activities of national 
banks.212 Although its various rules are largely directed at trust 
administration from the view of preventing unsound activities that might 
expose a bank to liability, Part 9 does deal with the manner in which 
those assets are managed, particularly with respect to collective 
investment funds.213 As a supplement to the regulations, the Comptroller 
publishes general guidelines and issues opinions on specific matters, 
including a series of relevant handbooks.214 
                                                                                                                 
also OCC, Annual Reviews of Fiduciary Accounts Pursuant to 12 C.F.R. § 9.6(c) (Mar. 
27, 2008), http://occ.gov/news-issuances/bulletins/2008/bulletin-2008-10.html [http://pe 
rma.cc/3VCG-DCN7]; Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Fiduciary Activities 
of National Banks, 66 Fed. Reg. 34,792 (July 2, 2001) (stating that “[t]he Contravention 
Clause in section 92a(a) requires that a national bank look to the laws of the state in 
which it acts, or proposes to act, in a fiduciary capacity to determine what fiduciary 
capacities are permissible.”). The Comptroller’s rules require national banks to “invest 
funds of a fiduciary account in a manner consistent with applicable law,” 9 C.F.R. § 
9.11, and define “applicable law” to mean “the law of a state or other jurisdiction 
governing a national bank’s fiduciary relationships, any applicable Federal law 
governing those relationships, the terms of the instrument governing a fiduciary 
relationship, or any court order pertaining to the relationship.” 9 C.F.R. § 9.2(b). 
 211. 12 C.F.R. § 9.3, § 5.26; see also id. § 9.2(g) (defining “fiduciary powers”). 
Once a national bank has obtained the Comptroller’s permission to exercise fiduciary 
powers, it generally need not obtain prior approval to engage in other fiduciary 
activities or to exercise those powers in another state, but instead need only give notice. 
See id. § 9.3(b); see also Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Fiduciary Activities 
of National Banks, 66 Fed. Reg. 34,792 (July 2, 2001). The Comptroller may also 
charter national banks that limit themselves to the operation of trust companies. See 12 
U.S.C. § 27(a). 
 212. 12 C.F.R. pt. 9; see also BINES & THEL, supra note 7, at § 8.02[B][2][a]. 
 213. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 9.11 (investment of fiduciary funds); id. § 9.18 
(collective investment funds); see also id. § 9.4 (administration of trust activities); id. § 
9.5 (written procedures); id. § 9.6 (review of accounts); id. § 9.8 (recordkeeping); id. § 
9.9 (audits of fiduciary activities); id. § 9.10 (funds awaiting investment or 
distribution); id. § 9.12 (conflicts of interest); id. § 9.13 (custody of assets); id. § 9.15 
(compensation). 
 214. See, e.g., Office of the Comptroller, Comptroller’s Handbook: Asset 
Management: Collective Investment Funds (May 2014); Office of the Comptroller, 
Comptroller’s Handbook: Asset Management: Retirement Plan Products and Services 
(Feb. 2014); Office of the Comptroller, Comptroller’s Handbook: Asset Management: 
Unique and Hard-tot0-Value Assets (Aug. 2012); Office of the Comptroller, 
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In addition to traditional trust services, banks increasingly offered 
investment advisory services and brokerage services to institutional and 
retail customers even under the strictures of the Glass-Steagall Act. By 
1989, for example, the Federal Reserve Board ruled that the parent of a 
national bank could provide investment advisory and brokerage services 
to institutional and retail customers through a subsidiary.215 With the 
partial repeal of Glass-Steagall, banks and their affiliates have even 
greater authority to offer advisory, brokerage, fiduciary and mutual fund 
services, albeit sometimes under supervision of the SEC. 
As banks expanded their investment management and other 
activities relating to the securities markets, the SEC sought regulatory 
authority over bank securities activities, including those of trust 
departments.216 The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act extended the SEC’s 
authority over certain bank activities, under the guise of functional 
regulation, but traditional bank trust activities remain outside 
Commission control.217 Gramm-Leach-Bliley also repealed the long-
standing exclusion of banks from the definition of “broker” in the 
Exchange Act.218 Banks that meet the statutory definition (i.e., any 
person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for 
the account of others) still are not brokers if they confine their activities 
to trust activities (and certain others).219 Specifically, Section 
3(a)(4)(B)(ii) provides that a bank shall not be considered a broker 
where the bank effects transactions in a trustee capacity, or effects 
                                                                                                                 
Comptroller’s Handbook: Asset Management Operations and Controls (Jan. 2011); 
Office of the Comptroller, Comptroller’s Handbook: Asset Management (Dec. 2000); 
Office of the Comptroller, Comptroller’s Handbook: Conflicts of Interest (Jan. 
2015June 2000); Comptroller’s Handbook: Investment Management Services (Aug. 
2001); Office of the Comptroller, Comptroller’s Handbook: Personal Fiduciary 
Activities (Feb. 2015). These publications are available on the Office of the 
Comptroller’s web site. See OCC,  http://www.occ.treas.gov/handbook/amgt.htm 
[http://perma.cc/5AGX-EGX2]; see also OCC, THE DIRECTOR’S BOOK 61-64 (2010) 
http://www.occ.treas.gov/director.pdf [http://perma.cc/CB62-2N6Q] (director responsi- 
bility for administering trust activities), 
 215. PNC Financial Corp. [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] FED. BANKING L. REP. 
(CCH) ¶ 87,614 (Mar. 14, 1989); see also FEIN, supra note 46, at §§ 1.03, 1.04, 1.05 
(chronicling regulatory and judicial relief for banks). 
 216. See FEIN, supra note 46, at § 3.01[C](1)B]. 
 217. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999). 
 218. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 201; see also Securities Exchange Act § 3(a)(4), 15 
U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (defining “broker”). 
 219. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(B). 
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transactions in a fiduciary capacity in its trust department or other 
department that is regularly examined by bank examiners for 
compliance with fiduciary principles and standards, and— 
 
(I) is chiefly compensated for such transactions, consistent with 
fiduciary principles and standards, on the basis of an administration or 
annual fee (payable on a monthly, quarterly, or other basis), a 
percentage of assets under management, or a flat or capped per order 
processing fee equal to not more than the cost incurred by the bank in 
connection with executing securities transactions for trustee and 
fiduciary customers, or any combination of such fees; and 
(II) does not publicly solicit brokerage business, other than by 
advertising that it effects transactions in securities in conjunction with 
advertising its other trust activities.220 
 
In addition to subjecting banks to “fiduciary principles and 
standards,” this statutory exclusion is conditioned on the banks’ 
directing trades in publicly traded securities to a registered broker or 
dealer for execution.221 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley also changed the way that banks are treated 
under the Exchange Act’s definition of “dealer.”222 Banks are no longer 
excluded in total from the definition, but a bank is not a dealer merely 
because it “buys or sells securities for investment purposes . . . for 
accounts for which the bank acts as a trustee or fiduciary.”223 In sum, 
and speaking broadly, banks are now subject to SEC regulation if they 
are brokers and dealers, but traditional trust activities do not make banks 
brokers or dealers. 
In May 2001, the SEC adopted “interim final rules” to implement 
the new exclusions for banks, but extended the general exception from 
broker-dealer registration until October 1, 2001.224 Banks and bank 
                                                                                                                 
 220. Id. § 78c(a)(4)(B)(ii); see also id. § 78c(a)(4)(D) (defining “fiduciary 
capacity”). 
 221. Id. § 78c(a)(4)(C). 
 222. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 202; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5) (defining 
“dealer”). 
 223. Securities Exchange Act § 3(a)(5)(C)(ii), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5)(C)(ii). 
 224. SEC, Definition of Terms in and Specific Exemptions for Banks, Savings 
Associations, and Savings Banks Under Sections 3(a)(4) and 3(a)(5) of the Securities 
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regulators alike criticized the rules intensely, and in response, the 
Commission extended the exemption from registration and proposed 
further changes in the rules.225 The Commission finally adopted final 
rules in February 2003, which deal primarily with the exclusion for 
banks dealing with asset-backed securities.226 
In 2004, the SEC proposed a new Regulation B, which would 
permit banks, thrifts and credit unions to affect a variety of securities 
transactions without coming within the definition of “broker” within the 
Exchange Act.227 After proposing Regulation B, the SEC further 
extended the temporary exemption of banks, savings associations, and 
savings banks from the definition of “broker” to give itself time to 
consider comments to Regulation B and particularly harsh criticism 
from bank regulators.228 Subsequently, the Financial Services 
                                                                                                                 
Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 44291, 66 Fed. Reg. 27,760 (May 
18, 2001). 
 225. SEC, Definition of Terms in and Specific Exemptions for Banks, Savings 
Associations, and Savings Banks Under Sections 3(a)(4) and 3(a)(5) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 46745, 67 Fed. Reg. 67,496 (Nov. 5, 
2002). 
 226. SEC, Definition of Terms in and Specific Exemptions for Banks, Savings 
Associations, and Savings Banks Under Sections 3(a)(4) and 3(a)(5) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 47364, 68 Fed. Reg. 8686, (Feb. 24, 
2003). But see id. at 8695 n.83 (stating “[w]e note, however, that in giving meaning to 
the term ‘fiduciary’ in Section 3(a)(5)(C)(ii), we look to the legislative history. The 
legislative history states that [Exchange Act Section 3(a)(5)] “‘excepts a bank from the 
definition of ‘dealer’ when it buys and sells securities for investment purposes for the 
bank or for accounts for which the bank acts as trustee or fiduciary. This mirrors 
existing law distinguishing between investors and dealers, and is limited to the portfolio 
trading of the bank and accounts for which it makes investment decisions.”“) (citing 
H.R. REP. NO. 106-74, pt. 3, at 170-171 (1999)). 
 227. Exchange Act Release No. 49,879, 69 Fed. Reg. 39,682 (June 30, 2004); see 
also Timothy R. McTaggart, Thrift Exception under the Investment Advisers act: The 
Thrifts Quests for Parity with the Banks, INV. LAW., Mar. 2005, at 10; SEC Proposes 
Rule for Bank Brokers, Sees Ongoing Dialogue with Bank Regulators, 36 SEC. REG. & 
L. REP. 1021 (2004). 
 228. Order Extending Temporary Exemption of Banks, Savings Associations, and 
Savings Banks From the Definition of “Broker” under Section 3(a)(4) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 50,618, 69 Fed. Reg. 64,607 (Nov. 
5, 2004). Bank regulators harshly criticized proposed Regulation B. Regulators 
Criticize SEC Bank Proposals, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 2004, at C3. The Federal Reserve 
Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency filed a critical comment letter with the SEC on Oct. 8, 2004. BD. OF 
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FDIC, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE 
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Regulatory Relief Act of 2006 directed the Federal Reserve Board and 
the SEC to adopt a single set of rules to implement the Exchange Act’s 
bank exception.229 At the end of 2006, the SEC and the Federal Reserve 
Board jointly proposed rules that would make clear that the exception 
extends to banks involved in a relatively wide variety of securities-
related activities or referring customers to registered broker-dealers.230 
At the same time, the SEC withdrew proposed Regulation B.231 
In 2007, the SEC and the Federal Reserve Board jointly adopted 
final rules, designated Regulation R, that except banks from the 
definition of “broker” when they engage in certain third-party 
networking arrangements and trust and fiduciary, sweep, custody, and 
safekeeping activities.232 The agencies also indicated that they would 
thenceforth act jointly in issuing interpretations and no-action letters 
concerning the new rules. 
B. INVESTMENT ADVISERS: THE INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT OF 1940 
The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the “Investment Advisers 
Act” or “Advisers Act”),233 originally designed as little more than a 
                                                                                                                 
CURRENCY, COMMENT LETTER ISSUED ON THE SEC’S PROPOSED BROKER RULES FOR 
BANKS (2004), http://www.occ.gov/static/news-issuances/news-releases/2004/nr-ia-
2004-93.pdf [http://perma.cc/T7VY-U5BB]. 
 229. Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-351 §101, 
120 Stat. 1966 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §78c(a)(4)(F) (2012)). 
 230. Definitions of Terms and Exemptions Relating to the “Broker” Exceptions for 
Banks, Exchange Act Release No. 54945, 2006 SEC LEXIS 2942 (Dec. 18, 2006). The 
Regulatory Relief Act also amended the definition of “bank” in Exchange Act §3(a)(6) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §78c(a)(6)) to include federal savings associations 
and other savings associations insured by the FDIC, and the proposed rules would apply 
to their status as broker as well. 
 231. Definitions of Terms and Exemptions Relating to the “Broker” Exceptions for 
Banks, Exchange Act Release No. 54945, 2006 SEC LEXIS 2942 (Dec. 18, 2006). 
 232. 17 C.F.R. § 247.100 to 247.781 (2015); see Definitions of Terms and 
Exemptions Relating to the “Broker” Exceptions for Banks, Exchange Act Release No. 
56,501, 72 Fed. Reg. 56,514, 2007 SEC Lexis 2169 (Oct. 3, 2007); see also Exchange 
Act Release No. 56,501A, 73 Fed. Reg. 20,779 (Apr. 17, 2008) (technical 
amendments); David F. Freeman, Jr., SEC and Federal Reserve Finalize Regulation R, 
Bank Broker and Dealer Exemptions, INV. LAW. Nov. 2007, at 1. 
 233. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 et seq. In addition to the Investment Advisers Act, state 
Blue Sky laws also regulate investment advisers. 
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census-type licensing law,234 has become a statute with substantive 
regulatory power over investment managers. The provisions of the 
Advisers Act extend, according to the statutory definition of “investment 
adviser” in Section 202(a)(11),235 to every person in the business of 
offering investment advice to others for a fee, unless a statutory or 
regulatory exclusion is available. 
With certain important exceptions, statutory investment advisers 
must register with the SEC.236 The Advisers Act was amended in 1996 
in a manner designed to split the registration of investment advisers 
between the states and the SEC.237 As a result, an investment adviser 
that was not an adviser to a registered investment company could not 
register with the SEC if it had less than $25 million under management 
and was regulated (or required to be regulated) as an investment adviser 
in the state of its principal office.238 
                                                                                                                 
 234. In 1940, David Schenker, the Chief Counsel of the SEC Investment Trust 
Study, described the purposes of Title II of Section 3580, the SEC’s proposal for 
regulating investment companies and investment advisers, in the following terms: 
Now, I cannot impress too strongly upon the Senators the fact that 
our title 2 does not attempt to say who can be an investment 
counselor, and does not even remotely presume to undertake to pass 
upon their qualifications. All we say is that in order to get some idea 
of who is in this business and what is his background, you cannot 
use the mails to perform your investment counsel business unless 
you are registered with us. 
Hearings on S. 3580 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and 
Currency, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. Pt. 1, at 50 (1940). It should be noted however, that the 
title also contains antifraud and other prohibitory provisions directed at practices of 
advisers. See e.g., Investment Advisers Act § 206, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1970). These 
received some attention in debate: “[t]he bill makes fraudulent practices by investment 
advisers unlawful and requires investment advisers . . . to register with the Commission 
which is empowered to deny registration to individuals convicted . . . for securities 
frauds.” 86 CONG. REC. 9809 (1940) (remarks of Rep. Cole). 
 235. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11). 
 236. Id. § 80b-3. 
 237. National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 
110 Stat. 3416, 3437 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-20 (2014)); see Stevens 
& Tyler, supra note 61. 
 238. Investment Advisers Act § 203A, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a; see Rule 203A-1, 17 
C.F.R. § 275.203A-1 (increasing the $25 million threshold); see also Rule 203A-2, 17 
C.F.R. § 275.203A-2 (exemption from prohibition for certain small investment 
advisers) 
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In 2010, the Dodd-Frank Act pushed more small advisers into state 
regulation, increasing the threshold for federal regulation to $100 
million unless the adviser would have to register with 15 or more states 
or would not be subject to examination by the securities commissioner 
of its home state if it registered therein.239 The SEC adopted regulations 
implementing the change in 2011.240 A mid-sized adviser must register 
with the Commission unless it is registered with the securities 
commissioner in the state in which it maintains its principal place of 
business (or it would not be subject to examination as an investment 
adviser by the commissioner if it registered in that state).241 The 
commission adopted a new rule, Advisers Act Rule 203A-5,242 which 
provided for the withdrawal of mid-sized advisers from SEC registration 
and for the transition from federal to state regulation. 
An investment adviser registers with the SEC by filing a Form 
ADV.243 Over time, Form ADV has come to play a central role in the 
regulation of investment managers who are subject to the Advisers Act, 
and indeed is the primary regulatory tool to the extent that the 
Commission has relied upon disclosure as a means of regulation. The 
SEC’s “brochure rule” requires investment advisers registered under the 
Act (or required to be registered) to “furnish each advisory client and 
prospective advisory client with a written disclosure statement which 
may be either a copy of Part II of its form ADV . . . or a written 
document containing at least the information . . . required by Part II of 
Form ADV.”244 The Advisers Act authorizes the SEC to require 
investment advisers to make extensive disclosure about their business 
                                                                                                                 
 239. Investment Advisers Act § 203A(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a(a) (as amended by 
Dodd-Frank Act § 410). Section 928 of the Dodd-Frank Act, entitled “Clarification that 
Section 205 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 Does Not Apply to State-registered 
Advisers,” amended Investment Advisers Act § 205(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(a), to exempt 
state-only registered advisers from the restrictions on gain-based compensation. 
 240. See Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 
Securities and Exchange Commission Release Act Release No. 3221 (June 22, 2011). 
 241. See Investment Advisers Act § 203A(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a(a)(2). The 
Commission also amended Rule 203A-2(a), 17 C.F.R. § 275. 203A-2(a), so that 
pension consultants advising plan assets of less than $200 million will generally be 
registered and regulated by states. 
 242. 17 C.F.R. § 275.203A-5. 
 243. See Investment Advisers Act § 203(c)(1),15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(c)(1); 17 C.F.R. § 
275.203-1 (filing requirement); see also 17 C.F.R. § 275.203-1. 
 244. Rule 204-3, 17 C.F.R. § 275.2 04-3. 
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practices in their registration forms, and Part II of Form ADV requires 
just such disclosure, which is of course subject to rigorous antifraud 
provisions. Advisers must disclose the advisory services and fees they 
offer, their investment expertise, methods, information sources and 
strategies and execution procedures, among other things. For practical 
and political reasons, the Commission has frequently attempted to 
accomplish its substantive goals by tinkering with the disclosure 
requirements of the Form.245 
Beyond registration and disclosure, the Advisers Act provides for 
substantive regulation of various activities of investment advisers. For 
example, Section 205(a) regulates adviser performance fees and the 
assignment of investment advisory contracts.246 As noted above, Section 
206 is a broad antifraud provision.247 
At the same time the SEC adopted Investment Company Act Rule 
38a-1, which requires every registered investment company to appoint a 
chief compliance officer and to institute written policies and procedures 
to prevent violations of the federal securities laws,248 the SEC adopted 
Advisers Act Rule 206(4)-7,249 which makes it unlawful for a registered 
investment adviser to provide investment advice unless it has 
implemented written policies and procedures reasonably designed to 
prevent it and its supervised persons from violating the Advisers Act. 
Like Rule 38a-1, Rule 206(4)-7 does not set out the policies and 
procedures required. It is clear, however, that the SEC understands the 
rule to demand thorough and effective policies. As the SEC explained: 
                                                                                                                 
 245. Compare SEC, Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers 
Act of 1940, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3221 (June 22, 2011) (adopting 
extensive changes to Form ADV to accomplish shift from federal to state registration 
for mid-sized investment advisers and the disclosure of information for advisers exempt 
from registration), with SEC, Investment Advisers Act Rel No. 3060, 75 Fed. Reg. 
49,234 (July 28, 2010) (requiring plain English disclosure in brochures in Form ADV); 
and SEC, Disclosure by Investment Advisers Regarding Wrap Fee Programs, 
Investment Advisers Act Rel No. 1411, 59 Fed. Reg. 21,657 (April 19, 1994). But see 
also BINES & THEL, supra note 7, at §10.03[B][2] (proposals to require disclosure of 
brokerage direction practices). 
 246. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(a). The regulation of performance fees is discussed in BINES 
& THEL, supra note 7, at § 5.03[B][3]. 
 247. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6; see also BINES & THEL, supra note 7, at § 8.02[B][2][b]. 
 248. See supra text accompanying note 80. 
 249. 17 C.F.R. §275.206(4)-7; see also SEC, Compliance Programs of Investment 
Companies and Investment Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2204, 68 
Fed. Reg. 74,714 (Dec. 24, 2003) (adopting release). 
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Rule 206(4)-7 does not enumerate specific elements that advisers 
must include in their policies and procedures. Commenters [on the 
proposed rule] agreed with our assessment that funds and advisers 
are too varied in their operations for the rules to impose a single set 
of universally applicable required elements. Each adviser should 
adopt policies and procedures that take into consideration the nature 
of that firm’s operations. The policies and procedures should be 
designed to prevent violations from occurring, detect violations that 
have occurred, and correct promptly any violations that have 
occurred.250 
On the model of Rule 38a-1, its companion, the Investment 
Advisers Act rule, Rule 206(4)-7, also requires registered advisers to 
have a chief compliance officer and to review their policies and 
procedures annually to determine their adequacy and effectiveness. 
The SEC also adopted Rule 204A-1, which requires investment 
advisers registered or required to be registered under the Advisers Act to 
maintain and enforce codes of ethics. The rule requires that the codes 
contain certain minimum standards, particularly with respect to 
securities trading by employees, but contemplates variation among 
firms.251 Any supervised person working as a registered investment 
adviser who violates the code is required to report that violation to the 
adviser’s chief compliance officer. Later in the year, the Investment 
Counsel Association of America published a report entitled “Best 
Practices for Investment Adviser Codes of Ethics,” which is based on 
earlier Association codes and a review of the practices and policies of 
various investments advisers and managers.252 
                                                                                                                 
 250. SEC, Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and Investment 
Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2204, 68 Fed. Reg. 74,715-16 (Dec. 24, 
2003). 
 251. 17 C.F.R. §275.204A-1; see also SEC, Investment Adviser Codes of Ethics, 
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2256, Investment Company Act Release No. 
26,492, 69 Fed. Reg. 41,696 (July 9, 2004). The personal trading provisions of the rule 
are modeled on Investment Company Act § 17j-. See Investment Company Act Release 
No. 26,492, 69 Fed. Reg. at 41,698. Rule 17j-1 is discussed in BINES & THEL, supra 
note 7, at §11.03[A]. 
 252. Best Practices for Investment Adviser Codes of Ethics, ICAA, 
http://investmentadviser.org/eweb/docs/Publications_News/PublicDocs_UsefulWebsite
s/PubDoc/IAA_Best_Practices_for_Code_of_Ethics.pdf [http://perma.cc/3DUX-
7RBD]. 
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Regulation under the Advisers Act often raises difficult questions, 
but the focus here is on the initial question of whether an investment 
manager is an investment adviser within the meaning of the Act. In 
considering the scope of the statute, it is important to bear in mind that 
the statutory definition of investment adviser excludes a number of 
people or entities which would otherwise seem to fit the definition,253 
                                                                                                                 
 253. See BINES & THEL, supra note 7, at ch. 5 (“The Reach of the Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940”). Section 202(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) provides: 
“Investment adviser” means any person who, for compensation, 
engages in the business of advising others, either directly or through 
publications or writings, as to the value of securities or as to the 
advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities, or who, 
for compensation and as part of a regular business, issues or 
promulgates analyses or reports concerning securities; but does not 
include (A) a bank, or any bank holding company as defined in the 
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, which is not an investment 
company, except that the term “investment adviser” includes any 
bank or bank holding company to the extent that such bank or bank 
holding company serves or acts as an investment adviser to a 
registered investment company, but if, in the case of a bank, such 
services or actions are performed through a separately identifiable 
department or division, the department or division, and not the bank 
itself, shall be deemed to be the investment adviser; (B) any lawyer, 
accountant, engineer, or teacher whose performance of such services 
is solely incidental to the practice of his profession; (C) any broker 
or dealer whose performance of such services is solely incidental to 
the conduct of his business as a broker or dealer and who receives no 
special compensation therefor; (D) the publisher of any bona fide 
newspaper, news magazine or business or financial publication of 
general and regular circulation; (E) any person whose advice, 
analyses, or reports relate to no securities other than securities which 
are direct obligations of or obligations guaranteed as to principal or 
interest by the United States, or securities issued or guaranteed by 
corporations in which the United States has a direct or indirect 
interest which shall have been designated by the Secretary of the 
Treasury, pursuant to section 3(a)(12) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 [15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(12)], as exempted securities for the 
purposes of that Act; or (F) such other persons not within the intent 
of this paragraph, as the Commission may designate by rules and 
regulations or order. 
136 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXI 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
and that various statutory advisers are exempt from the registration 
requirement.254 
1. Investment Counsel 
Section 208(c)255 of the statute reserves the title “investment 
counsel” to investment advisers satisfying two conditions: (1) that their 
principal business be serving as statutory investment advisers; and (2) 
that a substantial part of their business consist of rendering investment 
supervisory services for clients. The purpose of Section 208(c) was to 
protect the emerging industry of non-trustee investment management 
and to encourage development of professional standards.256 The content 
of the investment supervisory services required for entitlement to use of 
the name “investment counsel” is unclear, however. As defined in 
Section 202(a)(13), “investment supervisory services” requires that 
investment advice be given continuously on the basis of individual 
needs.257 But there has been little regulatory effort to interpret Section 
202(a)(13) in context except in a 1973 report of an advisory committee 
to the SEC.258 
Persons rendering financial advice operate under various names and 
designations.259 The Dodd-Frank Act directed the Comptroller General 
                                                                                                                 
 254. Investment Advisers Act §§ 203(b), 203(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-3(b), 80b-3A(a). 
 255. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-8(c). This provision was amended in 1960 to eliminate the 
requirement that a person be engaged primarily in rendering investment supervisory 
services, Congress relying instead on the operative term “substantial part.” Pub. L. No. 
86-750, 74 Stat. 885, 887 (1960). 
 256. See, e.g., Report on H.R. 10065, House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce, H.R. REP. NO. 2639, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 27-28 (June 18, 1940); see also 7 
LOSS, SELIGMAN & PAREDES, supra note 52, at § 8-C-4(e). 
 257. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(13). 
 258. SEC, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT 
SERVICES FOR INDIVIDUAL INVESTORS, SMALL ACCOUNT INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT 
SERVICES 27-32 (1973). The statutory definition in Section 202(a)(13) has been the 
subject of litigation, however. See Anderson Co. v. John P. Chase, Inc., [1974-1975 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 95,009 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); see also In re 
Clements, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 177, 1964 SEC LEXIS 397, 42 SEC 
373 (Oct. 19, 1964). 
 259. See ANGELA A. HUNG ET AL., INVESTOR AND INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES ON 
INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS (2008); Bill Introduced to Protect 
Elderly from Scamming ‘Senior’ Specialists, 41 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 867 (2009). 
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of the United States to study and report to Congress on “the 
effectiveness of State and Federal regulations to protect investors and 
other consumers from individuals who hold themselves out as financial 
planners through the use of misleading titles, designations, or marketing 
materials.”260 The Act directed the Comptroller to consider a number of 
issues, particularly the possibility that various titles and designations 
may mislead investors: 
 
In conducting the study . . . the Comptroller General shall 
consider— 
(1)  the role of financial planners in providing advice regarding the 
management of financial resources, including investment planning, 
income tax planning, education planning, retirement planning, estate 
planning, and risk management; 
(2) whether current regulations at the State and Federal level 
provide adequate ethical and professional standards for financial 
planners; 
(3) the possible risk posed to investors and other consumers by 
individuals who hold themselves out as financial planners or as 
otherwise providing financial planning services in connection with the 
sale of financial products, including insurance and securities; 
(4) the possible risk posed to investors and other consumers by 
individuals who otherwise use titles, designations, or marketing 
materials in a misleading way in connection with the delivery of 
financial advice; 
(6) the ability of investors and other consumers to understand 
licensing requirements and standards of care that apply to individuals 
who hold themselves out as financial planners or as otherwise providing 
financial planning services; 
(7) the possible benefits to investors and other consumers of 
regulation and professional oversight of financial planners; and 
(8) any other consideration that the Comptroller General deems 
necessary or appropriate to effectively execute the study required . . . .261 
 
In formulating recommendations in the report on the study, the 
Comptroller was required to consider: 
                                                                                                                 
 260. Dodd-Frank Act § 919C(a)(1). 
 261. Id. § 919C(b) (section 919C(b) skips subsection (5)). 
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[T]he appropriate structure for regulation of financial planners and 
individuals providing financial planning services . . . and . . . the 
appropriate scope of the regulations needed to protect investors and 
other consumers, including but not limited to the need to establish 
competency standards, practice standards, ethical guidelines, 
disciplinary authority, and transparency to investors and other 
consumers.262 
In 2011, the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”), which is 
part of the Comptroller’s authority, delivered the mandated report to the 
congressional committee specified in the Act.263 Though it noted the 
absence of regulatory schemes directed at financial planners, the GAO 
reported that most services provided by financial planners are regulated. 
The GAO expressed concern that, to consumers, the sources of 
regulatory oversight may be confusing, and there is a risk that 
consumers are unfamiliar with standards of care applicable to different 
services. The GAO also commented on the titles and designations relied 
on by financial planners as an additional source of consumer 
information. Given that neither regulators nor industry representatives 
recommended additional regulation, the GAO proposed no federal 
regulatory action for the present. 
2. Broker-Dealers 
Most of the advisory activities of broker-dealers are regulated 
under the Exchange Act, especially the antifraud provisions in Sections 
10(b)264 and 15(c)(1).265 Nevertheless, were it not for a statutory 
exclusion in Section 202(a)(11)(C) of the Investment Advisers Act, 
broker-dealers would also almost unavoidably fall within the statutory 
definition of investment adviser. That subsection excludes from the 
definition of investment adviser “any broker or dealer whose 
performance of [investment advisory] services is solely incidental to the 
                                                                                                                 
 262. Id. § 919C(c). 
 263. GAO Report to Congressional Addressees, Regulatory Coverage Generally 
Exists for Financial Planners, but Consumer Protection Issues Remain, GAO-11-235 
(Jan. 18, 2011). The Committees are the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and 
Foreign Affairs, the Senate Special Committee on Banking and the House Committee 
on Financial Services. See Dodd-Frank Act § 919C(d)(1). 
 264. Securities Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). 
 265. Securities Exchange Act § 15(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(1). 
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conduct of his business as a broker or dealer and who receives no 
special compensation therefor . . . .”266 To be sure, a number of broker-
dealers do not rely on the statutory exclusion to avoid registration 
because they or their advisory affiliates charge management fees for 
providing investment advice; and hence, are probably receiving “special 
compensation therefor.”267 
                                                                                                                 
 266. Investment Advisers Act § 202(a)(11)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(11)(C). It seems 
that broker-dealers were not intended to be excluded from the definition of investment 
adviser as the Investment Company and Investment Advisers Acts were originally 
contemplated by the drafters. The proposed legislation submitted by the SEC defined 
“investment adviser” for purposes of both titles as follows: 
“Investment adviser” means any person who, for compensation, 
engages in the business of advising others, either directly or through 
publications or writings, as to the value of securities or as to the 
advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities, or who, 
for compensation and as part of a regular business, issues or 
promulgates analyses or reports concerning securities; but does not 
include (A) a bank; (B) any lawyer, accountant, engineer, or teacher 
whose performance of such services is solely incidental to the 
practice of his profession; (C) the publisher of any bona fide 
newspaper or newsmagazine of general circulation; or (D) such other 
persons, not within the intent of this paragraph, as the Commission 
may designate by rules and regulations or order. 
S. 3580, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. § 45(a)(16) (3d Sess. 1940). Moreover, broker-dealers 
were expressly excluded from the application of Title I, the investment company 
portion. Id. § 3(a)(2)). This indicated that they were not intended to be excluded from 
Title II, the investment adviser portion. See also Investment Trusts and Investment 
Companies: Hearings on S. 3580 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking 
and Currency, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 181 (3d Sess. 1940) (statement of David Schenker, 
Chief Counsel, Securities and Exchange Commission). 
 267. The hearings on Senate Doc. S. 3580 show that broker-dealers receiving 
advisory fees were intended to be included. 76th Cong., 3d Sess. at 711 (statement of 
Douglas T. Johnston, President, Johnston & Lagerquist, Inc and Vice President, 
Investment Counsel Association of America). More importantly, the hearings on the 
draft of the bill, which became the Investment Company and Investment Advisers Acts 
of 1940, confirm that the Committee believed that the exclusion of broker-dealers in 
Investment Advisers Act § 202(a)(11)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2a(11)(C), would not be 
available to broker-dealers receiving a fee for their investment advisory activities. See 
Investment Trusts and Investment Companies: Hearings on H.R. 10065 Before a 
Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 76th Cong. 87 (3d 
Sess. 1940) (statement of James White, Representing Soudder, Stevens & Clark, 
Boston, Mass.). 
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Section 202(a)(11)(C) sets up two conditions to be satisfied for 
broker-dealers to be excluded from the statutory definition of investment 
adviser: 
 
(1) investment advice is provided only as an incident of the broker-
dealer function; and 
(2) no special compensation is received for the advice. 
 
Furthermore, both conditions must be satisfied for the exclusion to 
operate because Section 202(a)(11)(C) lists them conjunctively.268 
The legislative history of the Section 202(a)(11)(C) exclusion is 
thin.269 Shortly after the Advisers Act was adopted, the SEC issued 
                                                                                                                 
 268. The relevant portion of Investment Advisers Act § 202(a)(11)(C) reads: 
“Investment adviser” means any person who, for compensation, 
engages in the business of advising others . . . as to the value of 
securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or 
selling securities . . . but does not include . . . (C) any broker or 
dealer whose performance of such service is solely incidental to the 
conduct of his business as a broker or dealer and who receives no 
special compensation therefor . . . . 
See also Kassover v. UBS AG, 619 F. Supp. 2d 28, 33 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (dismissing 
complaint because investors failed to allege that UBS was paid special compensation or 
that advice was not incidental to brokerage). 
 269. The meaning of the exclusionary language is unclear, since the meaning of 
“investment adviser” is discussed in the legislative history of the Act only in its 
broadest sense by repetition of the definition provided in the Act. It is clear that the 
definition was meant to encompass a wider spectrum of “advisers” than members of the 
profession of investment counselors: 
Investment advisers are persons who for compensation engage in the 
business of advising others … as to the value of securities or as to 
the advisability of investing in, purchasing or selling securities or 
who, for compensation and as part of a regular business, promulgate 
analyses or reports concerning securities. 
H.R. Rep. No. 2639, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 27 (3d Sess. 1939-40) (similar language 
appears in S. Rep. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 20 (1940)). 
  David Schenker, Chief Counsel of the SEC Investment Trust Study, stated that 
investment advisers are “that broad category ranging from people who are engaged in 
the profession of furnishing disinterested, impartial advice to a certain economic 
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Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2,270 taking the position that a 
commission surcharge based on advice to customers constitutes special 
compensation. But that release is of little help in evaluating 
arrangements in which the broker-dealer is ostensibly paid only standard 
brokerage fees for executing transactions,271 but obtains something else 
of value, such as more business for client referrals. 
As methods of marketing and pricing brokerage services change 
over time, broker-dealers must be alert to the possibility that new 
practices may make them investment advisers subject to the Advisers 
Act. This is especially true with respect to accounts in which clients pay 
their brokers a fixed dollar amount or a percentage of assets held on 
account for all investment advice, securities transactions, and related 
services. These fee-based accounts may simplify arrangements with 
clients and increase broker-dealer profits, and may also reduce the 
incentive of brokers to churn accounts, albeit perhaps at the price of 
giving them an incentive not to trade at all.272 
                                                                                                                 
stratum of our population to the other extreme, individuals engaged in running tipster 
organizations, or sending through the mails stock market letters.” Investment Trusts and 
Investment Companies: Hearings on S. 3580 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. 
on Banking and Currency, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. Pt. 1, at 47 (3d Sess. 1940). 
Apparently, the only direct interpretation of the exclusion at issue was made by 
Douglas T. Johnston, vice-president of the Investment Counsel Association of America, 
who said that the definition would still include “certain . . . brokerage houses which 
maintain investment advisory departments and make charges for services rendered . . . 
.” Id. pt. 2, at 711. Thus, the only theme that appears widely in the legislative history is 
that the statute is meant to apply to those who render investment advice for 
compensation in the ordinary course of their business or as an independent aspect 
thereof. For a discussion of current problems in distinguishing between broker-dealers 
and investment advisers, see Thomas M. Selman, Joseph Price & Lawrence N. 
Kosciulek, Regulating Mutual Fund Distribution: Is the Traditional Definition of 
‘Broker-Dealer’ Obsolete?, INV. LAW., Apr. 1998, at 9. 
 270. Participation in Transactions by Broker-Dealers, Release No. IA-2, Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 56156, 11 Fed. Reg. 10996 (Oct. 28, 1940), 4 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 
56,156 (Oct. 28, 1940). 
 271. The release dealt only with the addition of an “overriding commission” or 
“service charge” over and above the regular commission that a broker-dealer would 
receive from executing the transaction. See id. 
 272. The Investment Counsel Association of America has argued that fee-based 
brokerage accounts may be inappropriate for some clients, especially those who do not 
trade frequently. See Rachel McTague, Broker-Dealer, Adviser Groups Disagree on 
SEC Exemption for Fee-Based Accounts, 36 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1714 (2004) 
[hereinafter Broker-Dealer, Adviser Groups Disagree]; see also Rachel McTague, SEC 
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Broker-dealers that offer these fee-based programs may be outside 
the exclusion from the definition of investment adviser because 
investment advice might seem to be more than an incident to the broker-
dealer function, or because the fee amounts to special compensation for 
advice.273 Broker-dealers that were also registered as investment 
advisers could avoid some issues by treating only their relationships 
with wrap-fee clients as investment advisory relationships. In 1994, the 
SEC amended its rules to provide specific disclosure requirements for 
registered investment advisers, including broker-dealers registered as 
investment advisers that offered wrap-fee programs.274 Registered 
investment advisers offering wrap-fee programs were required to 
provide clients a separate wrap-fee program brochure setting forth the 
wrap fee, whether the fee is negotiable, any other fees that might be 
payable, and the services provided. The brochure must also disclose that 
the costs of the wrap-fee program might differ from the cost of 
purchasing the covered services separately. 
In 1999, the SEC proposed, and in 2005 re-proposed, a rule to 
provide that broker-dealers that allowed clients to pay for securities 
transactions, advice and other services by fee of a fixed amount or a 
percentage of assets would not be deemed investment advisers.275 Under 
the proposed rule, a broker-dealer providing investment advice to clients 
would be excluded from the definition of “investment adviser,” no 
                                                                                                                 
Looks into Possibility of Abuses Related to Use of Fee-Based Accounts, 36 SEC. REG. & 
L. REP. 1819 (2004). 
 273. The SEC has long been inclined to limit an exemption from the Investment 
Advisers Act for broker-dealers, but declined to adopt a permanent rule change. See 
Certain Broker-Dealers Deemed Not to Be Investment Advisers, Investment Advisers 
Act Release No. 2340, 2004 WL 38804, at *2-3 (proposed (Jan. 6, 2005)); Investment 
Advisers Act Release Nos. 34-42099, Release No. 1845, 64 Fed. Reg. 61,226, 61,228-
29 (proposed 227 (Nov. 10, 1999)); see also Certain Broker-Dealers Deemed Not to be 
Investment Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2339, 84 SEC Docket 2204, 
2005 WL 38803, at *2-3 (Jan. 6, 2005) (temporary rule); cf. 17 C.F.R. § 206(3)(1) 
(2015), discussed at BINES & THEL, supra note 7, at § 11.02[D][2][b] (acting as 
principal or broker for another). Serious initiatives to treat broker-dealers providing 
investment advice as fiduciaries have been proposed by both the Department of Labor 
and the SEC. See infra text accompanying notes 301-06. 
 274. Disclosure by Investment Advisers Regarding Wrap Fee Programs, Investment 
Company Act. Rel No. 1411, 59 Fed. Reg. 21,657 (Apr. 19, 1994) (effective Oct. 1, 
1994). 
 275. See supra text accompanying notes 293-305. 
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matter how compensated, if the advice was provided solely incidental to 
brokerage services, the account was non-discretionary, and the broker-
dealer informed the client that the accounts were brokerage accounts. 
When it proposed the rule, the SEC also announced that until it took 
final action, the SEC would act as if the rule were in effect.276 
The proposed rule engendered a great deal of comment and 
opposition, and the Financial Planning Association brought an action 
challenging the SEC’s authority to adopt the rule and suggesting that, by 
honoring the rule without adopting it, the SEC was violating 
administrative law.277 In response to these developments, the SEC 
reopened the comment period for the proposed rule in August 2004.278 
The SEC subsequently asked the court to postpone consideration of the 
Association’s challenge, indicating that it would take final action on the 
rule by the end of 2004.279 
In January 2005, the SEC re-proposed Rule 202(a)(11)-1 and 
sought comment on its overall approach to the regulation of broker-
dealers as advisers. Under the re-proposed rule, broker-dealers would be 
excepted from the definition of “investment adviser” if they provided 
non-discretionary advice solely incidental to brokerage services, even if 
compensated on an asset-based or fixed fee. The Commission also 
proposed to announce an interpretive position clarifying when advisory 
services such as financial planning are solely incidental to brokerage, so 
that the rendering of such services would not bring a broker-dealer into 
                                                                                                                 
 276. Id. 
 277. Fin. Planning Ass’n v. SEC, 482 F.3d 481, 483-84 (D.C. Cir. 2007); see also 
Financial Planning Group Asks SEC to Withdraw Proposal Regarding Brokers, 36 
SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1167 (2004); Rachel McTague, SEC Reopens Comment Period on 
Proposed Exemptive Rule for Brokers, 36 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1517 (2004); Rachel 
McTague, Financial Planners Sue SEC over Exemptive Rule for Brokers, 36 SEC. REG. 
& L. REP. 1344 (2004). The Financial Planning Association also ran advertisements 
asking readers to write to the SEC about the rule proposal. See, e.g., WALL ST. J., Sept. 
10, 2004, at C3. 
 278. See Certain Broker-Dealers Deemed not to be Investment Advisers, Investment 
Advisers Act Release No. 2278, 69 Fed. Reg. 51620, 83 SEC Docket 1745 (Aug. 18, 
2004). 
 279. See Investment Advisers: SEC Seeks Delay of FPA Challenge to Proposal for 
Broker-Dealer Exemption, 36 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1566 (2004); see also Broker-
Dealer, Adviser Groups Disagree, supra note 272. In any event, the SEC did not even 
re-propose the rule until 2005. 
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the definition of adviser.280 In April 2005, the Commission adopted Rule 
202(a)(11)-1, explaining: 
Under the rule, a broker-dealer providing advice that is solely 
incidental to its brokerage services is excepted from the Advisers 
Act if it charges an asset-based or fixed fee (rather than a 
commission, mark-up, or mark-down) for its services, provided it 
makes certain disclosures about the nature of its services. The rule 
states that exercising investment discretion is not “solely incidental 
to” (a) the business of a broker or dealer within the meaning of the 
Advisers Act or (b) brokerage services within the meaning of the 
rule. The rule also states that a broker or dealer provides investment 
advice that is not solely incidental to the conduct of its business as a 
broker or dealer or to its brokerage services if the broker or dealer 
charges a separate fee or separately contracts for advisory services. 
In addition, the rule states that when a broker-dealer provides advice 
as part of a financial plan or in connection with providing planning 
services, a broker-dealer provides advice that is not solely incidental 
if it: (i) holds itself out to the public as a financial planner or as 
providing financial planning services; or (ii) delivers to its customer 
a financial plan; or (iii) represents to the customer that the advice is 
provided as part of a financial plan or financial planning services. 
Finally, under the rule, broker-dealers are not subject to the Advisers 
Act solely because they offer full-service brokerage and discount 
brokerage services (including electronic brokerage) for reduced 
commission rates.281 
The Financial Planning Association challenged the adopted rule in 
court.282 At the same time, firms that had welcomed the rule, full-service 
firms in particular, were concerned about implementing the requirement 
that they or their personnel register as advisers if they provide financial 
                                                                                                                 
 280. See Certain Broker-Dealers Deemed not to be Investment Advisers, Investment 
Company Act Release No. 2340, 70 Fed. Reg. 2716 (proposed Jan. 6, 2005) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275). 
 281. Certain Broker-Dealers Deemed not to be Investment Advisers, Investment 
Company Act Release No. 2376, 17 C.F.R. § 275.202(a)(11)-1 (2005); see also Eric 
Arnold & Kevin Zambrowicz, Final SEC Rule Addressing Broker-Dealer Exclusion 
from Definition of Investment Adviser, INV. LAW., June 2005, at 15; Jane A. Kanter & 
Michael L. Sherman, Broker-Dealer Developments: Better Late than Never? SEC 
Adopts Broker-Dealer Exemptive Rule, INV. LAW., Apr. 2005, at 18. 
 282. See Fin. Planning Ass’n v. SEC, 482 F.3d 481 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Phyllis 
Diamond, Investment Advisers: FPA Challenges Substance of SEC Exemptive Rule for 
Brokers, 37 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 770 (2005). 
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planning services or handle discretionary accounts. In response, the 
Commission delayed the compliance date of the new rule until the end 
of January 2006.283 
On March 30, 2007, in Financial Planning Association v. SEC,284 
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated Rule 
202(a)(11)-1, holding that the Commission had exceeded its statutory 
authority. The court reasoned that inasmuch as the Advisers Act directly 
addresses the status of broker-dealers, the exemption provided by the 
rule was not consistent with the intent of the statute, as required by 
Section 202(a)(11) of the Act.285 Following a stay of the court’s 
mandate, fee-based accounts had to be converted to either advisory 
accounts or traditional brokerage accounts by October 1, 2007.286 
In September 2007, the SEC proposed a new rule, also to be 
designated Rule 202(a)(11)-1, which would, according to the 
Commission, reinstate interpretive positions that the court had 
invalidated along with the old rule. The proposed rule would have 
clarified that investment advice is not “solely incidental” to the broker-
dealer business if the broker exercises investment discretion or charges a 
separate fee for the advice. It would also “clarify” that a broker-dealer 
does not receive special compensation solely because it charges a lower 
                                                                                                                 
 283. Certain Broker-Dealers Deemed Not To Be Investment Advisers, Extension of 
Compliance Date, Investment Company Act Release No. 2426, 70 Fed. Reg. 54629 
(Sept. 12, 2005). In December 2005, the Division of Investment Management published 
a letter of interpretative guidance on the new rule, focusing particularly on the holding-
out and financial planning elements. See Securities Industry Association, SEC No-
Action Letter, 2005 WL 3526529 (Dec. 16, 2005). Thereafter, industry associations 
representing various interested parties continued to petition the Commission for and 
against further delay in implementation. See Broker-Dealers: Advisers Group Calls on 
SEC to Enforce Broker-Dealer Exception, 38 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 163 (2006). The 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit heard oral argument on the Financial Planning 
Association’s challenge to the rule in October 2006. See Broker-Dealers: FPA, SEC 
Argue in D.C. Cir. over Power of SEC to Create New IAA Exemption for BDs, 38 SEC. 
REG. & L. REP. 1728 (2006). 
 284. Fin. Planning Ass’n, 482 F.3d at 483. 
 285. Investment Advisers Act § 202(a)(11). 
 286. See Temporary Rule Regarding Principal Trades with Certain Advisory 
Clients, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2653, 75 Fed. Reg. 55022 (Sept. 24, 
2007); see also Jane J. Kim & Eleanor Laise, SEC Decision Forces Investors to Make 
Choice, WALL ST. J., May 17, 2007, at D1; BINES & THEL, supra note 7, at 
§11.02[D][2][b] (discussing SEC response to the decision). See generally Arthur B. 
Laby, Reforming the Regulation of Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers, 65 BUS. 
LAW. 395 (2010). 
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commission for discount brokerage services than it charges for full-
service brokerage.287 
Controversy over the propriety of permitting broker-dealers to offer 
fee-based accounts without registering under the Advisers Act led the 
SEC to ask the Rand Corporation to analyze how investors view 
investment advisers and brokers.288 Early in 2008, Rand concluded that 
investors generally do not understand that each is subject to a distinct 
regulatory regime.289 
Congress addressed the question of whether broker-dealers and 
investment advisers should operate under the same fiduciary standards 
in the Dodd-Frank Act, but it did not resolve the issue. Although the 
House bill would have put broker-dealers and investment advisers under 
a uniform fiduciary duty, the enacted statute290 left the matter for 
subsequent determination, to be focused upon “retail customers,” 
meaning natural persons who receive personalized investment advice 
about securities from broker-dealers or investment advisers, and use that 
advice primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.291 The 
Dodd-Frank Act directed the SEC to study and report to Congress on the 
efficacy of existing standards of care for broker-dealers and investment 
advisers and associated persons, and whether there are gaps, 
shortcomings, or overlaps that should be addressed by rule or statute.292 
The Dodd-Frank Act also permitted the Commission to commence 
rulemaking to address the standard of care for broker-dealers and 
investment advisers and associated persons for providing personalized 
investment advice to retail customers and such other customers as the 
                                                                                                                 
 287. See Interpretive Rule Under the Advisers Act Affecting Broker-Dealers, 
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2652, 72 Fed. Reg. 55126 (Sept. 24, 2007). 
 288. See Securities and Exchange Commission: SEC Taps Rand Corp. for Study on 
Roles of BDs, Investment Advisers, 38 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1643 (2006). 
 289. See Financial Services: SEC Report Finds Lines Between Brokerages, Advisers 
Blur in Investors’ Eyes, 40 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 6 (2008). 
 290. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 291. See Dodd-Frank Act § 913(a) (defining retail customer); see also Investment 
Advisers Act § 211(g)(2) (defining retail customer). The term “retail customer” is 
defined in the Dodd-Frank Act and the amended Advisers Act, but it is not defined in 
the amended Exchange Act, although it is used there. 
 292. See Dodd-Frank Act § 913(b)(d). The Act sets out a number of considerations 
the Commission should consider in conducting the study. Id. § 913(c). 
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Commission provides.293 Toward that end, the Act amended Section 15 
of the Exchange Act to provide that the Commission may by rule subject 
broker-dealers providing personalized investment advice about 
securities to the same standards of conduct applicable to investment 
advisers under the Investment Advisers Act.294 It also amended Section 
211 of the Investment Advisers Act to provide that the Commission may 
require that broker-dealers and investment advisers when providing 
personalized investment advice must act in the best interest of the 
customer, and must disclose any material conflict of interest.295 
However, the grant of rulemaking authority specifically provides that 
the receipt by a broker-dealer of commissions or other standard 
compensation shall not, in and of itself, be considered a violation of any 
such standard, and further provides that nothing in the amended 
statutory section shall require a broker-dealer to have a continuing duty 
of care or loyalty to its customer after providing personalized investment 
advice.296 
The Dodd-Frank Act also attempted to improve the SEC’s focus on 
investor protection. In June 2009, the Commission formed an Investor 
Advisory Committee.297 The Dodd-Frank Act added a new Section 39 to 
                                                                                                                 
 293. Id. § 913(f). 
 294. See Securities Exchange Act §15(k)-(m). 
 295. See Investment Advisers Act § 211(g)-(i) (amended by Dodd-Frank Act § 
913(g)); see also S. Rep. No. 111-178, at 166: 
The section also requires the SEC to issue a report . . . that considers 
public input. If this study identifies any gaps or overlap in the legal 
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to the standards of care for brokers, dealers, and investment advisers, 
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the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.”). The SEC may promulgate 
rules governing the conduct of broker-dealers and investment 
advisers providing advice to retail customers and other customers as 
it by rule provides, “except the Commission shall not ascribe a 
meaning to the term ‘customer’ that would include an investor in a 
private fund managed by an investment adviser, where such private 
fund has entered into an advisory contract with such adviser. 
 296. See Securities Exchange Act § 15(k)(1), codified by Dodd-Frank Act § 913(g); 
see also Investment Advisers Act § 211(g)(1), codified by Dodd-Frank Act § 913(g). 
 297. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 104 (2010). 
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the Exchange Act that statutorily established the Committee, and 
charged it with advising and consulting with the Commission on 
regulatory priorities, the regulation of securities products, trading 
strategies, fee structures and the effectiveness of disclosure, and 
initiatives to protect investors and promote investor confidence.298 The 
Act also created the Office of the Investor Advocate within the SEC, 
which will make policy recommendations to the Commission and assist 
investors in resolving conflicts with financial firms, and amended the 
Exchange Act to establish firmly the Commission’s authority to gather 
information and conduct investor testing programs for the purpose of 
developing new rules and programs.299 
In January 2011, the staff of the SEC published its Study on 
Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers as required by Section 913 of 
the Dodd-Frank Act.300 The study found that retail investors did not 
understand the obligations of investment advisers and broker-dealers, 
and the staff concluded that the Commission should adopt rules 
implementing a uniform fiduciary standard for broker-dealers and 
investment advisers providing personalized investment advice to retail 
investors: 
Despite the extensive regulation of both investment advisers and 
broker-dealers, retail customers do not understand and are confused 
by the roles played by investment advisers and broker-dealers, and 
more importantly, the standards of care applicable to investment 
advisers and broker-dealers when providing personalized investment 
advice and recommendations about securities. Retail customers 
should not have to parse through legal distinctions to determine 
whether the advice they receive was provided in accordance with 
their expectations. Instead, retail customers should be protected 
uniformly when receiving personalized investment advice or 
recommendations about securities regardless of whether they choose 
to work with an investment adviser or a broker-dealer. At the same 
                                                                                                                 
 298. See Securities Exchange Act § 39, amended by Dodd-Frank Act § 911. Section 
39 also establishes qualifications and terms for Committee members. 
 299. See Securities Exchange Act § 19(e), amended by Dodd-Frank Act § 912. 
 300. See SEC, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS (2011), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf [http://perma.cc/T2MM-CSS 
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Dealers, Advisers, Sources Say, 44 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1811 (2012); Maria Lokshin, 
Republicans Urge SEC Not to Take Up Rulemaking on Uniform Fiduciary Standard, 43 
SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1877 (2011). 
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time, it is necessary that such protection allows retail customers to 
continue to have access to the various fee structures, account 
options, and types of advice that investment advisers and broker-
dealers provide. 
Therefore, this Study recommends that the Commission exercise its 
rulemaking authority to adopt and implement, with appropriate 
guidance, the uniform fiduciary standard of conduct for broker-
dealers and investment advisers when providing personalized 
investment advice about securities to retail customers. In addition, 
the study recommends that when broker-dealers and investment 
advisers are performing the same or substantially similar functions, 
the Commission should consider whether to harmonize the 
regulatory protections applicable to such functions. Such 
harmonization should take into account the best elements of each 
regime and provide meaningful investor protection.301 
In particular, the study recommended that the Commission should 
ensure that: 
[T]he standard of conduct for all brokers, dealers, and investment 
advisers, when providing personalized investment advice about 
securities to retail customers (and such other customers as the 
Commission may by rule provide), shall be to act in the best interest 
of the customer without regard to the financial or other interest of the 
broker, dealer, or investment adviser providing the advice.302 
It also recommended further initiatives with respect to principal trading 
between broker-dealers and customers, investor education, uniform and 
minimal professional standards, and harmonization of the regulation of 
advertising, supervision, licensing, books and records, and the use of 
finders and solicitors. 
Recently, the Department of Labor proposed to treat brokers and 
others providing investment advice to employee benefit plans, including 
IRAs, as ERISA fiduciaries.303 The Department also proposed an 
exemption, labeled the “Best Interest Contract Exemption,” for 
qualifying “common compensation, such as commissions and revenue 
                                                                                                                 
 301. See SEC, supra note 300, at 165-66; see also Yin Wilczek, GOP Lawmakers 
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sharing” affecting “retail accounts.”304 In parallel, the SEC’s Investment 
Advisory Committee recommended that broker-dealers providing 
investment advice to retail customers “be governed by a fiduciary duty,” 
and that extending such a duty to other investors be considered.305 
3. Other Statutory Investment Advisers 
Section 202(a)(11) was designed with two types of investment 
advisers principally in mind: investment counselors, and purveyors of 
limited circulation market letters. Instead of restricting the statutory 
definition to those types of investment advisers; however, Congress 
structured Section 202(a)(11) for broad coverage subject to specific 
exclusions. Given the breadth of the definition, particularly difficult 
questions can arise with respect to those not expressly excluded, as, for 
example, financial planners and consultants, or the general partner of an 
investment limited partnership.306 Moreover, the outlines of the 
exclusions are not entirely clear, either. Indeed, one of the Supreme 
Court’s most important decisions under the Advisers Act involved the 
construction of an exclusion.307 
                                                                                                                 
 304. Proposed Best Interest Contract Exemption, 80 Fed. Reg. 21960 (April 20, 
2015). 
 305. SEC, RECOMMENDATION OF THE INVESTOR ADVISORY COMMITTEE BROKER-
DEALER FIDUCIARY DUTY, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisory-committee-
2012/fiduciary-duty-recommendation-2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/PSF2-STVM]. 
 306. See SEC, Applicability of the Investment Advisers Act to Financial Planners, 
Pension Consultants, and Other Persons Who Provide Investment Advisory Services as 
a Component of Other Financial Services, Investment, Advisers Act Release No. 1092, 
1987 SEC LEXIS 3487 (Oct. 8, 1987); see also 7 LOSS, SELIGMAN & PAREDES, supra 
note 52, at § 8-C-2; Gregory Zuckerman & Michael Schroeder, Hedge Funds May Face 
Crackdown, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 2003, at C1, C7 (noting that less than 20% of hedge 
fund managers are registered with the SEC as investment advisers). Such persons may 
be exempt from the registration requirement even if they are statutory advisers. See 
Investment Advisers Act § 203(b); Marcia MacHarg, Kenneth J. Berman & Rachel H. 
Graham, Forever Unregulated? A Primer for Private Fund Sponsors, 15 INSIGHTS No. 
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In addition to broker-dealers, exclusions apply to banks and bank 
holding companies; professionals such as lawyers, accountants, and 
teachers; publishers of newspapers of general circulation; investment 
advisers dealing only in securities of the United States; and those 
investment advisers determined by the SEC not to require regulation 
under the Act. The exclusions must be read with some care, however. 
For example, the exclusion applying to banks and bank holding 
companies does not apply to their affiliates. Moreover, a bank is not 
excluded from the definition to the extent it is an adviser to a registered 
investment company, although in that case, if the advice is provided 
through a separately identifiable department or division, that entity—the 
department and not the bank—is the investment adviser.308 
Until the Advisers Act was amended in 2006, federal savings 
associations, federal savings banks, and state savings associations were 
not banks for purposes of the Advisers Act,309 and accordingly could not 
take advantage of the exclusion of banks from the definition of 
“investment adviser.” In 2004, the SEC proposed to allow thrift 
institutions an exemption from the Act.310 The SEC reasoned that the 
failure to exclude thrift institutions from the Advisers Act did not reflect 
a congressional judgment that thrifts should be subject to the Advisers 
Act, but was simply the result of the fact that at the time the Advisers 
Act was enacted, thrifts could not provide investment advisory 
services.311 Since then, however, thrifts had gained the power to offer 
trust services and act as investment advisers, subject to regulation by the 
Office of Thrift Supervision that is similar to the corresponding 
regulation of banks. On the theory that thrift regulation provides the 
same protection to thrift clients that bank regulation provides to bank 
clients, the SEC proposed to exempt from the Advisers Act thrift-
provided investment advisory services where the thrift acts solely in the 
capacity of trustee, executor, administrator, or guardian for customer 
accounts created for a fiduciary purpose, or as trustee of collective trust 
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funds excluded from the definition of “investment company.”312 
Subsequently, the issue was mooted when the Financial Services 
Regulatory Relief Act of 2006 amended the definition of the word 
“bank” in the Advisers Act (and the Exchange Act) to include savings 
associations, thus extending the statutory exclusion to savings 
associations.313 
As noted above, managers of hedge funds initially took different 
approaches on whether to register as investment advisers. Early in 2003, 
the SEC organized a roundtable on hedge funds, to discuss: 
[T]he structure, operation and compliance activities of hedge funds, 
including the role of hedge fund service providers; the marketing of 
hedge funds; investor protection concerns, including disclosure 
issues, valuation issues and potential conflicts of interest; current 
regulation of hedge funds and their managers,…whether additional 
regulation [was] necessary; and if additional regulation [was] 
warranted, what form it might take.314 
A few months later, the SEC published a staff report that concluded, 
among other things, that “the Commission should consider requiring 
hedge fund advisers to register as investment advisers under the 
Advisers Act, taking into account whether the benefits outweigh the 
burdens of registration.”315 The proposal and regulation promulgated 
under the Investment Advisers Act, attracted public attention in July 
2004, when, by a vote of three to two, the SEC proposed Rule 
203(b)(3)-2 to require advisers to certain hedge funds with 15 or more 
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investors to register as investment advisers under the Advisers Act.316 
The SEC cited three factors that caused the majority to be concerned 
with hedge fund advisers: (1) the growth in the number and size of 
hedge funds; (2) incidents of hedge fund advisers engaging in fraudulent 
activity, including exaggerated performance claims, payment of 
inappropriate commissions, and misappropriation of investor assets; and 
(3) the retailization of hedge funds, with smaller investors, pensioners, 
and other market participants directly or indirectly investing in hedge 
funds.317 The rule proposed that each owner of a private fund (that is, a 
fund that would have to register as an investment company but for the 
exemptions provided by Sections 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7) of the Investment 
Company Act) that permits owners to redeem part of their investments 
within two years of purchase and that offers interests based on the 
expertise of the adviser be counted as a separate client for purposes of 
deciding whether the adviser has to register. The redemption provision 
of the definition of private funds was designed to exclude private equity 
funds from the registration requirement. The dissenters questioned the 
majority’s premises, and encouraged those to be affected to submit 
comments to the SEC. The response was heavy, but the SEC, with the 
same division, adopted Rule 203(b)(3)-2, requiring advisers to most 
hedge funds to register by Feb. 1, 2006.318 The effect of the rule was not 
only to require registration, but also to require the newly registered 
advisers to adopt compliance provisions and subject them to SEC 
examination and other provisions of the Advisers Act.319 
An advisory firm and the hedge fund it managed challenged the 
new rule before the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
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Circuit,320 which vacated the rule in Goldstein v. SEC.321 Although the 
court noted the substantive criticism of the rule made by the dissenting 
commissioners, its opinion focused on the language of the Advisers Act, 
particularly on the word “client” in Section 203(b)(3), which, at the 
time, exempted advisers which had fewer than 15 clients during the 
course of the preceding 12 months. The Commission took the position 
that each investor in a hedge fund was a client of the fund’s adviser. The 
court rejected this position as unreasonable or even arbitrary. On the 
basis of a far-ranging discussion of the use of the word “client” in the 
securities laws and in commerce generally, the court concluded that a 
hedge fund adviser’s only client is the fund, and not those who invest in 
the fund. Accordingly, the court concluded, the Commission could not 
deprive a hedge fund adviser of the exemption of Section 203(b)(3). 
Although the court narrowed the reach of the registration requirements 
of the Advisers Act, it took some pains to indicate that hedge fund 
advisers are still subject to its antifraud provisions. In particular, the 
court seemed to approve of the Second Circuit’s opinion in Abrahamson 
                                                                                                                 
 320. Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006); see Judith Burns, Court 
Questions SEC Regulation for Hedge Funds, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 10, 2005), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB113418388100019212 [http://perma.cc/4HD3-CRD2] 
(discussing oral argument); Gregory Zuckerman, Hedge-Fund Hero? Maverick Attacks 
SEC Restrictions, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 28, 2006), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1138410 
92073358903 [http://perma.cc/47DD-KDEN]. About 800 hedge-fund advisers 
eventually registered with the SEC. See 800 Fund Advisers Register, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
2, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/02/business/02hedge.html?_r=0 [http://per 
ma.cc/L6CN-K95V]. Some advisers reportedly changed lock-up provisions of the funds 
they managed so that the managers would not have to register as advisers. See Gregory 
Zuckerman & Ian McDonald, Hedge Funds Avoid SEC Registration Rule, WALL ST. J. 
(Nov. 10, 2005), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB113158878465793171 [http://perma.c 
c/3N’BQ-NBU8]; Kara Scannell, Hundreds of Hedge-Fund Advisers Register with 
SEC, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 28, 2006), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB11384104385265889 
2 [http://perma.cc/XEG5-UAJF] (suggesting that advisers to one-quarter of hedge funds 
will avoid registration with two-year lockups); Roye Cautions Investors About 
Extension of Redemption Periods, 37 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 306 (2005). On December 8, 
2005, the SEC’s Division of Investment Management gave the Subcommittee on 
Private Investment Entities of the ABA’s Section of Business Law extensive advice on 
the two-year redemption period exclusion from registration. See ABA Subcomm. on 
Priv. Inv. Entities, SEC No-Action Letter (Dec. 8, 2005), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/ 
investment/noaction/aba120805.htm [http://perma.cc/JC7N-BFVS]. 
 321. Goldstein, 451 F.3d 873. 
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v. Fleschner,322 which held that limited partners in a hedge fund may 
challenge the fund’s adviser for fraud under Section 206 of the Advisers 
Act. 
The SEC seemed somewhat more willing to accommodate itself to 
judicial restriction of hedge fund regulation than it was with respect to 
the D.C. Circuit’s rejection of the independent director rules for mutual 
funds, discussed above.323 At the end of 2006, however, the Commission 
unanimously proposed explicitly to prohibit advisers of pooled 
investment vehicles—including hedge funds—from misleading or 
defrauding investors and prospective investors, and to make it more 
difficult for investors to qualify to invest in such vehicles.324 
With respect to fraud, the Commission explained that Goldstein 
created uncertainty with respect to whether Sections 206(1) and (2) of 
the Advisers Act apply to the advisers of investment pools. Accordingly, 
the Commission proposed to use its rulemaking power under Section 
206(4) of the Act to adopt Rule 206(4)-8, which would apply to advisers 
not required to register under the Advisers Act. In 2007, the 
Commission adopted Rule 206(4)-8 as proposed.325 
When the Commission proposed Rule 206(4)-8, it also proposed to 
restrict investor access to hedge funds by creating a sub-category of 
“accredited investor” for purposes of Regulation D under the Securities 
Act,326 to be called “accredited natural persons,” made up of investors 
owning at least $2,500,000 of certain types of investments. Under the 
                                                                                                                 
 322. Abrahamson v. Fletcher, 568 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1977). 
 323. Thus, for example, the Commission’s Chairman joined the conclusion of the 
President’s Working Group on Financial Markets in concluding that new direct 
regulation of hedge funds is unnecessary. See Rachel McTague, U.S. Regulators Agree 
on Key Principles to Improve Oversight of Hedge Fund Industry, 39 SEC. REG. & L. 
REP. 281 (2007). In December 2006, the incoming Democratic Chairman of the House 
Financial Services Committee stated that he would not reintroduce legislation to reverse 
the result of Goldstein. See SOX, Hedge Fund, Options Hearings in Frank’s Sights for 
House Panel Next Year, 38 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 2048 (2006). 
 324. See Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles, 
Sec. Act Release No. 8766 (Dec. 27, 2006). 
 325. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-8 (2007). See Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to 
Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2628, Fed. 
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), 72 Fed. Reg. 44756 (Aug. 3, 2007) (effective Sept. 10, 2007). In 
SEC v. Rabinovich & Assocs., No. 07 Civ. 10547(GEL), 2008 WL 4937360 (S.D.N.Y. 
Nov. 18, 2008), the SEC obtained a permanent injunction in a Rule 206(4)-8 
enforcement proceeding involving boiler-room sales of investment partnership interests. 
 326. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2015). 
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rules proposed by the Commission, issuers of securities that would be 
investment companies except for Section 3(c)(1) of the Investment 
Company Act would be limited to such investors in Regulation D 
offerings. The Commission subsequently determined to propose more 
extensive amendments and accordingly deferred consideration of the 
proposed change to the definition of “accredited investor.”327 
The Dodd-Frank Act addressed the definition of accredited investor 
for purposes of the Securities Act by directing the SEC to adjust the net 
worth threshold to exclude the primary residence of the investor, and to 
review the standard periodically. At the end of 2011, the SEC revised its 
rules to exclude the positive equity that a natural person has in his or her 
primary residence when determining whether the investor holds 
sufficient assets to be an accredited investor.328 
Although hedge funds and other private investment entities were 
not generally held responsible for the financial crisis that began in 2007, 
they were subjected to regulation in the Dodd-Frank Act, which undid 
much of what hedge fund managers had previously accomplished in the 
D.C. Circuit.329 
                                                                                                                 
 327. See Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles, 
72 Fed. Reg. 44756. 
 328. See Dodd-Frank Act § 413(a); see also Net Worth Standard for Accredited 
Investors, Securities Act Release No. 9287, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) (Dec. 21, 2011) 
(amending Securities Act Rules 215 & 501, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.215, 230.501); Net Worth 
Standard for Accredited Investors, Securities Act Release No. 9177, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) (Jan. 15, 2011) (proposing amendment to definition of accredited investor). 
 329. Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act, entitled “Regulation of Advisers to Hedge 
Funds and Others,” is given the short title of the Private Fund Investment Advisers 
Registration Act of 2010. See Dodd-Frank Act § 401; S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 
10938109: 
Title IV requires advisers to large hedge funds to register with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, in order to close a significant 
gap in financial regulation. Because hedge funds are currently 
unregulated, no precise data regarding the size and scope of hedge 
fund activities are available, but the common estimate is that the 
funds had at least $2 trillion in capital before the crisis. Their impact 
on the financial system can be magnified by extensive use of 
leverage—their trades can move markets. While hedge funds are 
generally not thought to have caused the current financial crisis, 
information regarding their size, strategies, and positions could be 
crucial to regulatory attempts to deal with a future crisis. The case of 
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The Dodd-Frank Act removed the provision of the Advisers Act 
that had previously exempted from registration advisers with fewer than 
fifteen clients who did not hold themselves out to the public as 
investment advisers,330 which consequently subjected many hedge fund 
managers to the registration requirement. The burden was ameliorated 
for some advisers by a new exemption from registration for advisers 
who advised solely venture capital funds, and by a provision directing 
the SEC to provide an exemption from registration for any adviser 
advising solely private funds that has assets under management in the 
United States of less than $150 million (although the SEC may require 
such advisers to maintain records and make reports).331 
The Dodd-Frank Act also increased the burden on registered 
advisers. Registered investment advisers are required to maintain a 
variety of records, subject to SEC inspection.332 The SEC was also given 
authority to regulate client assets over which a registered adviser has 
custody,333 and the Comptroller General was directed to study the cost 
associated with custody regulation.334 
In November 2010, the SEC proposed rules to implement and 
supplement the Dodd-Frank Act’s repeal of the private adviser 
exemption.335 At the same time, the Commission proposed limited 
exemptions for advisers to certain types of funds, as required by the 
Dodd-Frank Act, as well as requirements that advisers to private funds 
provide information to the SEC. Thus it proposed rules implementing 
the Dodd-Frank Act’s exemption from Investment Advisers Act 
registration for advisers to venture capital funds and advisers managing 
                                                                                                                 
Long-Term Capital Management, a hedge fund that was rescued 
through Federal Reserve intervention in 1998 because of concerns 
that it was ‘too-interconnected-to-fail,’ shows that the activities of 
even a single hedge fund may have systemic consequences. Hedge 
fund registration was part of the Treasury’s Department’s regulatory 
reform proposal, and has been endorsed by many witnesses before 
the Committee . . . . 
 330. See Dodd-Frank Act § 403. 
 331. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(l) to (m). 
 332. See id. § 80b-4. 
 333. See Dodd-Frank Act § 411. 
 334. Id. § 412. 
 335. Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3110, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) (Nov. 19, 2010). 
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less than $150 million in private fund assets.336 The Commission 
adopted rule revisions in June 2011.337 
As amended by the Dodd-Frank Act, Section 203(l)338 of the 
Advisers Act provides that an adviser that advises only venture capital 
funds is exempt from registration under the Act. Section 203(l) directed 
the SEC to define the term “venture capital fund” for purposes of the 
exemption, and Advisers Act Rule 203(l)-1(a) does so.339 Broadly 
speaking, a venture capital fund is a private fund340 that holds primarily 
qualifying assets of qualifying portfolio companies, does not incur 
leverage except for limited defined purposes, does not offer investors 
redemption or similar liquidity rights, represents itself to investors as 
pursuing a venture capital strategy and has not elected to be treated as a 
business development company.341 
                                                                                                                 
 336. See Exemptions for Advisers to Venture Capital Funds, Investment Advisors 
Act Release No. 3111, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) (Nov. 19, 2010). 
 337. See Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 
Inv. Advisers Act Release Inv. No. 3221, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) (June 22, 2011); 
Exemptions for Advisers to Venture Capital Funds, Investment Advisers Act Release 
No. 3222, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) (June 22, 2011). 
 338. Investment Advisers Act § 203(l). 
 339. Id. § 203(l)-1(a).l)-1. 
 340. See id. § 202(a)(29) (defining a private fund as a fund that would be an 
investment company but for Sections 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company 
Act). 
 341. Advisers who act as investment advisers solely to venture capital funds are also 
exempt from registration, although they will be subject to SEC record-keeping and 
reporting requirements. See id. § 203(b)(l), as amended by Dodd-Frank Act § 407. 
Section 407 of Dodd-Frank added Section 203(l) to the Advisers Act, which exempts 
from registration investment advisers advising a statutorily uncapped number of 
“venture capital funds.” Congress left to the SEC the responsibility for defining venture 
capital funds, and directed the SEC to act within a year. It also delegated authority to 
the SEC to require reporting by exempt venture capital fund advisers. As required by 
Section 407, the SEC proposed Advisers Act Rule 203(l)-1 as part of a release 
addressing rules to implement statutory exemptions for advisers to venture capital 
funds, advisers to private funds under $150 million and foreign private advisers. See 
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3111, 99 SEC Docket 3370, 2010 WL 4686054 
(Nov. 19, 2010) (the “Proposing Release”). The adopting release is Investment 
Advisers Act Release No. 3222, 101 SEC Docket 1649, 2011 WL 2482894 (Jun. 22, 
2011) (the “Adopting Release”). The Proposing Release had a prospective feature and a 
retrospective feature. Looking forward, the Proposing Release would exempt advisers 
to venture capital funds formed after December 31, 2011 that satisfy the criteria 
established in the regulatory definition. Looking back, self-identified venture capital 
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At the same time that it eliminated the exemption for advisers to 
private funds, the Dodd-Frank Act added Section 203(m) to the 
Advisers Act, which directed the SEC to provide an exemption from 
registration for private fund advisers with less than $150 million of 
assets under management.342 Advisers Act Rule 203(m)-1343 exempts 
from registration under the Advisers Act any investment adviser whose 
principal office and place of business is in the United States that acts 
solely as an investment adviser to qualifying private funds and manages 
private fund assets of less than $150 million.344 An adviser with its 
                                                                                                                 
funds, formed prior to that date, would be grandfathered. In response to comments 
urging flexibility in structuring portfolio investments, the SEC slightly modified the 
approach taken in the Proposing Release in order to permit greater discretion for 
advisers to “venture capital funds” to include some investments, up to twenty percent in 
value, that are not “qualifying investments.” Otherwise, Rule 203(l)-1 offered little 
flexibility to straight venture equity investing, for the most part limiting eligibility to 
equity-only portfolio investments. As a consequence, advisers to funds committing to 
later-round venture investing will have to register (or be otherwise exempt) if, as a 
matter of policy, they desire to allocate risk by engineering a fund’s or its portfolio 
companies’ capital structure. Advisers who act as investment advisers solely to venture 
capital funds are also exempt from registration, although they will be subject to SEC 
record-keeping and reporting requirements. 
  Further, portfolio companies must satisfy their own regulatory definition. Rule 
203(l)-1 requires at least eighty percent of a venture fund’s capital contributions, 
including uncommitted capital, to be invested in a qualifying investment issued by a 
“qualifying portfolio company.” See Investment Advisers Act Rule 203(l)-1(c)(4). For 
purposes of satisfying the regulatory definition, a “qualifying investment” must be a 
directly issued-and-purchased equity security and a “qualifying portfolio company” 
cannot be “foreign traded” or in a control relationship with a company that is, nor can it 
issue debt any of the proceeds of which are distributed to the fund’s investors. In 
addition, a qualified portfolio company cannot be an investment company, a private 
fund, a money-market fund or a commodity pool. Existing venture capital funds have a 
broad, but not carte-blanche, exemption. Exempt venture capital funds still are subject 
to the reporting obligations imposed by Dodd-Frank. In a trap for the unwary, in 
contrast to the foreign private-adviser exemption, advisers to U.S. venture capital funds 
lose the exemption if they advise foreign funds that would not be exempt, if domestic, 
under the qualification provisions of Rule 203(l)1. 
 342. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(m). 
 343. 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(m)-1; see also German Financial Services Firm 
Subsidiary Need Not Register Under IAA, Staff Confirms, 44 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1132 
(Jun. 4, 2012). 
 344. The Dodd-Frank Act directed the SEC to provide a registration exemption for 
any adviser that acts solely as an adviser to private funds and has assets under 
management in the United States of less than $150 million, although they will also be 
subject to SEC record-keeping and reporting requirements. See Investment Advisers 
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principal office and place of business outside the United States is 
exempt from registration if it has no client in the United States except 
for qualifying private funds, and its assets managed at a place of 
business in the United States are solely attributable to private fund assets 
which have a total value of less than $150 million.345 
At the same time the Commission adopted the venture capital and 
private fund advisers exemptions from registration, it adopted Advisers 
Act Rule 204-4346 requiring the exempted advisers to file informational 
                                                                                                                 
Act § 203(b)(m), as amended by Dodd-Frank Act § 408. The Dodd-Frank Act gave 
family offices even more generous treatment, excluding them from the definition of 
investment adviser rather than merely exempting them from registration, see Investment 
Advisers Act § 202(a)(11)(G), as amended by Dodd-Frank Act § 409, although some 
family offices are brought back within the antifraud provisions of the Advisers Act, see 
Dodd-Frank Act § 409(c). When the SEC proposed rules to define the term “family 
offices” for purposes of the exclusion, it discussed its history of regulation of family 
offices and family-run offices and explained that it attempted to define the term in a 
manner consistent with its previous administrative policy toward exemption. See 
Family Offices, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3098, 99 SEC Docket 2015, 2010 
WL 3994796 (Oct. 12, 2010); see also Family Offices, Investment Advisers Act 
Release No. 3220, 101 SEC Docket 1449, 2011 WL 2482889 (Jun. 22, 2011) (adopting 
Investment Advisers Act Rule 202(a)(11)(G)-1, 17 C.F.R. § 275.202(a)(11)(G)-1, 
defining “family offices”); see also SEC Division of Investment Management, 
Guidance Update No. 2014-13, Key Employee Trusts Under the Family Office Rule 
(Dec. 2014), http://www.sec.gov/investment/im-guidance-2014-13.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
HP6D-P3FP]. 
 345. Foreign private advisers are exempt from registration if they have no place of 
business in the United States, fewer than 15 clients in the United States in advised 
private funds, and aggregate assets attributable to United States investors of less than 
$25 million or such higher amount as the SEC provides by rule, and do not hold 
themselves out to the public in the United States as investment advisers and do not act 
as investment adviser to a registered investment company or a business development 
company. See Investment Advisers Act § 202(a)(30), as amended by Dodd-Frank Act § 
402 (defining “foreign private adviser”); Investment Advisers Act § 203(b)(3), as 
amended by Dodd-Frank Act § 403 (providing exemption from registration for foreign 
private adviser); see also Investment Advisers Act § 202(a)(29), as amended by Dodd-
Frank Act § 402 (defining “private fund” to mean any issuer that would be an 
investment company but for the exclusions of Section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of the 
Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-3(c)(1), 80a-3(c)(7)); BINES & THEL, supra 
note 7, § at2.06[D][3]. 
 346. Investment Advisers Act Rule 204-4, 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-4; see also 
Investment Advisers Act Rule 204-1, 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-1 (updating amendments to 
Form ADV). 
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reports with the SEC on Form ADV. The Commission amended Form 
ADV to require disclosure, among other things, of information about 
advised funds and the adviser’s affiliates. Most of the information on 
these reports is available to the public. 
In 2012, the JOBS Act was enacted.347 The JOBS Act was intended 
to reduce the regulatory burden on businesses seeking capital, and made 
substantial changes to the registration process for public sales of 
securities, among other things. One change of potentially substantial 
significance for hedge funds and other investment managers is the 
change the statute required for offerings under SEC Rule 506 of 
Regulation D,348 which permits an issuer to sell securities to accredited 
investors without requiring extensive disclosure. Until enactment of the 
JOBS Act, the most burdensome limitation of Rule 506 was the 
prohibition of general solicitation,349 which the SEC has interpreted to 
require that the issuer communicate only with potential investors with 
which it or its broker-dealer intermediaries had a preexisting 
relationship. The JOBS Act required the SEC to eliminate the 
prohibition of general solicitations for Rule 506 offerings.350 In July 
2013, the SEC amended Rule 506 to eliminate the prohibition against 
general solicitation and general advertising in some Rule 506 
offerings.351 General solicitation is not prohibited in a Rule 506 offering 
so long as all purchasers are accredited investors and the issuer takes 
reasonable steps to assure that all purchasers are accredited investors.352 
The SEC also amended Form D to require that issuers relying on this 
provision so state. At the same time, the Commission proposed further 
amendments to Regulation D and Form D, which would have required 
issuers to file a Form D before engaging in a general solicitation, and to 
file general solicitation materials with the Commission, and would have 
disqualified issuers from relying on Rule 506 if they did not comply 
                                                                                                                 
 347. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106. 126 Stat. 
306 (Apr. 5, 2012) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 348. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506. 
 349. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c). 
 350. See JOBS Act § 201(a)(1), 126 Stat. at 313-15. 
 351. See Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General 
Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 
9415, 2013 WL 3817300 (Jul. 10, 2013). 
 352. See, e.g., SIFMA Offers Firms Guidance for Verifying ‘Accredited Investor’ 
Status, 46 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1264 (2014). 
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with the Form D filing requirements.353 These proposals generated 
substantial criticism and controversy, and in September 2013 the 
Commission extended the comment period.354 
CONCLUSION 
The three principles that govern investment management law—the 
duty of care, the duty of loyalty, and the public duty—remain the 
common conduct postulates underlying investment management law. In 
the fullness of time, however, the means for promoting and measuring 
fiduciary conduct have changed remarkably. Whereas the particulars of 
enforcement of fiduciary conduct and remedying breaches were once 
mainly the product of common-law developments and scholarly 
commentary, statutory controls and regulatory oversight in separately 
defined spheres of activity now dominate. Compliance seems both to 
govern the boundaries of investment responsibility for investment 
fiduciaries, and to protect against after-the-fact challenges. To be sure, 
professionally indefensible investment management and classic self-
dealing will likely transgress both statutory and regulatory requirements, 
on the one hand, and common-law precedent, on the other. Yet, 
satisfaction of legislative and administrative requirements, coupled with 
defined contractual undertakings, are so much the focus of attention that 
often it is lost how dependent statutory and regulatory requirements are 
on the common-law history. The review we engaged in above will, we 
hope, promote broader recognition that planning and structuring legal 
responsibilities and risks associated with new or evolving investment 
management practices depends on engineering that crosses jurisdictional 
lines. 
                                                                                                                 
 353. See Amendments to Regulation D, Form D, and Rule 156, Securities Act of 
1933 Release No. 9416, 2013 WL 4413723 (Jul. 10, 2013); see also Disqualification of 
Felons and Other “Bad Actors” from Rule 506 Offerings, Securities Act of 1933 
Release No. 9414, 2013 WL 3817311 (Jul. 10, 2013). 
 354. See Re-opening of Comment Period for Amendments to Regulation D, Form 
D, and Rule 156, Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 9458 (Sept. 27, 2013). 
